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To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of swarms of drones on national security; and whether research has been commissioned on that issue.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of swarms of drones on national security; and whether research has been commissioned on that issue.
The Home Office coordinates the government’s homeland counter-drone policy and closely monitors how drones are being used in all threat areas. This includes organised crime, terrorism, and innovations coming out of conflict zones. We work closely with other Government departments and operational partners such as the police and the military, as well as the scientific community, to understand current and emerging drone and counter-drone technologies and the threats and opportunities they present, and to develop the necessary technical capabilities and legislation in response.
It would of course not be appropriate to comment on specific details of threat assessments.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what recent steps he has taken to protect critical national infrastructure from cyber threats.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what recent steps he has taken to protect critical national infrastructure from cyber threats.
The Government is working tirelessly to improve the cyber resilience of our most critical services and systems, including the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).
The Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, currently going through Parliament, will strengthen the UK’s cyber defences to tackle the evolving cyber threats we face. The Bill will protect more essential and digital services from cyber attacks, enable cyber regulators to be more effective, and provide the Government with the flexibility to respond to new threats in the cyber landscape.
In addition, the new Cyber Resilience Index, currently under development, will allow us to monitor progress of interventions against cyber resilience across the CNI landscape, ensuring that they keep pace with the evolving threat.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what specific items of expenditure have been counted towards the Government's claim to have met the NATO target of spending 1.5% of GDP on resilience-related investment.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what specific items of expenditure have been counted towards the Government's claim to have met the NATO target of spending 1.5% of GDP on resilience-related investment.
The UK has met NATO’s 1.5% defence and security-related spending target, as defined by NATO. NATO’s definition sets out that spend should be to protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation and strengthen our defence industrial base.
Given this definition, contributions came from a number of departments. All spending captured as part of the 1.5% is determined through the Spending Review and set out to Parliament via the Estimates process in the usual way.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether (a) his and (b) any other Department has identified any (i) state, (ii) state-linked and (iii) state-sponsored entity as (A) partially and (B) wholly responsible for the August 2025 to September 2025 cyber attack on Jaguar Land Rover.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether (a) his and (b) any other Department has identified any (i) state, (ii) state-linked and (iii) state-sponsored entity as (A) partially and (B) wholly responsible for the August 2025 to September 2025 cyber attack on Jaguar Land Rover.
The Government does not routinely comment on ongoing investigations or operational activity.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, pursuant to the answer of 30 June 2026, to Question 10652, on Intelligence Services: Voluntary Work, whether there are SIS internships or voluntary work placements which are eligible for people who are white British.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, pursuant to the answer of 30 June 2026, to Question 10652, on Intelligence Services: Voluntary Work, whether there are SIS internships or voluntary work placements which are eligible for people who are white British.
The schemes listed in the answer to Question 10652 are open to individuals who meet the eligibility criteria as set out on sis.gov.uk/how-to-apply/eligibility/. This includes individuals who are white British.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what estimate she has made of the cost of establishing and operating a dedicated, multilingual hotline for reporting transnational repression, staffed by personnel trained in state threats; and how that cost compares to the annual cost of the Defending Democracy...
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what estimate she has made of the cost of establishing and operating a dedicated, multilingual hotline for reporting transnational repression, staffed by personnel trained in state threats; and how that cost compares to the annual cost of the Defending Democracy...
The Government is committed to ensuring that individuals who may be victims of transnational repression (TNR) can report concerns with confidence, and that those reports are handled effectively across policing. While it would not be appropriate to comment on individual security arrangements, support is always threat‑led and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.
Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) is embedding a national reporting model to ensure that cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. This is supported by training and guidance available to all forces, including call handlers, to recognise indicators of TNR.
Our understanding of TNR is informed by multiple sources, including engagement with victims and civil society (which continues at ministerial and official level), to ensure policy remains evidence led and proportionate.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are well established, operate 24/7, and allow for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Pursuant to the answer of 29 June 2026, to Question 10654, on Defence: Finance, what is the definition of critical infrastructure used as part of the 1.5% NATO target that the Government uses; and whether there is a longer guidance note on...
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Pursuant to the answer of 29 June 2026, to Question 10654, on Defence: Finance, what is the definition of critical infrastructure used as part of the 1.5% NATO target that the Government uses; and whether there is a longer guidance note on...
As confirmed in the answer to Question 10654, NATO provided a breakdown of the types of spend that could be included within the 1.5% commitment. This included Critical Infrastructure.
In 2023, NATO published a report on the EU/NATO taskforce on the resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Within that report, it noted that Critical Infrastructure enables the fulfilment of the organisation's core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
It is for each NATO ally to determine whether they have eligible Critical Infrastructure spend to include as part of their 1.5% commitment.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether funding has been provided since July 2024 in relation to the security of Hon Members from the Reform UK party.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether funding has been provided since July 2024 in relation to the security of Hon Members from the Reform UK party.
Parliament is responsible for providing and funding a range of security measures for all Members of Parliament (MPs). There is an extensive and comprehensive range of protective security measures available. These protective security measures are kept under review to ensure MPs can carry out their duties safely.
The Home Office, Parliament and police work closely to assess risk to MPs. These risk assessments inform appropriate protective security measures to ensure the safety and security of MPs in Westminster and in their constituencies.
It is the Home Office’s long-standing policy not to provide detailed information on individual MPs’ security arrangements, as doing so could compromise the integrity and safety of individuals.
The Home Office remains firmly committed to safeguarding all elected officials and has implemented a range of notable measures, which have enhanced protective security. This includes expanding Operation Bridger, the police support for MPs away from the Parliamentary Estate, by funding a fulltime network of police officers in forces across the UK known as Force Elected Official Advisors (FEOAs). These FEOAs provide dedicated police support to MPs, locally elected representatives and candidates across the UK.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to the answer of 13 July 2026 to question 16731, what assessment she has made of the potential merits of tracking response times to Mutual Legal Assistance requests.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to the answer of 13 July 2026 to question 16731, what assessment she has made of the potential merits of tracking response times to Mutual Legal Assistance requests.
We keep the effectiveness of the UK Central Authority under regular review and continually seek to improve its systems and processes including considering publishable data. I can assure you that we are committed to effectively providing mutual legal assistance objectively and impartially across the world in accordance with international commitments.
The UKCA is one of the busiest central authorities in the world, responding to requests that often involve complex legal processes across different jurisdictions. Requests concerning the most serious offences are treated as a high priority.
Response times depend on the timely cooperation of multiple law enforcement authorities. Where delays arise, we remain committed to progressing requests as quickly and effectively as possible.
The UKCA aims to acknowledge receipt of a new MLA request quickly and to respond to requests promptly. Requests concerning the most serious offences are treated as a high priority to ensure justice is done and that the UK maintains its reputation as a high-quality criminal justice partner.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the consistency of scrutiny applied under the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme to Russian-linked institutions compared with institutions linked to other foreign states.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the consistency of scrutiny applied under the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme to Russian-linked institutions compared with institutions linked to other foreign states.
The Government remains alert to the risk that foreign states may seek to use a range of organisations (including religious and cultural centres), proxies and influence networks, to advance their objectives in the UK.
The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) supports transparency around activity directed by foreign states. We have placed Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier of FIRS, requiring those carrying out any activity in the UK at the direction of the Russian or Iranian states to register or face criminal penalties.
The Government is focused on ensuring compliance with FIRS, including referring cases to the police where we believe a criminal offence has been committed. There will be an annual report on the operation of the scheme, including total numbers of registrations under the enhanced tier, which will be published later this year.
More recently, the Home Secretary has introduced a new designation power enabling her to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, including state-linked proxies and affiliated structures. The UK has also imposed extensive sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including sanctions against Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his public support for and endorsement of Russia's invasion.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps are being taken to ensure that organisations in the UK which may be acting at the direction of the Russian state or Russian state-controlled entities, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, are appropriately assessed for compliance with the...
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps are being taken to ensure that organisations in the UK which may be acting at the direction of the Russian state or Russian state-controlled entities, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, are appropriately assessed for compliance with the...
The Government remains alert to the risk that foreign states may seek to use a range of organisations (including religious and cultural centres), proxies and influence networks, to advance their objectives in the UK.
The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) supports transparency around activity directed by foreign states. We have placed Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier of FIRS, requiring those carrying out any activity in the UK at the direction of the Russian or Iranian states to register or face criminal penalties.
The Government is focused on ensuring compliance with FIRS, including referring cases to the police where we believe a criminal offence has been committed. There will be an annual report on the operation of the scheme, including total numbers of registrations under the enhanced tier, which will be published later this year.
More recently, the Home Secretary has introduced a new designation power enabling her to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, including state-linked proxies and affiliated structures. The UK has also imposed extensive sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including sanctions against Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his public support for and endorsement of Russia's invasion.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the potential risk that Russian religious or cultural institutions operating in the UK may be used to facilitate foreign influence activity.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the potential risk that Russian religious or cultural institutions operating in the UK may be used to facilitate foreign influence activity.
The Government remains alert to the risk that foreign states may seek to use a range of organisations (including religious and cultural centres), proxies and influence networks, to advance their objectives in the UK.
The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) supports transparency around activity directed by foreign states. We have placed Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier of FIRS, requiring those carrying out any activity in the UK at the direction of the Russian or Iranian states to register or face criminal penalties.
The Government is focused on ensuring compliance with FIRS, including referring cases to the police where we believe a criminal offence has been committed. There will be an annual report on the operation of the scheme, including total numbers of registrations under the enhanced tier, which will be published later this year.
More recently, the Home Secretary has introduced a new designation power enabling her to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, including state-linked proxies and affiliated structures. The UK has also imposed extensive sanctions in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including sanctions against Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his public support for and endorsement of Russia's invasion.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps she is taking to protect mosques and other Islamic institutions from hate crime and violent attacks.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps she is taking to protect mosques and other Islamic institutions from hate crime and violent attacks.
Protecting the right of all faith communities to worship in peace and without fear is fundamental. The Government works closely with the police and other partners to review threats and strengthen protections for faith communities against hate crime, terrorism and wider security threats.
The Protective Security for Mosques Scheme provides protective security measures (such as security personnel services, CCTV, intruder alarms and secure perimeter fencing) to mosques and associated Muslim faith community centres. Protective security measures are also available to Muslim faith schools. Under this scheme, up to £40 million is being made available for protective security for Muslim communities in 2026/27.
The Home Office has also launched a new scheme, Faith Security Training (FST), to better protect faith communities in England and Wales. FST, developed in partnership with policing and faith representatives, is a free scheme designed to help faith communities strengthen their security awareness and preparedness.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what funding has been allocated through the Jewish Community Protective Security Grant to institutions in Buckinghamshire in each of the last three financial years.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what funding has been allocated through the Jewish Community Protective Security Grant to institutions in Buckinghamshire in each of the last three financial years.
The Government remains steadfast in its commitment to the safety and security of Jewish communities, and to tackling antisemitism wherever it manifests. All communities should feel safe to practise their faith and participate in public life free from intimidation or fear.
The Jewish Community Protective Security (JCPS) Grant, administered on behalf of the Home Office by the Community Security Trust (CST), provides funding for protective security measures, such as security personnel services, CCTV and alarm systems, at synagogues, Jewish educational establishments and other communal locations across the United Kingdom, including in Buckinghamshire.
This work sits alongside the Government’s wider package of support for Jewish communities, and our ongoing efforts to tackle antisemitism in all its forms. On 30 April, the Government announced £25 million of immediate funding in 2026/27 to strengthen policing, protect Jewish communities and provide reassurance in response to the awful terrorist attack in Golders Green and the wider spate of antisemitic attacks seen this year. This funding package included an additional £4 million for Jewish community protective security, taking the total available in 2026/27 to a record £32.4 million.
The Home Office does not provide detailed information on funding allocated to individual sites or local areas, as disclosure of such information could inadvertently reveal details about the security needs of specific communities. Nonetheless, the Government continues to work closely with CST, the police and other partners to monitor threats and ensure that effective and proportionate protective measures are in place where they are needed most.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether Jewish schools, synagogues and community centres in Buckinghamshire are eligible for security funding under the Places of Worship Security Fund; and what steps her Department is taking to ensure uptake of that funding in the county.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether Jewish schools, synagogues and community centres in Buckinghamshire are eligible for security funding under the Places of Worship Security Fund; and what steps her Department is taking to ensure uptake of that funding in the county.
The Government remains steadfast in its commitment to the safety and security of Jewish communities, and to tackling antisemitism wherever it manifests. All communities should feel safe to practise their faith and participate in public life free from intimidation or fear.
The Jewish Community Protective Security (JCPS) Grant, administered on behalf of the Home Office by the Community Security Trust (CST), provides funding for protective security measures, such as security personnel services, CCTV and alarm systems, at synagogues, Jewish educational establishments and other communal locations across the United Kingdom, including in Buckinghamshire.
This work sits alongside the Government’s wider package of support for Jewish communities, and our ongoing efforts to tackle antisemitism in all its forms. On 30 April, the Government announced £25 million of immediate funding in 2026/27 to strengthen policing, protect Jewish communities and provide reassurance in response to the awful terrorist attack in Golders Green and the wider spate of antisemitic attacks seen this year. This funding package included an additional £4 million for Jewish community protective security, taking the total available in 2026/27 to a record £32.4 million.
The Home Office does not provide detailed information on funding allocated to individual sites or local areas, as disclosure of such information could inadvertently reveal details about the security needs of specific communities. Nonetheless, the Government continues to work closely with CST, the police and other partners to monitor threats and ensure that effective and proportionate protective measures are in place where they are needed most.
That is very controversial!
That is very controversial!
My Noble Friend the Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:
Today the Government is launching two calls for evidence to strengthen the evidence base on two key and evolving fraud threats: unauthorised fraud and misuse of telephone numbers.
Fraud is...
My Noble Friend the Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:
Today the Government is launching two calls for evidence to strengthen the evidence base on two key and evolving fraud threats: unauthorised fraud and misuse of telephone numbers.
Fraud is...
Motion that the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved. Agreed to on question.
Motion that the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved. Agreed to on question.
I beg to move,
That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.
I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the...
I beg to move,
That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.
I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the...
I am tempted to say hold my beer, as there are 50 minutes left, but I suspect that many people will want to have their beers elsewhere, in front of a larger screen than we have in this House. I am grateful to all colleagues who have contributed to the...
I am tempted to say hold my beer, as there are 50 minutes left, but I suspect that many people will want to have their beers elsewhere, in front of a larger screen than we have in this House. I am grateful to all colleagues who have contributed to the...