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To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the expiration of the New START treaty; and what implications of this they anticipate for nuclear arms control and disarmament.
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the expiration of the New START treaty; and what implications of this they anticipate for nuclear arms control and disarmament.
The New START Treaty was a bilateral agreement between the United States and Russian Federation; any replacement treaty is a matter for the US and Russia. Genuine and verifiable strategic arms control among the largest Nuclear Weapons States can be a positive step for global security. However, following Russia's decision to suspend participation in New START verification measures in 2023, future approaches need to be based on concrete, and verifiable actions. The UK regularly raises issues related to strategic risk reduction through the P5 process.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what progress has she made on renewing the New START Treaty before its expiration in February 2026.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what progress has she made on renewing the New START Treaty before its expiration in February 2026.
The New START Treaty is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Russian Federation; any replacement treaty is a matter for the US and Russia. The UK regularly raises issues related to strategic risk reduction, including arms control with the USA and Russia through the expert-level P5 process. Genuine and verifiable strategic arms control among the largest Nuclear Weapons States can be a positive step for global security. However, following Russia's decision to suspend participation in New START verification measures in 2023, future approaches need to be based on concrete, and verifiable actions.
In late 2024, President Putin approved a new Russian nuclear doctrine. This paper briefly examines Russia's nuclear weapons policies, capabilities and programmes.
In late 2024, President Putin approved a new Russian nuclear doctrine. This paper briefly examines Russia's nuclear weapons policies, capabilities and programmes.
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, if he will hold discussions with his US counterpart on taking steps to ensure that all parties originally committed to the New START Treaty comply with their obligations under that treaty.
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, if he will hold discussions with his US counterpart on taking steps to ensure that all parties originally committed to the New START Treaty comply with their obligations under that treaty.
The UK has long valued New START (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties) for its contribution to strategic stability, transparency and building trust. Russia's unilateral suspension undermines this. We urge Russia to return to full Treaty compliance.
We regularly discuss nuclear arms control issues with the US and will continue to support their efforts to secure a successor to the Treaty when it expires in 2026. We welcome the United States' commitment to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what discussions he has had with his United States counterpart on Russia's announced suspension of participation in the New START Treaty.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what discussions he has had with his United States counterpart on Russia's announced suspension of participation in the New START Treaty.
The UK has long valued New START for its contribution to strategic stability, transparency and building trust. Russia's unilateral suspension undermines this. We have been, and will remain, in close contact with the US to discuss Russia's withdrawal from New START and its implications. We have expressed at NATO our disappointment in this decision and urge Russia to immediately return to full compliance of the Treaty and to engage with the US constructively.
This briefing looks at how President Joe Biden's foreign policy has in his first year lived up to his campaign promises, his other major foreign policy achievements and the challenges ahead.
This briefing looks at how President Joe Biden's foreign policy has in his first year lived up to his campaign promises, his other major foreign policy achievements and the challenges ahead.
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have had any discussions with (1) the government of Russia, and (2) the government of the United States, about a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have had any discussions with (1) the government of Russia, and (2) the government of the United States, about a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
The Foreign Secretary holds regular discussions with his US counterpart on a range of issues, including on arms control and strategic stability. These discussions are reflected and supported by daily cooperation at official level between the UK and the US, as well as by wider cooperation with NATO Allies. As a fellow Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, we engage with Russia on matters of international peace and security, including arms control. Through our Embassy in Moscow we have had a number of discussions with the Russian authorities on this topic.
US strategic arms, along with those of Russia, are limited by the New START Treaty. We recognise the contribution New START has made to international security and strategic stability by increasing transparency and mutual confidence among the two largest Nuclear Weapons States. However, New START does not include new Russian systems, nor does it place any limits on China's growing nuclear arsenal. We therefore support extension of New START while a successor agreement is negotiated.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what steps he is taking to support negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what steps he is taking to support negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
The Foreign Secretary holds regular discussions with his US counterpart on a range of issues, including on arms control and strategic stability. These discussions are reflected and supported by daily cooperation at official level between the UK and the US, as well as by wider cooperation with NATO Allies.
US strategic arms, along with those of Russia, are limited by the New START Treaty. We recognise the contribution New START has made to international security and strategic stability by increasing transparency and mutual confidence among the two largest Nuclear Weapons States. As we have stated publicly, both in multilateral fora and in this House, we support its continued implementation and have encouraged the US to extend New START while negotiating a successor agreement.
However, we recognise that New START has its limits. It does not include new Russian systems, nor does it place any limits on China's growing nuclear arsenal. We therefore urge China to engage seriously with US calls for a new trilateral arms control agreement.
Bilateral agreements aimed at restricting the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have been in place since the early 1970s. For the first time in nearly 50 years that nuclear arms control architecture is now potentially heading towards a crisis.
Bilateral agreements aimed at restricting the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have been in place since the early 1970s. For the first time in nearly 50 years that nuclear arms control architecture is now potentially heading towards a crisis.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with the government of the United States about the possible renewal of the New START Treaty next year.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with the government of the United States about the possible renewal of the New START Treaty next year.
We recognise the contribution the New START Treaty has made to international security by increasing transparency and mutual confidence amongst the two largest Nuclear Weapons States. The Treaty has delivered a reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism. However, we are also clear that New START has limitations. It does not include new Russian systems. Nor does it place any limits on China's growing nuclear arsenal. We therefore support the US Government's trilateral strategic arms control initiative.
We have regular discussions with the Government of the United States on these issues and have made clear that we support the continued implementation of New START. We have also encouraged the US to extend the Treaty while negotiating any successor agreement.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to whether the government of China should be party to any future New START Treaty.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to whether the government of China should be party to any future New START Treaty.
We recognise the contribution the New START Treaty has made to international security by increasing transparency and mutual confidence amongst the two largest Nuclear Weapons States. The Treaty has delivered a reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism. We support its continued implementation and have encouraged the US to extend New START while negotiating any successor agreement. However, we are also clear that New START has limitations. It does not include new Russian systems. Nor does it place any limits on China's growing nuclear arsenal. We therefore support the US Government's trilateral strategic arms control initiative.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with the governments of Russia and the United States about extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which is due to expire in February 2021.
To ask Her Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with the governments of Russia and the United States about extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which is due to expire in February 2021.
We recognise the contribution the New START Treaty has made to international security by increasing transparency and mutual confidence amongst the two largest Nuclear Weapons States. The Treaty has delivered a reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism. We support its continued implementation and have encouraged the US to extend New START while negotiating any successor agreement.
However, we are also clear that New START has limitations. It does not include new Russian systems. Nor does it place any limits on China's growing nuclear arsenal. We therefore see real advantage in President Trump's call for a new strategic arms control agreement including China. We urge both Russia and China to engage seriously with the US on this initiative.
The UK regularly discusses these issues with the US and Russia. We recently had discussions on strategic arms control at a meeting of the five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states, or "P5", which took place in London on 12-13 February. At that meeting, all five states, including the US and Russia, underlined the importance of reducing nuclear risk and promoting stability, and agreed that dialogue on strategic risk reduction should continue.
My Lords, I am glad that we have been able to reach the time for this debate but, like others, I am obviously sorry about the circumstances. I join them in wishing a speedy recovery to my very good friend the noble Lord, Lord Judd.
This report is presented to your...
My Lords, I am glad that we have been able to reach the time for this debate but, like others, I am obviously sorry about the circumstances. I join them in wishing a speedy recovery to my very good friend the noble Lord, Lord Judd.
This report is presented to your...
If my noble friend will allow me, there is an important recommendation in view of the recent tension between India and Pakistan. The committee made a sensible recommendation to
invite India and Pakistan to attend the next P5 meeting; they have been included in past discussions. I see that the...
If my noble friend will allow me, there is an important recommendation in view of the recent tension between India and Pakistan. The committee made a sensible recommendation to
invite India and Pakistan to attend the next P5 meeting; they have been included in past discussions. I see that the...
Like my noble friend, I am not enlightened by the Government’s reply. It would be a very good idea, but the P5 would have to do it. As the UK is its chair, it may have some additional influence in persuading that step to be taken. I very much hope...
Like my noble friend, I am not enlightened by the Government’s reply. It would be a very good idea, but the P5 would have to do it. As the UK is its chair, it may have some additional influence in persuading that step to be taken. I very much hope...
My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the register of interests, particularly my vice-chairmanship of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I shall do my best to conclude my remarks within the newly imposed time limit. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, on...
My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the register of interests, particularly my vice-chairmanship of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I shall do my best to conclude my remarks within the newly imposed time limit. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, on...
I have very real concerns on the cyber issue. As we construct the Dreadnought class, one needs to look down to the SMEs providing equipment. Proper attention is not being paid at the moment to the possibility of trojans and other things being placed within systems that are fitted in...
I have very real concerns on the cyber issue. As we construct the Dreadnought class, one needs to look down to the SMEs providing equipment. Proper attention is not being paid at the moment to the possibility of trojans and other things being placed within systems that are fitted in...
I thank my noble friend for those points. The last time this issue was raised in a debate, he asked the Minister to consider red teaming the Dreadnought programme. The US regularly red teams its resilient military systems and is candid about its vulnerability to this threat. We are investing...
I thank my noble friend for those points. The last time this issue was raised in a debate, he asked the Minister to consider red teaming the Dreadnought programme. The US regularly red teams its resilient military systems and is candid about its vulnerability to this threat. We are investing...
My Lords, I have only a fraction of the experience and knowledge of the noble Lord, whose contribution to this debate I agree with. He gave very clear evidence as part of our committee’s inquiry and should be commended for the work that he is doing.
The noble Lord concluded by...
My Lords, I have only a fraction of the experience and knowledge of the noble Lord, whose contribution to this debate I agree with. He gave very clear evidence as part of our committee’s inquiry and should be commended for the work that he is doing.
The noble Lord concluded by...