The Home Office coordinates the government’s homeland counter-drone policy and closely monitors how drones are being used in all threat areas. This includes organised crime, terrorism, and innovations coming out of conflict zones. We work closely with other Government departments and operational partners such as the police and the military, as well as the scientific community, to understand current and emerging drone and counter-drone technologies and the threats and opportunities they present, and to develop the necessary technical capabilities and legislation in response.

It would of course not be appropriate to comment on specific details of threat assessments.

The Government is working tirelessly to improve the cyber resilience of our most critical services and systems, including the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).

The Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, currently going through Parliament, will strengthen the UK’s cyber defences to tackle the evolving cyber threats we face. The Bill will protect more essential and digital services from cyber attacks, enable cyber regulators to be more effective, and provide the Government with the flexibility to respond to new threats in the cyber landscape.

In addition, the new Cyber Resilience Index, currently under development, will allow us to monitor progress of interventions against cyber resilience across the CNI landscape, ensuring that they keep pace with the evolving threat.

The Government does not routinely comment on ongoing investigations or operational activity.

The schemes listed in the answer to Question 10652 are open to individuals who meet the eligibility criteria as set out on sis.gov.uk/how-to-apply/eligibility/. This includes individuals who are white British.

The Government is committed to ensuring that individuals who may be victims of transnational repression (TNR) can report concerns with confidence, and that those reports are handled effectively across policing. While it would not be appropriate to comment on individual security arrangements, support is always threat‑led and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.

Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) is embedding a national reporting model to ensure that cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. This is supported by training and guidance available to all forces, including call handlers, to recognise indicators of TNR.

Our understanding of TNR is informed by multiple sources, including engagement with victims and civil society (which continues at ministerial and official level), to ensure policy remains evidence led and proportionate.

The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are well established, operate 24/7, and allow for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases.

As confirmed in the answer to Question 10654, NATO provided a breakdown of the types of spend that could be included within the 1.5% commitment. This included Critical Infrastructure.

In 2023, NATO published a report on the EU/NATO taskforce on the resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Within that report, it noted that Critical Infrastructure enables the fulfilment of the organisation's core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

It is for each NATO ally to determine whether they have eligible Critical Infrastructure spend to include as part of their 1.5% commitment.

The UK has met NATO’s 1.5% defence and security-related spending target, as defined by NATO. NATO’s definition sets out that spend should be to protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation and strengthen our defence industrial base.

Given this definition, contributions came from a number of departments. All spending captured as part of the 1.5% is determined through the Spending Review and set out to Parliament via the Estimates process in the usual way.

Parliament is responsible for providing and funding a range of security measures for all Members of Parliament (MPs). There is an extensive and comprehensive range of protective security measures available. These protective security measures are kept under review to ensure MPs can carry out their duties safely.

The Home Office, Parliament and police work closely to assess risk to MPs. These risk assessments inform appropriate protective security measures to ensure the safety and security of MPs in Westminster and in their constituencies.

It is the Home Office’s long-standing policy not to provide detailed information on individual MPs’ security arrangements, as doing so could compromise the integrity and safety of individuals.  

The Home Office remains firmly committed to safeguarding all elected officials and has implemented a range of notable measures, which have enhanced protective security. This includes expanding Operation Bridger, the police support for MPs away from the Parliamentary Estate, by funding a fulltime network of police officers in forces across the UK known as Force Elected Official Advisors (FEOAs). These FEOAs provide dedicated police support to MPs, locally elected representatives and candidates across the UK.

We keep the effectiveness of the UK Central Authority under regular review and continually seek to improve its systems and processes including considering publishable data. I can assure you that we are committed to effectively providing mutual legal assistance objectively and impartially across the world in accordance with international commitments.

The UKCA is one of the busiest central authorities in the world, responding to requests that often involve complex legal processes across different jurisdictions. Requests concerning the most serious offences are treated as a high priority.

Response times depend on the timely cooperation of multiple law enforcement authorities. Where delays arise, we remain committed to progressing requests as quickly and effectively as possible.

The UKCA aims to acknowledge receipt of a new MLA request quickly and to respond to requests promptly. Requests concerning the most serious offences are treated as a high priority to ensure justice is done and that the UK maintains its reputation as a high-quality criminal justice partner.

The Government remains alert to the risk that foreign states may seek to use a range of organisations (including religious and cultural centres), proxies and influence networks, to advance their objectives in the UK.

The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) supports transparency around activity directed by foreign states. We have placed Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier of FIRS, requiring those carrying out any activity in the UK at the direction of the Russian or Iranian states to register or face criminal penalties.

The Government is focused on ensuring compliance with FIRS, including referring cases to the police where we believe a criminal offence has been committed. There will be an annual report on the operation of the scheme, including total numbers of registrations under the enhanced tier, which will be published later this year.

More recently, the Home Secretary has introduced a new designation power enabling her to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, including state-linked proxies and affiliated structures. The UK has also imposed extensive sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including sanctions against Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his public support for and endorsement of Russia's invasion.

The Government remains alert to the risk that foreign states may seek to use a range of organisations (including religious and cultural centres), proxies and influence networks, to advance their objectives in the UK.

The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) supports transparency around activity directed by foreign states. We have placed Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier of FIRS, requiring those carrying out any activity in the UK at the direction of the Russian or Iranian states to register or face criminal penalties.

The Government is focused on ensuring compliance with FIRS, including referring cases to the police where we believe a criminal offence has been committed. There will be an annual report on the operation of the scheme, including total numbers of registrations under the enhanced tier, which will be published later this year.

More recently, the Home Secretary has introduced a new designation power enabling her to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, including state-linked proxies and affiliated structures. The UK has also imposed extensive sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including sanctions against Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his public support for and endorsement of Russia's invasion.

The Government remains alert to the risk that foreign states may seek to use a range of organisations (including religious and cultural centres), proxies and influence networks, to advance their objectives in the UK.

The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) supports transparency around activity directed by foreign states. We have placed Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier of FIRS, requiring those carrying out any activity in the UK at the direction of the Russian or Iranian states to register or face criminal penalties.

The Government is focused on ensuring compliance with FIRS, including referring cases to the police where we believe a criminal offence has been committed. There will be an annual report on the operation of the scheme, including total numbers of registrations under the enhanced tier, which will be published later this year.

More recently, the Home Secretary has introduced a new designation power enabling her to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, including state-linked proxies and affiliated structures. The UK has also imposed extensive sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including sanctions against Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his public support for and endorsement of Russia's invasion.

Protecting the right of all faith communities to worship in peace and without fear is fundamental. The Government works closely with the police and other partners to review threats and strengthen protections for faith communities against hate crime, terrorism and wider security threats.

The Protective Security for Mosques Scheme provides protective security measures (such as security personnel services, CCTV, intruder alarms and secure perimeter fencing) to mosques and associated Muslim faith community centres. Protective security measures are also available to Muslim faith schools. Under this scheme, up to £40 million is being made available for protective security for Muslim communities in 2026/27.

The Home Office has also launched a new scheme, Faith Security Training (FST), to better protect faith communities in England and Wales. FST, developed in partnership with policing and faith representatives, is a free scheme designed to help faith communities strengthen their security awareness and preparedness.

The Government remains steadfast in its commitment to the safety and security of Jewish communities, and to tackling antisemitism wherever it manifests. All communities should feel safe to practise their faith and participate in public life free from intimidation or fear.

The Jewish Community Protective Security (JCPS) Grant, administered on behalf of the Home Office by the Community Security Trust (CST), provides funding for protective security measures, such as security personnel services, CCTV and alarm systems, at synagogues, Jewish educational establishments and other communal locations across the United Kingdom, including in Buckinghamshire.

This work sits alongside the Government’s wider package of support for Jewish communities, and our ongoing efforts to tackle antisemitism in all its forms. On 30 April, the Government announced £25 million of immediate funding in 2026/27 to strengthen policing, protect Jewish communities and provide reassurance in response to the awful terrorist attack in Golders Green and the wider spate of antisemitic attacks seen this year. This funding package included an additional £4 million for Jewish community protective security, taking the total available in 2026/27 to a record £32.4 million.

The Home Office does not provide detailed information on funding allocated to individual sites or local areas, as disclosure of such information could inadvertently reveal details about the security needs of specific communities. Nonetheless, the Government continues to work closely with CST, the police and other partners to monitor threats and ensure that effective and proportionate protective measures are in place where they are needed most.

The Government remains steadfast in its commitment to the safety and security of Jewish communities, and to tackling antisemitism wherever it manifests. All communities should feel safe to practise their faith and participate in public life free from intimidation or fear.

The Jewish Community Protective Security (JCPS) Grant, administered on behalf of the Home Office by the Community Security Trust (CST), provides funding for protective security measures, such as security personnel services, CCTV and alarm systems, at synagogues, Jewish educational establishments and other communal locations across the United Kingdom, including in Buckinghamshire.

This work sits alongside the Government’s wider package of support for Jewish communities, and our ongoing efforts to tackle antisemitism in all its forms. On 30 April, the Government announced £25 million of immediate funding in 2026/27 to strengthen policing, protect Jewish communities and provide reassurance in response to the awful terrorist attack in Golders Green and the wider spate of antisemitic attacks seen this year. This funding package included an additional £4 million for Jewish community protective security, taking the total available in 2026/27 to a record £32.4 million.

The Home Office does not provide detailed information on funding allocated to individual sites or local areas, as disclosure of such information could inadvertently reveal details about the security needs of specific communities. Nonetheless, the Government continues to work closely with CST, the police and other partners to monitor threats and ensure that effective and proportionate protective measures are in place where they are needed most.

The first duty of Government is National Security and so we treat all potential threats with the utmost seriousness.

In November 2022, the previous government instructed all government departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment on their sensitive sites where it is manufactured by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. As the previous Security Minister said in a debate on this topic on Tuesday 18 November 2025, all sensitive Government sites which were identified as having such equipment had finished their replacement work.

More broadly, the National Cyber Security Centre and National Protective Security Agency provide extensive support to local authorities to mitigate threats to national security – including guidance on surveillance equipment.

As set out in the National Security Act 2023, the Secretary of State may make a specification under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) where they consider it is reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. To date, Iran and Russia are the only two countries to have been specified under the enhanced tier.

In reaching that decision, the Government considers a broad range of factors, including national security assessments.

Any additional enhanced tier specifications would be made through regulations laid before and approved by Parliament in the usual way. However, it would not be appropriate to comment now on which countries may or may not be specified in future.

As set out in the National Security Act 2023, the Secretary of State may make a specification under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) where they consider it is reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. To date, Iran and Russia are the only two countries to have been specified under the enhanced tier.

In reaching that decision, the Government considers a broad range of factors, including national security assessments.

Any additional enhanced tier specifications would be made through regulations laid before and approved by Parliament in the usual way. However, it would not be appropriate to comment now on which countries may or may not be specified in future.

The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) is the Government’s principal tool for identifying and assessing the most serious malicious and non-malicious risks facing the United Kingdom and its interests overseas.

Whilst construction supply is not currently included as a discrete risk, critical supply chain disruption is considered from a range of causes across the NSRA.

Both the NSRA and the publicly available version, the National Risk Register (NRR), are kept under continual review to reflect the changing risk landscape. During every update, policy makers are encouraged to consider the potential implications of their risk across a range of sectors.

The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) is the Government’s principal tool for identifying and assessing the most serious malicious and non-malicious risks facing the United Kingdom and its interests overseas.

Whilst construction supply is not currently included as a discrete risk, critical supply chain disruption is considered from a range of causes across the NSRA.

Both the NSRA and the publicly available version, the National Risk Register (NRR), are kept under continual review to reflect the changing risk landscape. During every update, policy makers are encouraged to consider the potential implications of their risk across a range of sectors.