1-20 of 40 results for subject:Sanctions
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Motion that this House has considered Israel and Palestine. Agreed to on question.
Motion that this House has considered Israel and Palestine. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion that this House has considered the situation in Ukraine. Agreed to on question.
Motion that this House has considered the situation in Ukraine. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Statement on the cross-government review of sanctions implementation and enforcement.
Statement on the cross-government review of sanctions implementation and enforcement.
Motion that the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI, 2025, No. 504), dated 22 April 2025, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23 April, be approved. Agreed to on question.
Motion that the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI, 2025, No. 504), dated 22 April 2025, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23 April, be approved. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion that the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 (SI, 2024, No. 944), dated 11 September 2024, a copy of which was laid before this House on 12 September, be approved. Agreed to on question.
Motion that the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 (SI, 2024, No. 944), dated 11 September 2024, a copy of which was laid before this House on 12 September, be approved. Agreed to on question.
Questions to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
The following extract is from Questions to the Foreign, Commonwe a lth and Development Office on 30 July 2024.
As the Foreign Secretary and I have already outlined, we took robust action against Russia’s shadow fleet, alongside allies at the European
Political Community. We...
Questions to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
The following extract is from Questions to the Foreign, Commonwe a lth and Development Office on 30 July 2024.
As the Foreign Secretary and I have already outlined, we took robust action against Russia’s shadow fleet, alongside allies at the European
Political Community. We...
To ask the Deputy Foreign Secretary, what steps he has taken to prevent the transit of items in circumvention of UK sanctions (a) to and (b) from (i) Russia and (ii) Belarus via third countries.
To ask the Deputy Foreign Secretary, what steps he has taken to prevent the transit of items in circumvention of UK sanctions (a) to and (b) from (i) Russia and (ii) Belarus via third countries.
Along with the EU, US and Japan, the UK has published a list of 50 sensitive technologies and other items Russia is most actively seeking to procure via third countries. Working closely with G7 partners, we have stepped up our engagement with third countries to address circumvention risks, including sending joint delegations to the UAE, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Armenia, to highlight risks and offer technical support. HMG is also setting up the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, which will boost the enforcement and implementation of UK trade sanctions.
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what plans he has to (a) make an assessment of the adequacy of the Navalny list and (b) review further sanctions on Russia.
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what plans he has to (a) make an assessment of the adequacy of the Navalny list and (b) review further sanctions on Russia.
The United Kingdom consistently condemned Mr Navalny's politically motivated sentencing, called for his immediate and unconditional release and expressed our grave concern for his welfare.
Over 2020 and 2021, the UK sanctioned 13 individuals and one entity responsible for his poisoning. The UK has also sanctioned six individuals heading up the penal colony where Alexei Navalny died after years of mistreatment by the Russian authorities on 21 February 2024. Whilst we do not comment on potential future designations, the UK has designated the majority of individuals on both the original Navalny 35 list, and the wider Anti-Corruption Foundation list.
The UK remains steadfast in our support to Ukraine. Together with our international partners, we have implemented the most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on a major economy. The UK alone has sanctioned 2,000 individuals and entities under the Russia sanctions regime. Most recently, on 22 February a new package of over 50 UK designations targeted Russia's efforts to circumvent sanctions on its war machine and major revenue sources, demonstrating the UK's unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps he is taking to (a) identify and (b) prosecute sanctions evasion.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps he is taking to (a) identify and (b) prosecute sanctions evasion.
HMG is committed to investing in its sanction’s policy and enforcement architecture. In recognition of the centrality of sanctions, the FCDO established a permanent Sanctions Directorate in 2022 with over 120 permanent staff delivering its response. In addition, we have strengthened financial sanctions enforcement capacity and capability. OFSI has significantly increased its staffing from 40 FTE in February 2022 to over 100.
On 13 March 2023, the Prime Minister announced a new Economic Deterrence Initiative (EDI) which will tackle sanctions evasion across the UK’s trade, transport and financial sanctions. The initiative will be a cross-government effort, led by FCDO and involving a range of Departments and agencies including DBT, HMT and DFT, as well as HMRC and NCA.
With funding of up to £50m over two years, the initiative will improve our sanctions implementation and enforcement. This will maximise the impact of our trade, transport and financial sanctions, including by cracking down on sanctions evasion.
The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 brought powers to provide for the civil forfeiture of cyrptoassets and can be used as a tool to prevent cryptoassets being used as vector for sanctions evasion.
Finally, a new kleptocracy cell in the NCA has been established to target sanctions evasion and corrupt Russian assets hidden in the UK – meaning oligarchs in London will have nowhere to hide.
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what steps his Department is taking to close loopholes in the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation.
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what steps his Department is taking to close loopholes in the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation.
We continue to use sanctions to bear down on Russia's illegal war in Ukraine. Last month, a new package of over 50 UK designations targeted Russia's efforts to circumvent sanctions on its war machine and major revenue sources. Earlier this month, we delivered new legislation to bring about a coordinated ban on Russian diamond exports. With partners, we have strengthened the Oil Price Cap (OPC) mechanism and added new items to the Common High Priority (CHP) list. We are preparing to bolster our existing powers to target malign Russian shipping activity. We continue to strengthen sanctions enforcement, with the creation of the Office for Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) and a new unit within the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) to licence and enforce the OPC.
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what steps he is taking to ensure compliance with UK sanction regimes at (a) airports, (b) seaports and (c) rail entry points.
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what steps he is taking to ensure compliance with UK sanction regimes at (a) airports, (b) seaports and (c) rail entry points.
Transport sanctions apply to all UK ports and airports. His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs lead on the enforcement of trade sanctions at rail entry points. At all ports, airports and rail entry points, there are clear processes in place to effectively identify and deal with sanctions breaches.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many enforcement proceedings have been instated relating to the (a) Russia and (b) Belarus sanctioned regimes since 24 February 2022.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many enforcement proceedings have been instated relating to the (a) Russia and (b) Belarus sanctioned regimes since 24 February 2022.
The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published its Annual Review for the 2022-23 financial year on 14 December available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ofsi-annual-reviews.
This contains details of the number of cases recorded and outcomes for the relevant financial year.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what processes his Department has in place for Ministerial oversight of (a) licenses and (b) other exemptions to the sanctions regime.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what processes his Department has in place for Ministerial oversight of (a) licenses and (b) other exemptions to the sanctions regime.
There is a delegated framework which sets out how decisions are taken. Copies of this framework have been deposited in the Libraries of the Houses.
Urgent question on the effectiveness of the implementation of the UK sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus.
Urgent question on the effectiveness of the implementation of the UK sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on the repurposing of seized Russian state assets to support reconstruction efforts in Ukraine.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on the repurposing of seized Russian state assets to support reconstruction efforts in Ukraine.
The FCDO is working closely with other Government departments including the Home Office and the Treasury as well as law enforcement agencies to identify all possible options for seizing Russian-linked assets in the UK that could be used to pay for reconstruction in Ukraine. While the UK is pursuing this at pace, ensuring any policy implemented is safe, robust, and compliant with the rule of law is of paramount importance.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent discussions he has had with G7 counterparts on the seizure and repurposing of Russian state assets.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent discussions he has had with G7 counterparts on the seizure and repurposing of Russian state assets.
We continue to work across the G7 to share expertise and experience on possible options for seizing Russian-linked assets in the UK that could be used to pay for reconstruction in Ukraine. The G7 February and April Leaders' Statement reiterated that Russia will have no access to the assets frozen or immobilised in the UK until it ends its violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. International partners have also frozen a significant volume of assets but, like the UK, are yet to fully test the lawfulness of this.