1-20 of 34 results for subject:"Bank reserves"
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To ask His Majesty's Government what amount of interest has been paid to commercial banks on central bank reserves in each of the last ten years; and whether they have considered ending such payments.
To ask His Majesty's Government what amount of interest has been paid to commercial banks on central bank reserves in each of the last ten years; and whether they have considered ending such payments.
Data on the interest paid on central bank reserves backed by bonds held in the Asset Purchase Facility is made publicly available by the Office for National Statistics in its monthly Public Sector Finances publication.
Time period | Interest payable |
Dataset identifier code | MDD7 |
2015 | 1,872 |
2016 | 1,515 |
2017 | 1,501 |
2018 | 3,434 |
2019 | 3,374 |
2020 | 1,078 |
2021 | 941 |
2022 | 13,394 |
2023 | 38,233 |
2024 | 36,335 |
2025 | 25,910 |
These data refer to reserves backed only by bonds held in the Asset Purchase Facility. While data on total interest paid is not available, the Bank of England does publish the aggregate level of outstanding reserves and the Bank Rate.
Paying interest on reserves is an important part of the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy and there are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England.
Explains how the Bank of England’s (BoE's) quantitative easing (QE) programme affects government's spending on debt interest. Discusses contentious proposals to decrease the affect by reducing the interest rate paid on the reserves commercial banks hold at the BoE.
Explains how the Bank of England’s (BoE's) quantitative easing (QE) programme affects government's spending on debt interest. Discusses contentious proposals to decrease the affect by reducing the interest rate paid on the reserves commercial banks hold at the BoE.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment she has made of the potential merits of (a) reducing or (b) removing the interest paid to commercial banks on the reserves those banks hold with the Bank of England.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment she has made of the potential merits of (a) reducing or (b) removing the interest paid to commercial banks on the reserves those banks hold with the Bank of England.
Monetary policy, including quantitative easing, is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England. The separation of fiscal and monetary policy is a key feature of the UK’s economic framework, and essential for the effective delivery of monetary policy, so the government does not comment on the conduct or effectiveness of monetary policy.
Paying interest on reserves is an important part of the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. There are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government is providing the stability required for the independent Monetary Policy Committee to bring inflation to target, by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what recent assessment she has made of the potential merits of requiring the Bank of England to pay interest on its reserves to commercial banks.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what recent assessment she has made of the potential merits of requiring the Bank of England to pay interest on its reserves to commercial banks.
The Bank of England has operational independence from the government to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability. Monetary policy, including quantitative easing, is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England.
There are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government continues to support the Bank to bring inflation in line with its target, including by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether she has had recent discussions with the Governor of the Bank of England on moving to a two-tier system for reserve remuneration.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether she has had recent discussions with the Governor of the Bank of England on moving to a two-tier system for reserve remuneration.
The Chancellor regularly meets with the Governor of the Bank of England to discuss matters relating to economy and the Bank’s progress towards meeting its price stability targets.
The government continues to support the Bank’s independence to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability, and there are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government is providing the stability required for the MPC to bring interest rates down, by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what estimate she has made of the potential saving to the Exchequer of moving to a two-tier system for reserve renumeration.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what estimate she has made of the potential saving to the Exchequer of moving to a two-tier system for reserve renumeration.
The Chancellor regularly meets with the Governor of the Bank of England to discuss matters relating to economy and the Bank’s progress towards meeting its price stability targets.
The government continues to support the Bank’s independence to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability, and there are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government is providing the stability required for the MPC to bring interest rates down, by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether she has made an assessment of the merits of the Bank of England paying interest on reserve accounts maintained by commercial banks.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether she has made an assessment of the merits of the Bank of England paying interest on reserve accounts maintained by commercial banks.
The Bank of England has operational independence from the government to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability. Monetary policy, including quantitative easing, is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England.
There are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government continues to support the Bank to bring inflation in line with its target, including by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether she has had discussions with the Bank of England on a tiered reserve system.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether she has had discussions with the Bank of England on a tiered reserve system.
The Bank of England has operational independence from the government to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability. Monetary policy, including quantitative easing, is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England. The separation of fiscal and monetary policy is a key feature of the UK’s economic framework, and essential for the effective delivery of monetary policy, so the government does not comment on the conduct or effectiveness of monetary policy.
There are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government continues to support the Bank to bring inflation in line with its target, including by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment her Department has made of the potential impact of introducing a tiered reserve system on public finances.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment her Department has made of the potential impact of introducing a tiered reserve system on public finances.
The Bank of England has operational independence from the government to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability. Monetary policy, including quantitative easing, is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England. The separation of fiscal and monetary policy is a key feature of the UK’s economic framework, and essential for the effective delivery of monetary policy, so the government does not comment on the conduct or effectiveness of monetary policy.
There are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government continues to support the Bank to bring inflation in line with its target, including by managing the public finances responsibly.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if she will make an assessment of the potential merits of limiting the amount of money that the Bank of England can pay in interest to commercial banks.
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if she will make an assessment of the potential merits of limiting the amount of money that the Bank of England can pay in interest to commercial banks.
The Bank of England has operational independence from the government to carry out its statutory responsibilities for monetary policy and financial stability. Monetary policy, including quantitative easing, is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England.
There are no plans to change the way reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England. The government continues to support the Bank to bring inflation in line with its target, including by managing the public finances responsibly.
Letter dated 20/07/2021 from John Glen MP to Pat McFadden MP regarding points raised during the Draft Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-Prudential Measures) (Amendment) Order 2021: whether this instrument is part of the onshoring process, the effect of excluding central bank reserves from the leverage ratio calculation, the government’s broader plans for bank capital now the UK has left the EU.. 2p.
Letter dated 20/07/2021 from John Glen MP to Pat McFadden MP regarding points raised during the Draft Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-Prudential Measures) (Amendment) Order 2021: whether this instrument is part of the onshoring process, the effect of excluding central bank reserves from the leverage ratio calculation, the government’s...
Letter dated 20/12/2018 from Lord Bates to Lord Tunnicliffe regarding questions raised during the debate on the Capital Requirements (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018: exposures to EU sovereign debt and firms' use of internal models, and replacing the reference to EU Directive with reference to standards issued by the Financial Reporting Council or a predecessor body. 2p.
Letter dated 20/12/2018 from Lord Bates to Lord Tunnicliffe regarding questions raised during the debate on the Capital Requirements (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018: exposures to EU sovereign debt and firms' use of internal models, and replacing the reference to EU Directive with reference to standards issued by the Financial...
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Lords motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
Lords motion to consider. Agreed to on question.
My Lords, Her Majesty’s Treasury is in the process of laying statutory instruments under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act in order to deliver a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the event of a no-deal scenario. The two SIs being debated in this group are part of...
My Lords, Her Majesty’s Treasury is in the process of laying statutory instruments under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act in order to deliver a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the event of a no-deal scenario. The two SIs being debated in this group are part of...
Thank you. On the assumption that I do not have a little hat on my microphone, I should say that when I read through these two sets of draft regulations and their Explanatory Memoranda, they were a depressing reminder of the consequences of leaving the EU with no Brexit deal...
Thank you. On the assumption that I do not have a little hat on my microphone, I should say that when I read through these two sets of draft regulations and their Explanatory Memoranda, they were a depressing reminder of the consequences of leaving the EU with no Brexit deal...
My Lords, probably few if any other people would stand up and say that CRD IV is their favourite piece of legislation, but for a variety of reasons it is my favourite. I do not mean to alarm the Minister or his officials by that, because we seem to have...
My Lords, probably few if any other people would stand up and say that CRD IV is their favourite piece of legislation, but for a variety of reasons it is my favourite. I do not mean to alarm the Minister or his officials by that, because we seem to have...