We take all allegations of breaches of sanctions or export controls seriously, and my officials are leading a review of the allegations made in recent press articles that UK universities are collaborating with Iran to develop drones and other technologies which may be linked to Iran’s military programmes.

They are working at pace with others in the Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) to establish the facts and assess if any export controls (Military, Dual-Use, UK National) or relevant sanctions regulations may have been contravened.

In parallel, the Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT) - which advises research institutions on national security risks linked to international collaboration - is establishing what due diligence was carried out by the institutions identified to date.

The outcome of this review will determine what further action may be needed. If there has been a potential breach of the sanctions or export controls, HMRC and/or Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) will consider appropriate enforcement action.

The Government takes all credible allegations of breaches of sanctions and export controls seriously, and the enforcement agencies will take further action if appropriate. The UK has a number of sanctions in place against Iran including against Iranian UAV manufacturers and related military individuals and executives.

Officials in my department have been leading a review of the allegations made in the recent press articles. They are working at pace with others in the Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) to establish the facts and assess if any export controls (Military, Dual-Use, UK National) or relevant sanctions regulations may have been contravened.

The outcome of this review will determine what further action may be needed. If there has been a potential breach of the sanctions or export controls, HMRC and/or OFSI will consider appropriate enforcement action.

The Government take all allegations of breaches of export controls or sanctions seriously, and officials in my department have been leading a review of the allegations made in the recent press articles. They are working at pace with others in the Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) to establish the facts and assess if any export controls (Military, Dual-Use, UK National) or relevant sanctions regulations may have been contravened.

The outcome of this review will determine what further action may be needed. If there has been a potential breach of the sanctions or export controls, HMRC and/or OFSI will consider appropriate enforcement action.

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. What we have seen from the Iranian regime, sadly, is that overlap of crime, state threats and the use of terrorism to threaten the British people and our allies around the world. This Government will absolutely not allow those to flourish, and will stand extremely firmly against any such threats in this country.

Iran's nuclear programme has never been more advanced than it is today. In November 2022 Iran announced it would take further steps to expand its nuclear programme, including increasing its production of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) at its underground facility at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. This step, which further advances its programme, and carries significant proliferation-related risks, has no credible civilian justification.

Iran's continued escalation of its nuclear activities is threatening international peace and security and undermining the global non-proliferation system. We are considering next steps with our international partners.

Iran's nuclear programme has never been more advanced than it is today. In November 2022 Iran announced it would take further steps to expand its nuclear programme, including increasing its production of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) at its underground facility at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. This step, which further advances its programme, and carries significant proliferation-related risks, has no credible civilian justification.

Iran's continued escalation of its nuclear activities is threatening international peace and security and undermining the global non-proliferation system. We are considering next steps with our international partners.

We have real concerns about the instability that Iran causes in the region. Its nuclear programme is today more advanced than ever. There is an offer on the table and Iran should take it urgently—time is running out and there will not be a better one. If this deal is not struck, and soon, the joint comprehensive plan of action will collapse. In that scenario, we will have to consider carefully the options with partners and allies.

The Foreign Secretary has been clear that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. Our immediate priority is working with Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) participants to return the US to the deal, bring Iran back into compliance with its commitments and restore the benefits of the deal for all. The Government has also long been clear about its concerns over Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continued destabilising activity.

We regularly discuss regional issues with the Governments of Israel, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain including their policy towards Iran, and continue to support the security of our allies. The Foreign Secretary was in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories over 25-26 May for talks with Ministers following the Israel-Gaza ceasefire, including on regional security. I [Mr Cleverly] discussed regional security with HE Khalifa Shaheen al Marar, Minister of State with responsibility for Arab Affairs at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 March.

The UN conventional arms embargo prohibits the sale of military items to Iran. It does not cover dual-use items. All dual-use items for export to Iran are subject to export controls and licences are only granted where this is consistent with the Consolidated EU and UK Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The export of certain dual-use items relating to nuclear and missile technology is also prohibited subject to licensing under UN sanctions.

The UK has been clear that the scheduled expiry of the UN conventional arms embargo in October 2020 would still have major implications for regional security and stability. The UK Government continue to engage regional partners, the US, and others, to find a solution to Iranian proliferation in the region, whilst upholding the authority and integrity of the UN Security Council. We will also continue to enforce sanctions regimes, including those under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1701, and 2216 which prohibit the proliferation of weapons to Lebanese Hizballah and the Houthis in Yemen. The UK encourages all states to implement national export control best practice in support of these regimes. The EU arms embargo and UN ballistic missile restrictions on Iran will also remain in place until at least 2023.

My right hon. Friend is right to point out not only the systematic Iranian non-compliance on the nuclear front, but its wider destabilising activities in the region and its use of covert cyber-attacks against western interests. The reality is that we want to hold Iran to account every time it steps beyond the international pale, but we also want to leave the door ajar for it to take the confidence-building steps—when the regime in Tehran makes that decision, as only it can—to come in from the international cold.

We were given clear assurances that the oil and the tanker would not, in breach of sanctions, reach Syria and we expect those undertakings to be complied with. We want Iran to come in from the cold; the only way it can do that is by respecting the international rule of law, whether on freedom of navigation, the nuclear deal or indeed the treatment of our dual nationals.

My right hon. Friend speaks very wisely on this. The truth is that the only real solution to this problem is for Iran to stop its destabilising activities in Yemen, which has seen missiles being fired into airports in Saudi Arabia; in Lebanon, which is seeing Hezbollah activity and attacks happening on Israel; and in Iraq and in Syria. That is the long-term solution.

My right hon. Friend is right, and of course the short answer is that we keep on going, because the consequences of a confrontation leading to a conflict in the middle east involving Iran and others would be catastrophic. We will continue with our efforts. We have sanctions against elements in Iran. There are the economic sanctions employed by the United States and others, but we have to keep looking for a way in which we end the risk of a serious confrontation in the middle east. It is not to be encouraged by harsh rhetoric on either side, and I think that the United Kingdom’s diplomatic efforts to try to bring some resolution in the area are the best thing that we can do.

My right hon. Friend is completely right to raise the disgraceful behaviour of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the missiles that are fired from Syria at Israel and elsewhere. The JCPOA was not designed to constrain that activity; it was specifically designed to stop Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon and it has succeeded in that effort so far. That is why we propose to keep the core of that deal alive, but to work with our friends and partners to constrain the malign activity that my right hon. Friend describes.

My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I would simply remind the House of the virtues of our approach, which is on the one hand to be extremely tough with the Iranians on what they are doing wrong—as I say, they remain a highly disruptive and destabilising force—but on the other hand to do what we can not just to confront them, but to engage with the forces of reform in Iran, which do exist, need encouragement and could be imperilled. That has to be the way forward, and it is one of the reasons why we believe—I know that this sentiment is shared by many in this House—that the joint comprehensive plan of action, the Iran nuclear deal, is valid, represents a considerable diplomatic achievement and should be safeguarded.