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To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the resilience of supply chains for memory components used in artificial intelligence computing.
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the resilience of supply chains for memory components used in artificial intelligence computing.
The Government recognises the importance of advanced memory components, including those used in artificial intelligence (AI) computing, to the UK economy and critical technologies, and the need for secure and resilient supply chains. Global memory chip supply chains remain vulnerable to supply risks arising from rapidly growing demand and the concentration of production capacity in a limited number of overseas markets.
The Government monitors the impacts of supply chain disruption and engages with industry to understand potential impacts on UK businesses and critical sectors.
Given the global and interconnected nature of semiconductor supply chains, the UK is working closely with international partners, including through the G7 and OECD, to strengthen collective resilience, improve information-sharing and support secure and diversified semiconductor supply chains.
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, pursuant to the Answer of 5 June 2026 to Question 3329 on Electric Vehicles: Grants, what estimate she has made of the proportion of grant-supported vehicle components that originate from UK-based supply chains.
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, pursuant to the Answer of 5 June 2026 to Question 3329 on Electric Vehicles: Grants, what estimate she has made of the proportion of grant-supported vehicle components that originate from UK-based supply chains.
The Department for Transport does not collect or hold data on vehicle component origins.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, if his Department will conduct an investigation into whether Watchkeeper drone components are being exported from the UK to Israel to support drone exports to Romania.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, if his Department will conduct an investigation into whether Watchkeeper drone components are being exported from the UK to Israel to support drone exports to Romania.
Watchkeeper unmanned aerial system (UAS) components are licensed from the UK to Israel solely for the purpose of supporting onward export to a Romanian UAS programme.
The Department has published extensive information on our export licences to Israel. This is available here: Israel export control licensing data: 31 July 2025 - GOV.UK.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, if his Department will conduct an investigation into whether Watchkeeper drone components are being exported from the UK to Israel to support drone exports to Romania.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, if his Department will conduct an investigation into whether Watchkeeper drone components are being exported from the UK to Israel to support drone exports to Romania.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps he is taking to address delays in importing elevator parts to the UK.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps he is taking to address delays in importing elevator parts to the UK.
The Government is working with border and customs authorities to ensure import processes for elevator components operate as efficiently as possible, including through clear guidance and the use of simplified and digital customs procedures.
If a company’s goods are delayed at customs, they should first contact their courier (e.g., DHL, FedEx, UPS) or customs broker, as they usually have the most direct information on the status. They can contact the HMRC Customs and International Trade Helpline on 0300 322 9434, or HMRC imports and exports enquiries for assistance.
We have taken further steps to make it easier for businesses to import products, including extending importer labelling easements and continuing the recognition of some EU rules including CE marking. These measures reduce duplicative regulatory requirements and administrative burdens for manufactured goods. In practice, this supports smoother, faster market access and helps minimise delays in supplying critical components, including lift components, into the market.
The Government maintains strong relationships with industry and international partners and is always looking at ways to reduce burdens and support supply chains.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps he is taking to improve elevator part manufacturing levels in the UK.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps he is taking to improve elevator part manufacturing levels in the UK.
Manufacturing is crucial for the UK's economy, driving innovation, creating jobs, and boosting national security and resilience. Last year this government published our 10-year Modern Industrial Strategy, setting out our long-term approach to strengthening domestic capability. Alongside it we published the Advanced Manufacturing Sector Plan, which outlines both sector-specific and cross-cutting measures aimed at boosting manufacturing overall, including for component manufacturers. Our focus is on delivering against these strategies to make the UK the best place to start and grow a manufacturing business.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps he is taking to help increase domestic manufacturing capacity in (a) grid components, (b) pharmaceuticals, (c) advanced materials and (d) other essential sectors.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps he is taking to help increase domestic manufacturing capacity in (a) grid components, (b) pharmaceuticals, (c) advanced materials and (d) other essential sectors.
Last year this government published our 10-year Modern Industrial Strategy, setting out our long-term approach to strengthening domestic capability across strategically important sectors. Alongside it we published several sector plans. The Advanced Manufacturing Sector Plan, sets out our support for six ‘frontier’ manufacturing industries, including advanced materials. It also outlines cross-cutting measures aimed at boosting manufacturing overall, including for component manufacturers and foundational industries.
The Life Sciences Sector Plan sets out support for the pharmaceuticals industry, while the Clean Energy Industries Sector Plan shares our priorities for the UK’s clean energy economy, including how we’re tackling and improving grid connections.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps his Department is taking to ensure that UK-made weapons components are not used in violations of international humanitarian law by allied states.
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what steps his Department is taking to ensure that UK-made weapons components are not used in violations of international humanitarian law by allied states.
The Business and Trade Secretary is responsible for licensing the export of military goods. In his decisions he draws on advice from the Foreign Secretary, including with regard to compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Under the UK’s robust export licensing criteria, the Government will not issue export licences if there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of IHL. We review all new licence applications on this basis. We also keep all our extant licences (which typically last for two years) under continual review.
Should licences be found to no longer be consistent with the criteria, the Government can amend, suspend or revoke them.
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To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the extent to which British military equipment contains components made in China or is reliant on rare earth minerals from China.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the extent to which British military equipment contains components made in China or is reliant on rare earth minerals from China.
My Lords, the Government and the Ministry of Defence welcome foreign trade where it allows us to provide our Armed Forces with the equipment they require, but the Government will not compromise our national security or our stringent legal and regulatory requirements or conflict with the objectives of our defence industrial strategy. The Government are working at pace to diversify the UK critical mineral supply chain and reduce reliance on any single source.
My Lords, the Government and the Ministry of Defence welcome foreign trade where it allows us to provide our Armed Forces with the equipment they require, but the Government will not compromise our national security or our stringent legal and regulatory requirements or conflict with the objectives of our defence industrial strategy. The Government are working at pace to diversify the UK critical mineral supply chain and reduce reliance on any single source.
My Lords, the Government and the Ministry of Defence welcome foreign trade where it allows us to provide our Armed Forces with the equipment they require, but the Government will not compromise our national security or our stringent legal and regulatory requirements or conflict with the objectives of our defence industrial strategy. The Government are working at pace to diversify the UK critical mineral supply chain and reduce reliance on any single source.
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the extent to which British military equipment contains components made in China or is reliant on rare earth minerals from China.
My Lords, the chilling reality is that we are living in an age of cyber and data espionage and sabotage, whether from the use of SIMs, cellular IoT modules and everyday domestic components or wilfully directed malign activity by agencies hostile to western values and the UK. Can the Minister confirm to this House in more detail what protective measures the MoD is urgently deploying in respect of our defence supply chain to avoid our defence capability being unacceptably compromised?
My Lords, the chilling reality is that we are living in an age of cyber and data espionage and sabotage, whether from the use of SIMs, cellular IoT modules and everyday domestic components or wilfully directed malign activity by agencies hostile to western values and the UK. Can the Minister confirm to this House in more detail what protective measures the MoD is urgently deploying in respect of our defence supply chain to avoid our defence capability being unacceptably compromised?
The Government introduced a new critical minerals strategy—which is part of what the noble Baroness is asking about—that set an ambition for 2035 to reduce our reliance, and we are engaging with our partners on this. We also signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC. She asked me specifically about the approach of the MoD. The MoD is working hard to think about ways of stockpiling
critical components and critical minerals for the UK defence sector and to improve recycling and the circular economy. I want to stress the recognition of the point that the noble Baroness makes and the need for a much wider approach, as identified in the strategic defence review and the national security strategy. We do not in any way underestimate the persistent challenges in this space, and we will do all in our power to use the powers we have to deal with them.
The Government introduced a new critical minerals strategy—which is part of what the noble Baroness is asking about—that set an ambition for 2035 to reduce our reliance, and we are engaging with our partners on this. We also signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC. She asked me specifically about the approach of the MoD. The MoD is working hard to think about ways of stockpiling
critical components and critical minerals for the UK defence sector and to improve recycling and the circular economy. I want to stress the recognition of the point that the noble Baroness makes and the need for a much wider approach, as identified in the strategic defence review and the national security strategy. We do not in any way underestimate the persistent challenges in this space, and we will do all in our power to use the powers we have to deal with them.
The Government introduced a new critical minerals strategy—which is part of what the noble Baroness is asking about—that set an ambition for 2035 to reduce our reliance, and we are engaging with our partners on this. We also signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC. She asked me specifically about the approach of the MoD. The MoD is working hard to think about ways of stockpiling
critical components and critical minerals for the UK defence sector and to improve recycling and the circular economy. I want to stress the recognition of the point that the noble Baroness makes and the need for a much wider approach, as identified in the strategic defence review and the national security strategy. We do not in any way underestimate the persistent challenges in this space, and we will do all in our power to use the powers we have to deal with them.
My Lords, the chilling reality is that we are living in an age of cyber and data espionage and sabotage, whether from the use of SIMs, cellular IoT modules and everyday domestic components or wilfully directed malign activity by agencies hostile to western values and the UK. Can the Minister confirm to this House in more detail what protective measures the MoD is urgently deploying in respect of our defence supply chain to avoid our defence capability being unacceptably compromised?
My Lords, a typical high-end, Chinese-made electric and semi-autonomous vehicle will have up to a dozen cameras, radars and laser sensors collecting images of everything around it. Cyber security is at best opaque, and a Norwegian researcher recently reported that 90% of the data that was collected by his car was sent back to China. What is the Government’s view on visitors with Chinese cars coming to MoD sites? You would not allow someone from the People’s Liberation Army to stand there with a video camera, and you would not allow a drone to fly over your site. But how do you monitor, police, and manage foreign Chinese cars coming on and off MoD facilities?
My Lords, a typical high-end, Chinese-made electric and semi-autonomous vehicle will have up to a dozen cameras, radars and laser sensors collecting images of everything around it. Cyber security is at best opaque, and a Norwegian researcher recently reported that 90% of the data that was collected by his car was sent back to China. What is the Government’s view on visitors with Chinese cars coming to MoD sites? You would not allow someone from the People’s Liberation Army to stand there with a video camera, and you would not allow a drone to fly over your site. But how do you monitor, police, and manage foreign Chinese cars coming on and off MoD facilities?
The first thing I should say is that we focus on all vehicles coming to MoD sites, not just Chinese vehicles. All modern electric vehicles have surveillance components which we should be careful about, so I want to be completely clear with the noble Lord and the House that that is our approach. With regard to the question he asked, however, we are aware that individual defence organisations may have stricter requirements relating to electric vehicles on some sites, but, obviously, we do not provide specific details for security reasons, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand. We have made a lot of progress since the previous Administration instructed all government departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment. My right honourable friend the National Security Minister made it clear in November 2025 that all sensitive government sites originally identified with such equipment—that is CCTV equipment manufactured in China—have now finished their replacement work.
The first thing I should say is that we focus on all vehicles coming to MoD sites, not just Chinese vehicles. All modern electric vehicles have surveillance components which we should be careful about, so I want to be completely clear with the noble Lord and the House that that is our approach. With regard to the question he asked, however, we are aware that individual defence organisations may have stricter requirements relating to electric vehicles on some sites, but, obviously, we do not provide specific details for security reasons, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand. We have made a lot of progress since the previous Administration instructed all government departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment. My right honourable friend the National Security Minister made it clear in November 2025 that all sensitive government sites originally identified with such equipment—that is CCTV equipment manufactured in China—have now finished their replacement work.
The first thing I should say is that we focus on all vehicles coming to MoD sites, not just Chinese vehicles. All modern electric vehicles have surveillance components which we should be careful about, so I want to be completely clear with the noble Lord and the House that that is our approach. With regard to the question he asked, however, we are aware that individual defence organisations may have stricter requirements relating to electric vehicles on some sites, but, obviously, we do not provide specific details for security reasons, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand. We have made a lot of progress since the previous Administration instructed all government departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment. My right honourable friend the National Security Minister made it clear in November 2025 that all sensitive government sites originally identified with such equipment—that is CCTV equipment manufactured in China—have now finished their replacement work.
My Lords, a typical high-end, Chinese-made electric and semi-autonomous vehicle will have up to a dozen cameras, radars and laser sensors collecting images of everything around it. Cyber security is at best opaque, and a Norwegian researcher recently reported that 90% of the data that was collected by his car was sent back to China. What is the Government’s view on visitors with Chinese cars coming to MoD sites? You would not allow someone from the People’s Liberation Army to stand there with a video camera, and you would not allow a drone to fly over your site. But how do you monitor, police, and manage foreign Chinese cars coming on and off MoD facilities?
My Lords, the Minister will be aware that China has systematically and strategically got a grip and a monopoly on the refining of critical minerals. The effect of that has been demonstrated only this week, where China has cut off Japan from critical minerals over a political issue. First, what help are we and our allies giving to Japan in this important crisis? Secondly, what are we going to be doing in the future in order to secure our own supply chain to make sure we do not suffer from this dependence on China?
My Lords, the Minister will be aware that China has systematically and strategically got a grip and a monopoly on the refining of critical minerals. The effect of that has been demonstrated only this week, where China has cut off Japan from critical minerals over a political issue. First, what help are we and our allies giving to Japan in this important crisis? Secondly, what are we going to be doing in the future in order to secure our own supply chain to make sure we do not suffer from this dependence on China?
My noble friend raises a very important point, which is the basis of a very live and active discussion within government at the moment. I have already mentioned the launch of the critical mineral strategy. I want also to draw attention to the urgency and the energy with which this problem is being addressed. The UK and the US signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC on 4 February, only three weeks ago, and this will help secure supply
in the mining and processing of critical minerals. I also want to address my noble friend’s question about our work with partners and allies. Our long-standing and trusted relationships with our partners and allies around the world, including Japan, are one of our strongest—both hard-power and soft-power—assets. We are engaging very actively with Australia, including early discussions on collaboration on its critical mineral strategic reserve project. We are also working, as I think my noble friend would expect, with NATO, Five Eyes, AUKUS, Canada and France.