That this House notes the accusations, in the Observer on 15th May, by Dr. Rod Barton, an Australian intelligence officer, formerly a member of the CIA-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG), that Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Director-General John Scarlett, whilst still chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, tried to influence the content of the independent verification research evaluation of Iraq's alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction programme by e-mailing the head of the ISG in March 2004 proposing the insertion into the report of nine 'nuggets' of WMD-related information based on British intelligence information rather than information or discoveries originating from the ISG's investigations; believes such a report can only carry credibility if it retains its independence, and thus any such attempted `sexing-up' of the report would be damaging to the entire Iraq inspection process; and calls upon the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to make a public statement on any involvement by John Scarlett in the drafting of the ISG report.

That this House notes the accusations, in the Observer on 15th May, by Dr. Rod Barton, an Australian intelligence officer, formerly a member of the CIA-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG), that Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Director-General John Scarlett, whilst still chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, tried to influence the...

That this House notes that in response to concerns raised by honourable Members about the validity of the case made for war, the Prime Minister referred to House to the findings of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), for example stating on 21st January that it was the job of the Iraq Survey Group to find out what has happened, which it will do; notes that the ISG makes it clear that it found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium abroad after the first Gulf War in 1991, stating that it has uncovered no information to support allegations of Iraqi pursuit of uranium from abroad in the post-Operation Desert Storm era; further notes that the ISG report goes on to state it it had found only one offer of uranium to Baghdad since 1991, an approach which Iraq appeared to have turned down; further notes that the Government has provided no evidence to rebut this finding but is now relying on the conclusion of the Government appointed Butler Committee; but notes that Lord Butler's conclusions on the uranium claim only refer to the credibility of UK and US assertions made prior to 7th March 2003, the date the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed forged intelligence documents; and therefore calls on the Government to provide new evidence to counter the Iraq Survey Group findings or withdraw their isolated claim that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa.

That this House notes that in response to concerns raised by honourable Members about the validity of the case made for war, the Prime Minister referred to House to the findings of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), for example stating on 21st January that it was the job of the...

That this House notes that on 4th June 2003, Official Report, column 161, the Prime Minister stated, in respect of those expressing doubt over his certainty that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, that when a series of allegations are made, all described by the Prime Minister as untrue, that it was important, if people had evidence to justify such allegations, that that evidence be given; further notes that he stated that he had no doubt that the Iraq Survey Group would find the clearest possible evidence of weapons of mass destruction; further notes that the Iraq Survey Group has delivered its final report and has found no weapons of mass destruction; and therefore calls upon the Prime Minister to follow his own prescription and provide the House with the evidence upon which he based his allegations regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

That this House notes that on 4th June 2003, Official Report, column 161, the Prime Minister stated, in respect of those expressing doubt over his certainty that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, that when a series of allegations are made, all described by the Prime Minister as untrue, that...

That this House notes that the outgoing Head of the Iraq Survey Group, Dr David Kay, told the New York Times in an interview published on 26th January that his team had uncovered no evidence that Niger had tried to sell uranium to Iraq for its nuclear weapons programme and that the original reports on Niger have been found to be based on forged documents, and that the Bush administration has since backed away from its initial assertions; contrasts this with the reply by the Prime Minister to the honourable Member for Blaenau Gwent on 28th October 2003 in which he said that the United Kingdom ensured that the International Atomic Energy Agency was made aware of the contents of non-UK-owned intelligence on apparent Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Niger, and shared all relevant UK-owned material with the IAEA and United Nations Monitoring Vertification and Inspection Commission on these alleged uranium procurement activities; and calls upon the Government to explain, and publish, the exact source of its beliefs that Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger for its nuclear weapons programme.

That this House notes that the outgoing Head of the Iraq Survey Group, Dr David Kay, told the New York Times in an interview published on 26th January that his team had uncovered no evidence that Niger had tried to sell uranium to Iraq for its nuclear weapons programme and...

That this House expresses concern that according to its most recent quarterly report, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which conducted weapons inspections in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, is not being permitted to verify WMD-related claims made by the US Iraq Survey Group (ISG) weapons inspectors now operating in Iraq; notes that in October 2003, Mr David Kay testified before the US Congress that the ISG had not found evidence of Iraqi WMD stockpiles, nor had it found evidence of actual biological weapons production or active chemical and nuclear weapons programmes; further notes that Mr Kay did testify that the ISG had found dozens of WMD-related programme activities and significant amounts of equipment that had been concealed from UNMOVIC inspectors, but that despite these claims UNMOVIC has so far received no information on ISG activities other than Mr Kay's publicly available testimony before Congress; questions the reasons for withholding access from UNMOVIC to the full ICG progress report and the findings, documents, interviews and materials supporting and underlying the report; and calls on the UK Government to press for this material to be released to UNMOVIC immediately.

That this House expresses concern that according to its most recent quarterly report, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which conducted weapons inspections in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, is not being permitted to verify WMD-related claims made by the US Iraq Survey Group (ISG) weapons inspectors...