Whether the Dayton Agreement imposes any control over the arms trade into and out of ex-Yugoslavia and Albania; and whether the recent agreement for Croatia to export $1 million-worth of weapons to Colombia enjoys the appropriate international approval. [HL2297].

Whether the Dayton Agreement imposes any control over the arms trade into and out of ex-Yugoslavia and Albania; and whether the recent agreement for Croatia to export $1 million-worth of weapons to Colombia enjoys the appropriate international approval. [HL2297].

Who is responsible for monitoring that the arming of Bosnian Muslim-Croat forces by a US mercenary firm complies with the arms control provisions of the Dayton Agreement.

Who is responsible for monitoring that the arming of Bosnian Muslim-Croat forces by a US mercenary firm complies with the arms control provisions of the Dayton Agreement.

What is the status under the Dayton Agreement of the weapons and training being provided by the United Arab Emirates to the Bosnia Muslim forces.

What is the status under the Dayton Agreement of the weapons and training being provided by the United Arab Emirates to the Bosnia Muslim forces.

What is the present state of affairs in Bosnia and the extent to which (a) the military, and (b) the political, aspirations enshrined in the Dayton Agreement, negotiated by Mr Richard Holbrooke, have been secured.

What is the present state of affairs in Bosnia and the extent to which (a) the military, and (b) the political, aspirations enshrined in the Dayton Agreement, negotiated by Mr Richard Holbrooke, have been secured.

Whether all the signatories to the Dayton Agreement and members of the UN Security Council are agreed that the billion dollar arming of one Dayton signatory is compatible with the "need" mentioned in the Agreement "to avoid an arms race in the region" (Annex 1-B, Article 1, Dayton Accords).

Whether all the signatories to the Dayton Agreement and members of the UN Security Council are agreed that the billion dollar arming of one Dayton signatory is compatible with the "need" mentioned in the Agreement "to avoid an arms race in the region" (Annex 1-B, Article 1, Dayton Accords).

What is to be included in the report from the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Implementation of Annex 1B on regional stabilisation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

What is to be included in the report from the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Implementation of Annex 1B on regional stabilisation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

What effect on the status of the Dayton agreements has the relationship referred to in paragraph 10 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 10.31 (1995), "between the fulfilment by the parties of their commitments in the Peace Agreement and the readiness of the international community to commit financial resources...

What effect on the status of the Dayton agreements has the relationship referred to in paragraph 10 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 10.31 (1995), "between the fulfilment by the parties of their commitments in the Peace Agreement and the readiness of the international community to commit financial resources...

If Dayton Accords stipulated that if no agreement were reached on Sub-Regional Arms Control by a certain date, arrangements such as those for training and equipping Bosnians Muslim forces could go ahead, and what information Govt have concerning arrangements by others for training and equipping Bosnian Orthodox or Catholic forces.

If Dayton Accords stipulated that if no agreement were reached on Sub-Regional Arms Control by a certain date, arrangements such as those for training and equipping Bosnians Muslim forces could go ahead, and what information Govt have concerning arrangements by others for training and equipping Bosnian Orthodox or Catholic forces.

Whether there is to be any limit set on the arms that may be provided to any of the various recently warring parties in the former Yugoslavia by the United States, by other members of NATO, by Russia and other CIS states, or by members of the Council of Islamic...

Whether there is to be any limit set on the arms that may be provided to any of the various recently warring parties in the former Yugoslavia by the United States, by other members of NATO, by Russia and other CIS states, or by members of the Council of Islamic...

Whether OSCE rules concerning transparency, confidence-building, crisis prevention, etc., and any of the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement will apply to the arming of the states which are parties to the Dayton agreement, particularly, but not only, non-European states.

Whether OSCE rules concerning transparency, confidence-building, crisis prevention, etc., and any of the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement will apply to the arming of the states which are parties to the Dayton agreement, particularly, but not only, non-European states.

What changes have subsequently been made in Armistice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 between UN and North Korean Communist Command, and if Article 2Ac ('that both sides would cease to reinforce their troops, equipment, planes or other war supplies in Korea') has been rescinded.

What changes have subsequently been made in Armistice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 between UN and North Korean Communist Command, and if Article 2Ac ('that both sides would cease to reinforce their troops, equipment, planes or other war supplies in Korea') has been rescinded.

If statement issued from 10 Downing Street on 14 August 1953 still represents British policy towards Korean Armistice. - Statement was issued in relation to specific circumstances of August 1953 but general principles remain relevant today.

If statement issued from 10 Downing Street on 14 August 1953 still represents British policy towards Korean Armistice. - Statement was issued in relation to specific circumstances of August 1953 but general principles remain relevant today.

If UN was invited to accept terms of this joint statement and of Mutual Security Treaty, particularly as regards their implications for Article 4 of Armistice Agreement.

If UN was invited to accept terms of this joint statement and of Mutual Security Treaty, particularly as regards their implications for Article 4 of Armistice Agreement.

What assurances were given by UN Command to North Korea in July 1953 concerning safeguarding of Korean Armistice against disruption and if they are still valid.

What assurances were given by UN Command to North Korea in July 1953 concerning safeguarding of Korean Armistice against disruption and if they are still valid.

To what extent UN was committed by joint statement issued by Mr Dulles and President Rhee simultaneously with Armistice Text, concerning possible resumption of war in North Korea.

To what extent UN was committed by joint statement issued by Mr Dulles and President Rhee simultaneously with Armistice Text, concerning possible resumption of war in North Korea.

If Article 4 of Korean Armistice Agreement which recommended 'the convening of high level political conference within three months of the Armistice, to settle through negotiation the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea...' remains a valid expression of hopes of UN, or if these hopes and recommendations ceased with...

If Article 4 of Korean Armistice Agreement which recommended 'the convening of high level political conference within three months of the Armistice, to settle through negotiation the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea...' remains a valid expression of hopes of UN, or if these hopes and recommendations ceased with...

Whether HMG have asked the Russian Government if it interprets "Participation for Peace" agreements as involving association with a nuclear power or alliance, such as would preclude the activation of a Non-Proliferation Treaty-related security guarantee, as is implied in the New Russian Military Doctrine. - No.

Whether HMG have asked the Russian Government if it interprets "Participation for Peace" agreements as involving association with a nuclear power or alliance, such as would preclude the activation of a Non-Proliferation Treaty-related security guarantee, as is implied in the New Russian Military Doctrine. - No.

Whether HMG will spell out how they hope to develop peace & security in Middle East, if they agree with General Schwartzkopf that a permanent US military presence in Gulf will contribute to such peace & security & if so how they see such a "presence" being paid for.

Whether HMG will spell out how they hope to develop peace & security in Middle East, if they agree with General Schwartzkopf that a permanent US military presence in Gulf will contribute to such peace & security & if so how they see such a "presence" being paid for.

Whether it is HMG approval that US Commander of coalition forces in Gulf is making statements about future arrangements for ensuring "peace & security: in Middle East in advance of international agreement.

Whether it is HMG approval that US Commander of coalition forces in Gulf is making statements about future arrangements for ensuring "peace & security: in Middle East in advance of international agreement.