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To ask His Majesty's Government what are the security considerations on any work being carried out overseas in relation to Programme Euston.
To ask His Majesty's Government what are the security considerations on any work being carried out overseas in relation to Programme Euston.
All work associated with Programme Euston is conducted in accordance with clear departmental security policies applicable at HM Naval Base Clyde and across the wider Submarine enterprise.
The Ministry of Defence does not comment on the detail of those policies as to do so could prejudice National Security.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to support the Armed Forces in deterring Russian sub-surface operations threatening Atlantic undersea cables.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to support the Armed Forces in deterring Russian sub-surface operations threatening Atlantic undersea cables.
My Lords, as demonstrated by the operation that the Secretary of State for Defence described last week, our Armed Forces are continually ready to respond to threats against our and our allies’ critical undersea infrastructure. We are further supporting our Armed Forces in this effort by: launching the Atlantic Bastion programme, which will create an advanced hybrid naval force; providing an extra £100 million for vital P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft; and working closely with NATO allies, including delivering the Lunna House agreement with Norway to build a combined fleet of new submarine-hunting frigates and uncrewed systems.
My Lords, as demonstrated by the operation that the Secretary of State for Defence described last week, our Armed Forces are continually ready to respond to threats against our and our allies’ critical undersea infrastructure. We are further supporting our Armed Forces in this effort by: launching the Atlantic Bastion programme, which will create an advanced hybrid naval force; providing an extra £100 million for vital P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft; and working closely with NATO allies, including delivering the Lunna House agreement with Norway to build a combined fleet of new submarine-hunting frigates and uncrewed systems.
My Lords, as demonstrated by the operation that the Secretary of State for Defence described last week, our Armed Forces are continually ready to respond to threats against our and our allies’ critical undersea infrastructure. We are further supporting our Armed Forces in this effort by: launching the Atlantic Bastion programme, which will create an advanced hybrid naval force; providing an extra £100 million for vital P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft; and working closely with NATO allies, including delivering the Lunna House agreement with Norway to build a combined fleet of new submarine-hunting frigates and uncrewed systems.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to support the Armed Forces in deterring Russian sub-surface operations threatening Atlantic undersea cables.
I agree with my noble friend about interconnected threats. The important thing that flows from her Question is that, notwithstanding our focus on Iran, on Ukraine, quite rightly, and on many other operations across the world, it is a tribute to our Armed Forces personnel that they recognised the threat they found in the north Atlantic and responded to it. It is important that we demonstrate that to Russia, which, as my noble friend rightly said, is a major threat to us. As I have said from this Dispatch Box time and again, part of the Armed Forces response—and the response we need from our NATO allies—is to deter people from taking action against us, knowing that there will be consequences should they break international law or threaten us. The action we took in the north Atlantic on the attempted covert operation of those submarines was a tribute to all of us and to our country.
I agree with my noble friend about interconnected threats. The important thing that flows from her Question is that, notwithstanding our focus on Iran, on Ukraine, quite rightly, and on many other operations across the world, it is a tribute to our Armed Forces personnel that they recognised the threat they found in the north Atlantic and responded to it. It is important that we demonstrate that to Russia, which, as my noble friend rightly said, is a major threat to us. As I have said from this Dispatch Box time and again, part of the Armed Forces response—and the response we need from our NATO allies—is to deter people from taking action against us, knowing that there will be consequences should they break international law or threaten us. The action we took in the north Atlantic on the attempted covert operation of those submarines was a tribute to all of us and to our country.
Does my noble friend the Minister agree that taking a more overt approach to highlighting Russian aggression is necessary to send a message that attempts to attack critical undersea infrastructure will be called out and attributed to Russia, and to ensure that the public are fully aware of the dangers that we face from our primary adversary? Additionally, given that the UK military operation lasted for more than a month and involved 500 British personnel, 450 flying hours and several thousand nautical miles sailed, does he acknowledge that our Armed Forces are confronting the most challenging security circumstances in decades, and that we must all understand better that this is no longer a world of isolated crises but one of interconnected threats?
I am confident that the defence investment plan will come forward with a large number of investments, which, as the noble Viscount points out, will be vital to the future defence of our country. He has been a doughty proponent of GCAP, an arrangement between us, Japan and Italy for a new generation of fighter aircraft. It is a really important way of demonstrating that our country is looking at what we do to deter adversaries not only now but in future. I am sure that GCAP will play a full part in that.
I am confident that the defence investment plan will come forward with a large number of investments, which, as the noble Viscount points out, will be vital to the future defence of our country. He has been a doughty proponent of GCAP, an arrangement between us, Japan and Italy for a new generation of fighter aircraft. It is a really important way of demonstrating that our country is looking at what we do to deter adversaries not only now but in future. I am sure that GCAP will play a full part in that.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Antrobus, is quite right to urge the Government to give more support to our hard-pressed Armed Forces in meeting the many challenges that
they do. As the Minister knows, the Prime Minister has provided a temporary three-month bridge to enable work on the GCAP fighter project to start, but is he confident that the defence investment plan will be approved in time to permit the project to continue beyond the end of June?
I thank the noble Baroness, who always raises these issues, quite rightly, with respect to another part of the threat to us, which we need to deal with. She asked for the details of the memorandum of understanding signed a few weeks ago, in March. It focused on enhancing maritime co-operation, cyber defence, air domain information sharing, and increased joint procurement. That modernised memorandum of understanding will not only help Ireland meet some of the challenges and threats that it perceives to itself, notwithstanding its position of neutrality, but ensure that we work with Ireland, as far as we can, to deter the threats we face from that part of the Atlantic.
I thank the noble Baroness, who always raises these issues, quite rightly, with respect to another part of the threat to us, which we need to deal with. She asked for the details of the memorandum of understanding signed a few weeks ago, in March. It focused on enhancing maritime co-operation, cyber defence, air domain information sharing, and increased joint procurement. That modernised memorandum of understanding will not only help Ireland meet some of the challenges and threats that it perceives to itself, notwithstanding its position of neutrality, but ensure that we work with Ireland, as far as we can, to deter the threats we face from that part of the Atlantic.
My Lords, I commend our senior service for the work it has been doing for some time in the seas surrounding the United Kingdom and Ireland. Can the Minister give us some details on the recent agreement between our Government and that of the Republic of Ireland in relation to the seas off Ireland, in particular whether the Irish Government are contributing to our Royal Navy’s costs?
The noble Earl will have heard me mention in my Answer to my noble friend the Lunna House agreement between us and Norway, which is a significant step forward in the co-operation between us. Norway is a key ally in dealing with the threats we face. I think he was also asking about developments in Atlantic Bastion, which I also mentioned in that Answer. It talks about ships and frigates—the frigate deal that we have done—but also about the autonomous systems we need to develop. I say again from this Dispatch Box that the Navy of the future will be a hybrid Navy; it will have extensive autonomous
platforms and motherships—for want of a better word—above, on and below the sea. Our work with Norway and our other allies, through Atlantic Bastion and other alliances, will make a major contribution to protecting underwater structures on which this country depends.
The noble Earl will have heard me mention in my Answer to my noble friend the Lunna House agreement between us and Norway, which is a significant step forward in the co-operation between us. Norway is a key ally in dealing with the threats we face. I think he was also asking about developments in Atlantic Bastion, which I also mentioned in that Answer. It talks about ships and frigates—the frigate deal that we have done—but also about the autonomous systems we need to develop. I say again from this Dispatch Box that the Navy of the future will be a hybrid Navy; it will have extensive autonomous
platforms and motherships—for want of a better word—above, on and below the sea. Our work with Norway and our other allies, through Atlantic Bastion and other alliances, will make a major contribution to protecting underwater structures on which this country depends.
My Lords, Norway supplied 47% of our total gas consumption in 2025 and the UK is increasingly dependent on its offshore wind infrastructure and interconnectors as part of our energy mix. What urgent steps are being taken to strengthen our energy security and repair capabilities, to further harness autonomous technology and AI for continuous remote monitoring and to deepen our co-operation with allies to patrol, deter and prevent such threats?
There have been many meetings across government and there are always meetings across government, with DSIT and DESNZ, which have responsibility for underwater structures. I think that the meeting the noble Lord referred to is a meeting that the Defence Secretary announced last week in which he talked about the need for them to come together again to look at the increased threat from Russia with respect to that. That demonstrates the increased co-operation across government to meet what is a very real challenge and threat to our country.
There have been many meetings across government and there are always meetings across government, with DSIT and DESNZ, which have responsibility for underwater structures. I think that the meeting the noble Lord referred to is a meeting that the Defence Secretary announced last week in which he talked about the need for them to come together again to look at the increased threat from Russia with respect to that. That demonstrates the increased co-operation across government to meet what is a very real challenge and threat to our country.
My Lords, I welcome very much what the Minister said. But some 18 months ago, a group was formed, including senior Royal Marines and Royal Navy officers, to look at these underwater and over-surface risks to our maritime infrastructure. Six months ago, we stood that down because we think all the risks are well known. I was alarmed to see that the Secretary of State invited industry leaders to a meeting literally only in the last 48 hours. I am amazed that that had not happened already, beforehand. Can the Minister, who I have very great respect for, tell me whether this was the first meeting that senior Ministers have had with senior industry figures?
The noble Baroness asks a very reasonable question, but I cannot go into some of the operational details that she requires. Suffice to say, the important thing was that the Poseidon P-8s that she identified, flying from Lossiemouth, identified the threat. We also put a Type 23 frigate out there, HMS “Somerset”. Working with other assets, they made sure that the Russian submarines were aware that we were aware of them, because of course the whole point of submarine warfare is covert activity. We found them, we saw them, we took action against them and, if we had needed to, we would have been able to deal with that as well.
The noble Baroness asks a very reasonable question, but I cannot go into some of the operational details that she requires. Suffice to say, the important thing was that the Poseidon P-8s that she identified, flying from Lossiemouth, identified the threat. We also put a Type 23 frigate out there, HMS “Somerset”. Working with other assets, they made sure that the Russian submarines were aware that we were aware of them, because of course the whole point of submarine warfare is covert activity. We found them, we saw them, we took action against them and, if we had needed to, we would have been able to deal with that as well.
My Lords, the professionalism of the RAF and our Poseidon P-8 pilots operating out of Lossiemouth in monitoring the recent activities of that Russian attack submarine and the related Russian spy ships is to be commended. We thank them, and I hope everyone in this Chamber acknowledges their contribution. I also pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Antrobus, for her distinguished career in the RAF and her contribution to our defence and security. If the RAF surveillance operation had identified a malign attack on undersea cables, what UK assets were available in these seas to thwart such an attack?
I was just thinking about the red tie club, as I stood up. But the serious point that my noble friend makes is clearly an important one about our ability to detect and deter those who would threaten us. The importance of the activity that took place in the north Atlantic was that we were able to use the P-8s. We have nine P-8s based at Lossiemouth. Of course, not all of them are operational, although most of them are and they are enabled to detect and deter. There are other ways of detecting submarine activity, which is really important. As I say, the ability to deter and to take action where necessary is really important.
I say to my noble friend that our noble friend Lord Robertson quite rightly pointed out what he felt, and the need for the strategic defence review to be implemented and funded. That debate and discussion will move forward. I also say to him—he will be particularly interested in this, having mentioned submarines—that I was recently in Plymouth, where we are putting billions of pounds into the docks at Plymouth to ensure that we have docks which are capable of dealing and working with the submarines that we have now to increase and improve the availability of those submarines. That is true in many areas of the country. There is huge and significant investment going in. The issue for us is what we do now, in the interim, to provide the deterrent and capabilities we need to ensure that our forces are able to act in the way that they do while we wait for some of those new ships and new capabilities to become ready to us. We are looking to advance that.
I am sorry to take up noble Lords’ time but the need for this country to move to a position of war readiness is crucial. That is not a government effort but a whole of society effort. From this side of the House, from that side of the House, from all parts of the United Kingdom, to deal with the threats that we face, our population have to understand the threats that they face. We as a Government have to talk to them and all of us have to stand up and say that we will defend our country and the values that we stand for.
I was just thinking about the red tie club, as I stood up. But the serious point that my noble friend makes is clearly an important one about our ability to detect and deter those who would threaten us. The importance of the activity that took place in the north Atlantic was that we were able to use the P-8s. We have nine P-8s based at Lossiemouth. Of course, not all of them are operational, although most of them are and they are enabled to detect and deter. There are other ways of detecting submarine activity, which is really important. As I say, the ability to deter and to take action where necessary is really important.
I say to my noble friend that our noble friend Lord Robertson quite rightly pointed out what he felt, and the need for the strategic defence review to be implemented and funded. That debate and discussion will move forward. I also say to him—he will be particularly interested in this, having mentioned submarines—that I was recently in Plymouth, where we are putting billions of pounds into the docks at Plymouth to ensure that we have docks which are capable of dealing and working with the submarines that we have now to increase and improve the availability of those submarines. That is true in many areas of the country. There is huge and significant investment going in. The issue for us is what we do now, in the interim, to provide the deterrent and capabilities we need to ensure that our forces are able to act in the way that they do while we wait for some of those new ships and new capabilities to become ready to us. We are looking to advance that.
I am sorry to take up noble Lords’ time but the need for this country to move to a position of war readiness is crucial. That is not a government effort but a whole of society effort. From this side of the House, from that side of the House, from all parts of the United Kingdom, to deal with the threats that we face, our population have to understand the threats that they face. We as a Government have to talk to them and all of us have to stand up and say that we will defend our country and the values that we stand for.
My Lords, during the Cold War, I was a member of the “red tie” group, which consisted of intelligence officers, operations teams and the defence industry. Basically, we monitored the Soviet submarine threat. By the end of the Cold War, at any given time, we knew exactly where all its submarines were. We had up to 12 of our own operational
SSNs to mark them, plus American ones to mark them. If war had started, we would have killed them all within the first few minutes of that war.
I fear that we are no longer in that position. Part of the reason for that has been highlighted by my noble friend Lord Robertson, who refers to it as people’s “corrosive complacency” over a number of years. I am delighted that my noble friend the Minister has highlighted what is being done now, but I have a feeling that we have a long way to catch up. We are nowhere near that position, and we are in a state where we ought to put our military, and certainly our defence industries, on some sort of war footing to be able to catch up and to do the things that we need to do.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the Armed Forces have full control over all weapons systems they have purchased and do not require the authority or permission of a third party for their use.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the Armed Forces have full control over all weapons systems they have purchased and do not require the authority or permission of a third party for their use.
All equipment procured for use by the UK Armed Forces is for defence purposes and so permission is not required from any third party for its deployment or use by UK personnel.
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the security risk and the impact on the resilience of the defence industry of the construction of vessels in China or Vietnam for the Defence Maritime Next Generation Service program.
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the security risk and the impact on the resilience of the defence industry of the construction of vessels in China or Vietnam for the Defence Maritime Next Generation Service program.
The construction locations of vessels being procured as part of the Defence Marine Services Next Generation In-Port Services contract do not present a risk to the security of the United Kingdom. Future maintenance of the vessels will take place in the UK.
The Government is stepping up its support for sovereign shipbuilding capabilities. The Procurement Act 2023 provides greater scope to strengthen supply chain visibility and drive social value. All options in and around this legislation are being explored to support the UK shipbuilding industry. In addition, the forthcoming Shipbuilding and Maritime Technology Action Plan will describe the new approach to oversight of ship and boatbuilding programmes across the strategic breadth of Government procurement.
To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with NATO allies following the announcement that the United States intends to phase out security assistance programmes for European countries bordering Russia.
To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with NATO allies following the announcement that the United States intends to phase out security assistance programmes for European countries bordering Russia.
The UK Government is aware of the Trump Administration’s intention to cut funding for the Baltic Security Initiative. Recent airspace violations in Estonia, Poland and Romania by Russia demonstrate that we must do all that we can to support our allies. That’s why NATO Allies agreed to increase their spending at this year’s Summit in The Hague. The UK’s commitment to NATO remains unshakeable.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will publish any documents about vetting or security clearance processes that were given to applicants of the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will publish any documents about vetting or security clearance processes that were given to applicants of the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy.
When the Taleban seized control in 2021, many thousands of people who served and supported our British Armed Forces were left in Afghanistan.
The UK made a commitment to honour the moral obligation we owe to those Afghans who stood with us and there was cross party support for this at the time. This became the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme.
All those resettling in the UK under Afghan resettlement schemes are coming to the UK legally. As with all those arriving to the UK, all those found eligible for ARAP have to undergo robust security checks, including for national security. If they don’t pass these checks, they are not granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK
An application must first be made, by the applicant, to the Ministry of Defence, who will decide if the applicant is eligible. If they are eligible for relocation to the UK, the second stage is that the Ministry Of Defence (MOD) will on behalf of the applicant, make an application to the Home Office for entry clearance (if they are outside the UK) or settlement (if they are in the UK). Eligibility does not guarantee resettlement in the UK. Those who are eligible must first undergo checks in accordance with the UK Immigration Rules
The MOD, as part of the first stage, sends an offer letter to Eligible Persons (EPs) which details the vetting and security process that applicants must go through to enter the UK and signposts EPs to the Government's Immigration Rules for further guidance. Permission to enter the UK is subject to the enrolment of biometrics and security checks run by the Home Office as part of the second stage.
National security is a priority for this Government and all ARAP eligible individuals who arrive in the UK will have undergone thorough security checks.
To ask His Majesty's Government, following the security breach at RAF Brize Norton on 20 June, what plans they have to improve the security of all RAF airfields.
To ask His Majesty's Government, following the security breach at RAF Brize Norton on 20 June, what plans they have to improve the security of all RAF airfields.
We are now conducting a review of security across Defence that will assess and assure the state of protective security at all sites. As I am sure you can appreciate, we will not comment on the specifics before the review has concluded.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they plan to provide additional funding for security at RAF Lossiemouth following the recent compromise in security at RAF Brize Norton.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they plan to provide additional funding for security at RAF Lossiemouth following the recent compromise in security at RAF Brize Norton.
As per the statement made by the Minister of the Armed Forces on Monday 23 June 2025, an investigation is underway into the incident at RAF Brize Norton. Work has initially focused on Brize Norton but extends to all UK bases. The results will allow us to prioritise improvements and investment required. Further plans will be announced in due course after the completion of the review.
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to assess the existing security protocols at RAF Lossiemouth following the recent compromise in security at RAF Brize Norton.
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to assess the existing security protocols at RAF Lossiemouth following the recent compromise in security at RAF Brize Norton.
As per the statement made by the Minister of the Armed Forces on Monday 23 June 2025, an investigation is underway into the incident at RAF Brize Norton. Work has initially focused on Brize Norton but extends to all UK bases. The results will allow us to prioritise improvements and investment required. Further plans will be announced in due course after the completion of the review.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will ensure that the external scrutiny team of the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations will remain independent of the Ministry of Defence if the Council of the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations is converted into a non-departmental public body.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will ensure that the external scrutiny team of the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations will remain independent of the Ministry of Defence if the Council of the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations is converted into a non-departmental public body.
Defence Ministers are very grateful for the hard work of the External Scrutiny Team (EST). Alistair Carns DSO MC OBE, Minister for Veterans and People, expressed this sentiment on 17 December 2024, when he placed a copy in the Library of the House of the EST’s Annual Statutory Report 2024 on the health of the Reserve Forces.
Defence is clear that the EST is indeed independent, since it directs its own business, and we would aim to ensure that this independence is maintained if the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations are converted into a Non-Departmental Public Body.
Tabled by
Baroness Rawlings
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the cutting of undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea in November 2024.
Tabled by
Baroness Rawlings
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the cutting of undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea in November 2024.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Vallance stated on 3 December 2024, we continue to work closely with international partners following the breakage of subsea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea on 17 and 18 November 2024. We must let those investigations run their course.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Vallance stated on 3 December 2024, we continue to work closely with international partners following the breakage of subsea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea on 17 and 18 November 2024. We must let those investigations run their course.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Vallance stated on 3 December 2024, we continue to work closely with international partners following the breakage of subsea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea on 17 and 18 November 2024. We must let those investigations run their course.
Tabled by
Baroness Rawlings
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the cutting of undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea in November 2024.