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Swayne, Desmond (8)
Answering member
Legislative stage
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To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will make a statement about the E5 fault code found on the FADEC of RAF Chinook ZD576 - Inc figs and ref to 21 February 2000, 344 c730W. (Holding answer 23 April 2001).
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will make a statement about the E5 fault code found on the FADEC of RAF Chinook ZD576 - Inc figs and ref to 21 February 2000, 344 c730W. (Holding answer 23 April 2001).
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answered by
Lord Spellar
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
9 April 2001
For answer on
30 April 2001
Answered on
30 April 2001
Mr. Swayne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the E5 fault code found on the FADEC of RAF
Chinook ZD576. [158185]
Mr. Spellar: [holding answer 23 April 2001]: The E5 fault code which was found in the memory of the DECU of RAF Chinook ZD576
indicated that a soft fault had occurred at some point over the life of the DECU since delivery. A "soft fault" cannot affect the
safe operation of the control system and is therefore one that has no impact on the normal control of the aircraft.
The rotational speed (N2) of each engine's Power Turbine Spool is detected by two sensors. The E5 code would be displayed either
because of a power interrupt (switching from the Auxiliary Power Unit to main generators, or the reverse) or if a discrepancy of 5
per cent. or more is detected between the two N2 signals. When such a discrepancy is detected the lower N2 signal is disregarded (or
locked out). If the other signal is then lost, the original locked-out signal will be re-acquired. Should both signals be lost, the
fuel to the engines will be maintained at the pre-failure rate.
The "E5" fault on the pre-production software that caused the Wilmington incident was significant as the system at that time
operated differently. The team undertaking the test at Wilmington did not appreciate the significance of the E5 signal, which was
displayed due to a discrepancy of 5 per cent. or more between the two N2 signals, causing the lowest signal to be latched. The team
then removed a connector which resulted in the loss of the only remaining N2 signal. With the one signal latched, and the loss of
the remaining N2 signal, unlike the system now, the pre-production software did not re-acquire the original locked-out signal.
Instead the DECU "saw" an N2 value of zero, and in order to restore the N2, the system provided more fuel to increase the speed of
the power turbine. This caused the rotors to accelerate which seriously damaged the aircraft.
After the Wilmington incident the software was amended hence a similar incident could not have caused the Mull of Kintyre accident.
Moreover, as I informed the hon. Member on 21 February 2000, Official Report, column 730W, the Air Accidents Investigation Board's
report of their technical investigation into the accident found no evidence of a technical malfunction that could have contributed
to the accident, with the possible exception of a radar altimeter system fault.
Subjects
Software; Accidents; Helicopters; Military aircraft; Chinook helicopters; Mull of Kintyre
Date
30 April 2001
Reference
158185; 367 c445W
House
House of Commons
1st supplementary on ensuring standards for criteria against which female soldiers are measured.
1st supplementary on ensuring standards for criteria against which female soldiers are measured.
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Oral questions - 1st Supplementary
Status
Answered
Answered on
23 April 2001
Subjects
Armed forces; Women; Standards; Training
Date
23 April 2001
Reference
367 c18
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps the Air Accident Investigation Branch took to verify independently information provided by Textron Lycoming during their investigation into the loss of RAF Chinook ZD576.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps the Air Accident Investigation Branch took to verify independently information provided by Textron Lycoming during their investigation into the loss of RAF Chinook ZD576.
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answered by
Lord Spellar
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
9 April 2001
For answer on
23 April 2001
Answered on
23 April 2001
Mr. Swayne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps the Air Accident Investigation Branch took to verify independently
information provided by Textron Lycoming during their investigation into the loss of RAF Chinook ZD576. [158184]
Mr. Spellar: The engines of RAF Chinook ZD576 and their fuel systems were examined externally in detail by the Air Accidents
Investigation Branch (AAIB) at Farnborough with the assistance of a representative from Textron Lycoming, together with
representatives from Chandler Evans Co. and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics Engineering. The engines were then strip examined at Textron
Lycoming's Stratford, Connecticut plant under the direction of the AAIB.
Subjects
Accidents; Chinook helicopters
Date
23 April 2001
Reference
158184; 367 c99-100W
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 19th March, Official Report, 365 c86W, on what evidence he based his statement that RAF Chinook ZD576's engines were working right up until impact.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his Answer of 19th March, Official Report, 365 c86W, on what evidence he based his statement that RAF Chinook ZD576's engines were working right up until impact.
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answered by
Lord Spellar
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
9 April 2001
For answer on
23 April 2001
Answered on
23 April 2001
Mr. Swayne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 19 March 2001, Official Report, column 86W, on what
evidence he based his statement that RAF Chinook ZD576's engines were working right up until impact. [158215]
Mr. Spellar: This statement was based on the report of the technical investigation carried out by the Air Accidents Investigation
Branch following the accident, which said: "The engines sustained generally moderate impact and fire damage. Strip examination
indicated that both were running at high speed with turbines hot at the time of impact, and revealed no signs of pre-impact failure
or malfunction that could have affected the operation of either engine."
Subjects
Accidents; Chinook helicopters
Date
23 April 2001
Reference
158215; 367 c99W
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What recent assessment he has made of the fighting capabilities of female soldiers.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What recent assessment he has made of the fighting capabilities of female soldiers.
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answered by
Geoffrey Hoon
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Oral questions - Lead
Status
Answered
Tabled on
2 April 2001
For answer on
23 April 2001
Answered on
23 April 2001
Subjects
Armed forces; Women; Standards; Training
Date
23 April 2001
Reference
367 c18; 156946
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What revisions have been made to Chinook MKII FADEC software since June 1994. (Failed OPQ).
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What revisions have been made to Chinook MKII FADEC software since June 1994. (Failed OPQ).
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answered by
Lord Spellar
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
5 March 2001
For answer on
19 March 2001
Answered on
19 March 2001
Mr. Swayne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what revisions have been made to Chinook MKII FADEC software since June 1994.
[152731]
Mr. Spellar: As I explained in my letter of 21 August 1999 to the hon. Member, the only revisions to the Chinook FADEC software
since 1994 were the nine software changes introduced as part of the block 1 upgrade later in that year. Two of these changes were
potentially the most significant. The first of these was the introduction of a discrete memory to store the position of the engine
condition lever (ECL) which was designed to prevent an engine shut down. The second was the fitting of a software filter to screen
the speed values of the engine compressor and power turbines, which was designed to prevent an engine run-up.
However, we know that an engine shut down or run up was not a factor in the Mull of Kintyre accident. Examination of the wreckage
showed that both engines were working normally right up until impact, and thus faulty FADEC could not have caused this accident.
Indeed, the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could
possibly have caused the crash.
Subjects
Software; Accidents; Safety; Chinook helicopters; Mull of Kintyre
Date
19 March 2001
Reference
365 c86W; 152731
House
House of Commons
Supplementary on whether any Royal Navy fleet submarines will be decommissioned earlier than planned.
Supplementary on whether any Royal Navy fleet submarines will be decommissioned earlier than planned.
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Oral questions - 1st Supplementary
Status
Answered
Answered on
12 February 2001
Subjects
Decommissioning; Submarines
Date
12 February 2001
Reference
363 c17
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
House
House of Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What planning capability the EU Rapid Reaction Force will have. (Failed OPQ)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, What planning capability the EU Rapid Reaction Force will have. (Failed OPQ)
Asked by
Desmond Swayne
(Conservative)
Answered by
Geoffrey Hoon
(Labour)
Answering body
Ministry of Defence
Type
Written questions
Status
Answered
Tabled on
18 December 2000
For answer on
15 January 2001
Answered on
15 January 2001
Mr. Swayne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what planning capability the EU Rapid Reaction Force will have. [143739]
Mr. Hoon: There is no standing EU Rapid Reaction Force. The EU has a small military staff which will support its ability to take
decisions with military implications.
The terms of reference of the EU Military Staff make quite clear that it is not responsible for operational planning. The Nice
documents also make clear that NATO will carry out operational planning for EU-led operations that have recourse to NATO assets and
capabilities. Operational planning for other operations may be carried out in existing European national and multinational
headquarters, such as our own Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).
Subjects
EU countries; Planning; EU defence policy; Rapid reaction forces
Date
15 January 2001
Reference
361 c37W; 143739
House
House of Commons