I refer the noble lady to the answer given to Question 118566 in the House of Commons on 16 March 2026.

The size and composition of the Royal Navy are kept under continuous review to ensure the force can meet Defence tasks and operational commitments.

I refer the noble lady to the answers given in the House of Commons to Questions 9539 and 15397, reproduced below.

The Type 83 Destroyer forms part of a wider Future Air Dominance System (FADS) capability concept, making specific costs for the Type 83 element hard to differentiate from the wider whole. Over the last three financial years, c.£1M has been spent on platform-specific design for the Type 83. This forms part of a c.£6.9M which is the broader notional spend for Type 83 work as a part of FADS.

The role of Maritime Air Defence, currently delivered by Type 45 Destroyers, will be delivered in the future by a mix of crewed Common Combat Vessels and uncrewed, autonomous missile (Type 91) and sensor (Type 94) ships.

The decision to move to this hybrid approach was taken after detailed analysis of current and future threats, including lessons from ongoing conflicts. The specific analysis is necessarily classified, but the mix of crewed and uncrewed systems will produce a more flexible force, with greater missile capacity while also improving mass. The alternative, an expensive, exquisite platform such as the Type 83, would have resulted in too few ships to cover all the Royal Navy’s tasks, increasing risk. Detailed planning for the transition between Type 45 and the Hybrid Navy Maritime Air Defence capability will be undertaken in consultation with industry, which will determine whether a Type 45 extension is implemented. A final decision is not expected until 2027-28.

The role of Maritime Air Defence, currently delivered by Type 45 Destroyers, will be delivered in the future by a mix of crewed Common Combat Vessels and uncrewed, autonomous missile (Type 91) and sensor (Type 94) ships.

The decision to move to this hybrid approach was taken after detailed analysis of current and future threats, including lessons from ongoing conflicts. The specific analysis is necessarily classified, but the mix of crewed and uncrewed systems will produce a more flexible force, with greater missile capacity while also improving mass. The alternative, an expensive, exquisite platform such as the Type 83, would have resulted in too few ships to cover all the Royal Navy’s tasks, increasing risk. Detailed planning for the transition between Type 45 and the Hybrid Navy Maritime Air Defence capability will be undertaken in consultation with industry, which will determine whether a Type 45 extension is implemented. A final decision is not expected until 2027-28.

The Defence Investment Plan (DIP) has committed to a pipeline of work in Type 26 and Type 31 construction which will employ the prime Scottish shipyards (BAE Systems and Babcock) well into the 2030s, securing thousands of jobs and millions of pounds of economic benefit to the local areas.

Delivering world-leading anti-air warfare capability for the Royal Navy has always been a priority for this department as set out in the Strategic Defence Review and the DIP. The Type 83 destroyer was an early-stage concept, and no decisions had been made on where and how it would be delivered.

The DIP made commitments to the Common Combat Vessels and Type 9x autonomous vessels as part of the hybrid navy. This work presents a substantial and exciting opportunity for Scottish shipyards, boatyards and technology companies to sustain and create jobs across the shipbuilding enterprise and supply chain.

The Government is focused on providing a clear and transparent pipeline of work in support of the Royal Navy and as a spur to sectoral growth.

The Defence Investment Plan (DIP) has committed to a pipeline of work in Type 26 and Type 31 construction which will employ the prime Scottish shipyards (BAE Systems and Babcock) well into the 2030s, securing thousands of jobs and millions of pounds of economic benefit to the local areas.

Delivering world-leading anti-air warfare capability for the Royal Navy has always been a priority for this department as set out in the Strategic Defence Review and the DIP. The Type 83 destroyer was an early-stage concept, and no decisions had been made on where and how it would be delivered.

The DIP made commitments to the Common Combat Vessels and Type 9x autonomous vessels as part of the hybrid navy. This work presents a substantial and exciting opportunity for Scottish shipyards, boatyards and technology companies to sustain and create jobs across the shipbuilding enterprise and supply chain.

The Government is focused on providing a clear and transparent pipeline of work in support of the Royal Navy and as a spur to sectoral growth.

The role of Maritime Air Defence, currently delivered by Type 45 Destroyers, will be delivered in the future by a mix of crewed Common Combat Vessels and uncrewed, autonomous missile (Type 91) and sensor (Type 94) ships.

The decision to move to this hybrid approach was taken after detailed analysis of current and future threats, including lessons from ongoing conflicts. The specific analysis is necessarily classified, but the mix of crewed and uncrewed systems will produce a more flexible force, with greater missile capacity while also improving mass. The alternative, an expensive, exquisite platform such as the Type 83, would have resulted in too few ships to cover all the Royal Navy’s tasks, increasing risk. Detailed planning for the transition between Type 45 and the Hybrid Navy Maritime Air Defence capability will be undertaken in consultation with industry, which will determine whether a Type 45 extension is implemented. A final decision is not expected until 2027-28.

The role of Maritime Air Defence, currently delivered by Type 45 Destroyers, will be delivered in the future by a mix of crewed Common Combat Vessels and uncrewed, autonomous missile (Type 91) and sensor (Type 94) ships.

The decision to move to this hybrid approach was taken after detailed analysis of current and future threats, including lessons from ongoing conflicts. The specific analysis is necessarily classified, but the mix of crewed and uncrewed systems will produce a more flexible force, with greater missile capacity while also improving mass. The alternative, an expensive, exquisite platform such as the Type 83, would have resulted in too few ships to cover all the Royal Navy’s tasks, increasing risk. Detailed planning for the transition between Type 45 and the Hybrid Navy Maritime Air Defence capability will be undertaken in consultation with industry, which will determine whether a Type 45 extension is implemented. A final decision is not expected until 2027-28.

The Defence Investment Plan sets out the Royal Navy’s (RN) approach to delivering the UK’s most advanced maritime air defence capability and the rationale for this approach. Rather than delivering this capability through a small number of large and expensive Type 83 destroyers, the RN will instead invest in a hybrid mix of crewed and uncrewed capabilities that will be more suited to facing the threats of modern warfare. The RN will procure at least six Common Combat Vessels (CCV) which will act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, thus extending the Navy’s reach, resilience and lethality.

The Defence Investment Plan sets out the Royal Navy’s (RN) approach to delivering the UK’s most advanced maritime air defence capability and the rationale for this approach. Rather than delivering this capability through a small number of large and expensive Type 83 destroyers, the RN will instead invest in a hybrid mix of crewed and uncrewed capabilities that will be more suited to facing the threats of modern warfare. The RN will procure at least six Common Combat Vessels (CCV) which will act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, thus extending the Navy’s reach, resilience and lethality.

The Defence Investment Plan sets out the Royal Navy’s (RN) approach to delivering the UK’s most advanced maritime air defence capability and the rationale for this approach. Rather than delivering this capability through a small number of large and expensive Type 83 destroyers, the RN will instead invest in a hybrid mix of crewed and uncrewed capabilities that will be more suited to facing the threats of modern warfare. The RN will procure at least six Common Combat Vessels (CCV) which will act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, thus extending the Navy’s reach, resilience and lethality.

The Defence Investment Plan sets out the Royal Navy’s (RN) approach to delivering the UK’s most advanced maritime air defence capability and the rationale for this approach. Rather than delivering this capability through a small number of large and expensive Type 83 destroyers, the RN will instead invest in a hybrid mix of crewed and uncrewed capabilities that will be more suited to facing the threats of modern warfare. The RN will procure at least six Common Combat Vessels (CCV) which will act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, thus extending the Navy’s reach, resilience and lethality.

The Defence Investment Plan sets out the Royal Navy’s (RN) approach to delivering the UK’s most advanced maritime air defence capability and the rationale for this approach. Rather than delivering this capability through a small number of large and expensive Type 83 destroyers, the RN will instead invest in a hybrid mix of crewed and uncrewed capabilities that will be more suited to facing the threats of modern warfare. The RN will procure at least six Common Combat Vessels (CCV) which will act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, thus extending the Navy’s reach, resilience and lethality.

The Defence Investment Plan sets out the Royal Navy’s (RN) approach to delivering the UK’s most advanced maritime air defence capability and the rationale for this approach. Rather than delivering this capability through a small number of large and expensive Type 83 destroyers, the RN will instead invest in a hybrid mix of crewed and uncrewed capabilities that will be more suited to facing the threats of modern warfare. The RN will procure at least six Common Combat Vessels (CCV) which will act as a control hub for uncrewed systems, thus extending the Navy’s reach, resilience and lethality.

We inherited an underdeveloped concept for Type 83 when we took office. The Type 83 Destroyer forms part of a wider Future Air Dominance System (FADS) capability concept, making specific costs for the Type 83 element hard to differentiate from the wider whole. Over the last three financial years, c.£1 million has been spent on platform-specific design for the Type 83. This forms part of c.£6.9 million which is the broader notional spend for Type 83 work as a part of FADS.

I refer the hon. Member to my response to question 106653:

The Type 83 concept is currently under review against the Royal Navy’s Hybrid Navy Strategy. Future business case approval remains subject to the Defence Investment Plan.

I refer the hon. Member to my response to question 106653 on 27 January 2026.

I refer the hon Member to my response to question 106653.

I refer the hon Member to my response to question 106653.