As outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review and accompanying Command paper, the Government is investing in a number of seabed warfare capabilities. This includes the Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) programme, Mine Hunting Capability (MHC) and Deep-Water Military Data Gathering will enhance our ability to detect, understand, attribute and act against those who pose a threat to our interests and allow us to maintain maritime situational awareness.

These investments in underwater warfare capabilities will support the protection of our critical national infrastructure, the safeguarding of maritime trade and maintenance of our underwater advantage, increasing our ability to protect and assure underwater critical national infrastructure and to detect threats in the North Atlantic.

As outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review and accompanying Defence Command paper, Defence places great importance on underwater capabilities to protect and assure our critical national infrastructure, safeguard maritime trade and maintain our underwater advantage. The paper also sets out Defence's approach to seabed warfare, including investment in a suite of capabilities including the Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) programme, Mine Hunting Capability (MHC) and Deep-Water Military Data Gathering.

I refer the right hon. Member to answer I gave him to Question 188667 on 19 June 2023.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not the lead Department for resilience of undersea cables in the UK Marine Area; that responsibility sits with the Department for Science and Technology. Defence has therefore not conducted dedicated exercises related to the protection of such infrastructure over the time period in question.

Defence does, however, frequently rehearse the capabilities which would be called upon in response to a threat to our subsea infrastructure. MOD has underwater capabilities able to be employed to monitor and assure subsea infrastructure, and has invested in a Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) programme to enhance these capabilities further. These allow us to maintain maritime situational awareness, improve our ability to detect threats in the North Atlantic, and as a sovereign nation allow us to contribute to the defence and deterrence of the Euro Atlantic area.

We continue to invest in strong working relationships with neighbouring states and alliance partners within NATO, to enhance our ability to respond to threats in this domain. We are committed to prepare for, deter and defend against threats to our subsea infrastructure.

The Government takes the security and resilience of all at-sea infrastructure, including undersea cables and critical, very seriously. The Ministry of Defence continually reviews its capabilities to ensure we can respond to the latest threats.

The Multi Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) programme envisioned the procurement of two ships to boost the UKs capability in the Underwater Battlespace. The first of these was purchased from the commercial spot market this year and is undergoing a period of militarisation ahead of being generated for operations and service in the RFA. The second MROS ship is part of a larger programme to update the Royal Navy's military data gathering capability. The requirements for the ship are being developed but the programme is in the pre-concept phase and no decisions regarding its capability have been taken.

The Government takes the security and resilience of all at-sea infrastructure, including undersea cables, very seriously. The Department for Science Innovation and Technology (DSIT) is the lead department for the security and resilience of telecommunications subsea cables and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) is the lead department for subsea energy cables. Detailing our assessments as to threats and our ability to protect undersea cables would be likely to prejudice the purpose of safeguarding their security and consequently national security. Subsea internet cables are specifically considered in the National Risk Assessment which is kept under review.

The Ministry of Defence constantly monitors activity within UK waters and its Economic Exclusion Zone to counter and deter detected threats. British warships frequently patrol throughout the UK marine area and are routed through the North Sea where possible, to deter and increase our visibility of potential threats.

The Government takes the security and resilience of undersea cables and pipelines very seriously. The Royal Navy deters state aggression by, for example, monitoring vessels that enter the UK Marine Area and where necessary shadowing vessels as they transit through our territorial waters. Defence has invested in a Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance programme to allow us to maintain maritime situational awareness and improve our ability to detect threats.

The Ministry of Defence fully recognises the risk from hostile surface and sub-surface activities to the UK's critical national infrastructure and focuses on the full range of threats and hazards.

The Royal Navy maintains and protects the UK via the provision of a permanent 24/7/365 maritime presence and preparedness to ensure the security of the UK Marine Area.

You will understand that for reasons of National Security, Defence will not be able disclose the sensitive intelligence information you have requested - the disclosure of such information would provide hostile actors with insight into UK capability and preparedness and would therefore be contrary to section 24 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

There have been no recorded instances of engines on Royal Navy ships cutting out due to rising sea temperatures to date.

The recent incident in the Shetlands was assessed to have been caused by fishing. Accidental breakage of subsea communications cables is not uncommon, particularly through trawling and other seabed-disturbing activities, and mechanisms to repair them are well tested.

Overall Governmental responsibility for subsea power and telecommunications cables lies with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, respectively.

Subsea internet cables are specifically considered in the National Risk Assessment which is kept under review. The UK Government, with the support of Defence, continuously reviews the broad range of national security threats including threats and hazards to subsea communication cables.

The recent incident in the Shetland Islands was assessed to have been caused by fishing. Accidental breakage of subsea communications cables is not uncommon, particularly through trawling and other seabed-disturbing activities, and mechanisms to repair them are well tested. Assistance to local authorities from the Ministry of Defence has not been requested.

Overall governmental responsibility for subsea power and telecommunications cables lies with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, respectively.

The damage to the Shetland undersea cable has not impacted radar or radio data transmission to or from Remote Radar Head Saxa Vord.

The Ministry of Defence fully recognises the risk from hostile underwater activities to our undersea cable networks, here in the UK and across the world.

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is the lead department for the energy sector, including subsea energy cables. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is the lead department for telecommunications policy, including the security and resilience of telecommunications subsea cables.

Accidental damage caused by fishing, particularly trawling and other seabed-disturbing activities remains the most likely risk to subsea cables. Indeed, as the recent incident in the Shetlands has shown, accidental breakage of communications cables is not unknown and mechanisms to repair them are well tested.

The Government regards subsea cables as critical to our national and international infrastructure and monitors a variety of risks they face and subsea internet cables are specifically considered in the UK's National Risk Assessment. Detailing security arrangements made to protect such cables from sabotage would be likely to prejudice the purpose of safeguarding their security, and with it national security.

I refer the right. hon Member to the answer I gave on Wednesday 26 October 2022 to Question 68486.

Detailing our assessments as to hostile involvement in the damaging of undersea cables would be likely to prejudice the purpose of safeguarding their security and consequently national security. Subsea internet cables are specifically considered in the National Risk Assessment which is kept under review.

The most likely cause of damage to subsea cables is by fishing, particularly trawling and other seabed-disturbing activities. The recent incident in the Shetlands has shown that accidental breakage of communications cables is not unknown and mechanisms to repair them are well tested.

Responsibility for subsea power and telecommunications cables lies with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, respectively.