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To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the proportion of the Department's cryptographic estate that cannot be upgraded to post-quantum standards without hardware replacement; and what the replacement timetable is.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the proportion of the Department's cryptographic estate that cannot be upgraded to post-quantum standards without hardware replacement; and what the replacement timetable is.
The Ministry of Defence is assessing its cryptographic dependencies as part of its preparations for transition to post-quantum cryptography. This work will determine where migration can be achieved through software or firmware updates and where hardware replacement will be necessary.
This assessment remains ongoing and it is therefore not currently possible to provide a definitive proportion or replacement timetable. Necessary replacements will be managed through Defence's post-quantum migration planning and appropriate equipment refresh cycles.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, by what instrument the milestones in the National Cyber Security Centre's guidance Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography of 20 March 2025 are given effect for government departments and arm's length bodies.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, by what instrument the milestones in the National Cyber Security Centre's guidance Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography of 20 March 2025 are given effect for government departments and arm's length bodies.
The Government Cyber Action Plan (GCAP), published in 2026, sets out the responsibilities for improving cyber resilience within Government departments and arm's length bodies. Under the GCAP, Accounting Officers are accountable for ensuring their organisations meet agreed cyber resilience outcomes, including for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. The Government Cyber Unit is developing a suite of guidance to support departments' migration planning, in line with NCSC timelines, and a performance framework to monitor progress against GCAP outcomes across government, strengthening accountability for delivery.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what proportion of central government cryptographic systems is assessed as capable of being upgraded in place to the standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in August 2024; and what proportion will require hardware replacement.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what proportion of central government cryptographic systems is assessed as capable of being upgraded in place to the standards published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in August 2024; and what proportion will require hardware replacement.
The UK Government will follow the National Cyber Security Centre’s (NCSC) recommendations on post-quantum cryptography standards. Currently, the NCSC's recommended algorithms include those standardised by NIST in 2024. The Government Cyber Unit is developing a suite of guidance to support departments' migration planning, in line with NCSC timelines and will ask departments to complete a discovery of their cryptographic assets to understand the proportion that will require migration. This will include if assets require hardware replacement.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether she has made an estimate of the cost of migrating government systems to post-quantum cryptography.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether she has made an estimate of the cost of migrating government systems to post-quantum cryptography.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, who the senior responsible owner is for migration of government systems to post-quantum cryptography; in which department that post sits; and what budget has been allocated to that programme in the financial year 2026-27.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, who the senior responsible owner is for migration of government systems to post-quantum cryptography; in which department that post sits; and what budget has been allocated to that programme in the financial year 2026-27.
The UK Government does not currently operate a centrally funded programme to migrate all government systems to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Responsibility for planning, funding and implementing PQC migration plans rests with individual departments, as they manage their own technology estates, cyber risks and funding (including for 2026-27).
Work on PQC migration is delivered alongside broader improvements to Government cyber resilience under the Government Cyber Action Plan, which illustrates departmental responsibilities. The Government Cyber Unit, which moved to the new Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in July 2026, is developing a suite of guidance to support departments with their migration planning. The guidance follows timelines set out by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to complete planning by 2027, migrate high-priority systems by 2031 and all remaining systems by 2035.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment has been made of the level of vulnerability of military command-and-control networks to quantum-based decryption.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment has been made of the level of vulnerability of military command-and-control networks to quantum-based decryption.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether she has adopted the National Cyber Security Centre's guidance entitled Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography of 20 March 2025 as the standard for its own departments and arm's length bodies.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether she has adopted the National Cyber Security Centre's guidance entitled Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography of 20 March 2025 as the standard for its own departments and arm's length bodies.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what the timetable is for compiling a cryptographic inventory of central government systems; and whether a summary of that inventory will be published.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what the timetable is for compiling a cryptographic inventory of central government systems; and whether a summary of that inventory will be published.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, which services on the GOV.UK platform have completed migration to post-quantum cryptography; and what the timetable is for the remainder.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, which services on the GOV.UK platform have completed migration to post-quantum cryptography; and what the timetable is for the remainder.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment she has made of the readiness of operators of critical national infrastructure to meet the post-quantum cryptography migration milestones set out by the National Cyber Security Centre; and how that readiness is monitored.
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment she has made of the readiness of operators of critical national infrastructure to meet the post-quantum cryptography migration milestones set out by the National Cyber Security Centre; and how that readiness is monitored.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what measures are in place to protect or increase encryption with the advancement of quantum computing.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what measures are in place to protect or increase encryption with the advancement of quantum computing.
The Ministry of Defence is working closely with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), as the National Technical Authority, to address encryption relating to quantum computing. This includes identifying digital dependencies, migrating priority systems, and transitioning to post-quantum technology, in line with NCSC guidance.
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, who has custody over the encryption keys used to protect data held within the NHS Federated Data Platform and the Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, who has custody over the encryption keys used to protect data held within the NHS Federated Data Platform and the Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
NHS England owns the keys. The Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) software generates, controls, and stores the key values securely, so they are not accessible to human users.
The use of encryption keys is strictly controlled by NHS England for the NHS Federated Data Platform (NHS FDP) tenant and by the data owners of local tenants.
Both the NHS FDP and PET contracts are based on Government Legal Department terms and conditions, aligning to best practice in respect of cyber security and security management, which is reflected in the redacted versions of the agreements available on Contracts Finder.
The contract terms reflect and support the management of encryption keys as set out above, where specific requirements relate to encryption keys this would be included in the specifications of the contracts. Both agreements have terms which ensure enforcement of United Kingdom legislation and regulatory requirements in relation to data processing. For reference, the NHS FDP contract can be found at the following link:
https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/0f8a65b5-23a2-4294-abb1-a7fd8efb3ad0
In addition, the NHS England PET contract can be found at the following:
https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/2fa49293-bc01-4e0f-a017-f01cb0195212
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what steps the Government Communication Service is taking to implement cryptographic authentication and digital watermarking on official media to prevent the dissemination of deepfake government content.
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what steps the Government Communication Service is taking to implement cryptographic authentication and digital watermarking on official media to prevent the dissemination of deepfake government content.
GCS works closely with media partners and makes use of advanced technical capabilities, including artificial intelligence-driven tools, verification systems, and third-party brand safety tools, to ensure official content is served in safe, authentic, and suitable environments.
GCS continuously monitors developments from regulators to ensure that all platforms hosting official government messages uphold robust security measures.
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether she is considering using perceptual and cryptographic hash matching to prevent the spread of mis- and disinformation.
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether she is considering using perceptual and cryptographic hash matching to prevent the spread of mis- and disinformation.
The government is not considering hash matching to address the spread of mis- and disinformation. We recognise concerns and continue to explore options, but there is no single solution. Tackling such content requires a mix of regulation, law enforcement, education and technical solutions, balanced with freedom of expression – a fundamental right.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to page 24 of the Defence Industrial Strategy: Making Defence an Engine for Growth, published on 8 September 2025, what steps he has taken to ensure that cryptography capability is UK-based.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to page 24 of the Defence Industrial Strategy: Making Defence an Engine for Growth, published on 8 September 2025, what steps he has taken to ensure that cryptography capability is UK-based.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) recognises that Crypt-Key is fundamental to the defence and security of the UK. The ability to develop Crypt-Key technologies and capabilities is a strategic imperative for the United Kingdom’s (UK) national security.
The National Crypt-Key Strategy and the Crypt-Key Industrial Strategy were approved by the National Security Council (NSC) in May 2022. The MOD has implemented the core strategy outcomes such as the Cabinet Office Spent Control measures for Crypt-Key and continues to support their full implementation.
The Defence Industrial Strategy (2025) continues to recognise Crypt-Key as a critical sub-sector where strategic imperative requires full, or majority, industrial capability to be UK-based.
The MOD has taken the appropriate steps to ensure alignment to the Crypt-Key strategies.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps her Department is taking to ensure that end-to-end encryption continues to protect personal privacy while enabling law enforcement to detect serious criminal activity.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps her Department is taking to ensure that end-to-end encryption continues to protect personal privacy while enabling law enforcement to detect serious criminal activity.
This Government supports strong encryption, which protects our citizens online. However, this must not and need not be at the expense of public safety, which is this Government’s first priority.
Targeted investigatory powers allow the authorities to investigate terrorists, paedophiles and the most serious criminals and are subject to robust safeguards, including judicial authorisations and oversight to protect people’s privacy.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment her Department has made of the impact of end-to-end encryption on the ability of law enforcement agencies to (a) investigate and (b) prevent online child sexual exploitation.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment her Department has made of the impact of end-to-end encryption on the ability of law enforcement agencies to (a) investigate and (b) prevent online child sexual exploitation.
We have been consistent that the increasing moves to end-to-end-encryption (E2EE) on private messaging spaces, without sufficient safeguards to maintain proactive detection of child sexual abuse (CSA) will have a significant impact on our ability to keep children safe.
In May this year, the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) published their Cyber Tipline report for the year of 2024. This report indicated that globally there were 7 million fewer incidents of suspected child sexual abuse material reported in 2024 compared with 2023, which was partly attributed to the increased rollout of E2EE.
The Government is implementing the Online Safety Act (OSA) regulatory framework, to ensure that online platforms do more to protect their users from illegal content on their services. The Government is clear that platform design, including E2EE does not exempt platforms from their obligations to protect children from CSA.
The Government is committed to using all available levers, such as the Online Safety Act, to ensure children are protected online, and we will not hesitate to go further if necessary.
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, pursuant to the Answer of 25 March 2025 to Question 39835 on Social Media: Regulation, whether (a) his Department and (b) Ofcom has made an assessment of the impact of designating end-to-end encryption as a risk factor in the...
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, pursuant to the Answer of 25 March 2025 to Question 39835 on Social Media: Regulation, whether (a) his Department and (b) Ofcom has made an assessment of the impact of designating end-to-end encryption as a risk factor in the...
Ofcom is responsible for assessing the possible implications of its codes of practice and guidance under the Online Safety Act (OSA).
As previously noted, the OSA does not ban any service design and the European Conventions of Human Rights (ECHR) requires all UK public bodies, including Ofcom, to act in a way that complies with ECHR rights. Companies are legal persons having rights afforded by the ECHR.
DSIT will carry out a Post Implementation Review to assess the effectiveness of the legislation, including how the OSA has addressed harmful online content while protecting UK users’ rights.
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether he has plans to instruct Ofcom to conduct an impact assessment of the decision to designate end-to-end encryption as a risk factor in their Illegal Harms Codes of Practice and illegal content risk assessment guidance.
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether he has plans to instruct Ofcom to conduct an impact assessment of the decision to designate end-to-end encryption as a risk factor in their Illegal Harms Codes of Practice and illegal content risk assessment guidance.
The Online Safety Act does not ban any service design, including end-to-end-encryption. Under the Act, providers must risk assess the design of their service. Ofcom can only recommend measures in codes of practice that are technically feasible. Separately, Ofcom has powers to direct companies to develop and deploy accredited and accurate technology to identify and remove child sexual abuse material on private communications, but only when all other measures have not adequately addressed the risk.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what her Department's policy is on requiring technology companies to implement backdoors into encrypted services.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what her Department's policy is on requiring technology companies to implement backdoors into encrypted services.
I refer the Hon. Member to the response given to UIN 33378 answered on 3rd March 2025.