1-20 of 21 results for subject:LCH
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To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the Written Answers by Lord O’Neill of Gatley on 26 April (HL7583 and HL7584), what assessment they have made of whether the same collateral could be used to support risk at both LCH and Eurex.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the Written Answers by Lord O’Neill of Gatley on 26 April (HL7583 and HL7584), what assessment they have made of whether the same collateral could be used to support risk at both LCH and Eurex.
I refer the noble Lord to my previous answers of 26 April (HL7583 and HL7780) which noted that, once notified of the merger, the Bank of England and Financial Conduct Authority would assess the proposal from a regulatory standpoint, and that it would also be subject to assessments and approvals by the competition authorities, overseas regulators, and shareholders.
My previous answers further noted that any inter central counterparty links would need to be assessed against the relevant parts of European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) by the Bank of England, as supervisor of LCH.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government which regulator will be responsible for overseeing the correlation algorithms used in cross margining positions held with LCH Clearnet and Euronext.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government which regulator will be responsible for overseeing the correlation algorithms used in cross margining positions held with LCH Clearnet and Euronext.
I refer the noble Lord to my written answer of 26 April (HL7583, HL7584, HL7585, and HL7586).
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of whether the proposed cross-margining between LCH Clearnet and Euronext, consequent on the takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Bourse, will constitute a mechanism for transmitting financial risk; and whether they plan to take any action to limit...
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of whether the proposed cross-margining between LCH Clearnet and Euronext, consequent on the takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Bourse, will constitute a mechanism for transmitting financial risk; and whether they plan to take any action to limit...
I refer the noble Lord to my written answers of 1 April (HL7342) and 26 April (HL7583, HL7584, HL7585, and HL7586)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they will take to ensure that the liquidity ladder is not used to advantage counterparties of Euronext to the disadvantage of those of LCH Clearnet.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they will take to ensure that the liquidity ladder is not used to advantage counterparties of Euronext to the disadvantage of those of LCH Clearnet.
I refer the noble Lord to my written answers of 26 April (HL7583, HL7584, HL7585, and HL7586)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what actions they have taken, if any, to ensure that the proposed cross-margining arrangements between Eurex and LCH do not subordinate counter-parties in the latter in the event of a failure of Eurex.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what actions they have taken, if any, to ensure that the proposed cross-margining arrangements between Eurex and LCH do not subordinate counter-parties in the latter in the event of a failure of Eurex.
I refer the noble Lord to the investor relations section of the London Stock Exchange Group website, which contains information about the proposed merger, including some information on the combined group’s proposed structure. I also refer the noble Lord to my previous written answer HL7153.
Once formally notified of the proposed merger, the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority (as supervisors of the London Stock Exchange Group’s UK-authorised subsidiaries) must assess the proposal from a regulatory standpoint.
In addition the proposed merger must be approved by competition authorities and is subject to a range of other assessments including those of overseas regulators and shareholders.
European Regulation No 648/2012 (EMIR) sets out detailed standards on the quality of collateral that a central counterparty (CCP) can accept, and includes a general requirement that the CCP can demonstrate to its supervisor that the form of collateral in question does not present unmanageable risk to the CCP. Furthermore, CCPs are permitted under EMIR to invest their collateral “only in cash or in highly liquid financial instruments with minimal market and credit risk.”
Any proposals for inter-CCP links would need to be assessed against relevant parts of EMIR by the Bank of England, as supervisor of LCH. EMIR requires that models used to set CCP margin requirements (and any changes to them) are validated by the CCP’s supervisor. EMIR also requires that a CCP wishing to extend its business to additional products or services must obtain the authorisation of its supervisor.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of whether, in the event of the takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse, LCH and Eurex will have a regulator in common, and if so, whether that regulator will be the Financial Conduct Authority.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of whether, in the event of the takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse, LCH and Eurex will have a regulator in common, and if so, whether that regulator will be the Financial Conduct Authority.
I refer the noble Lord to the investor relations section of the London Stock Exchange Group website, which contains information about the proposed merger, including some information on the combined group’s proposed structure. I also refer the noble Lord to my previous written answer HL7153.
Once formally notified of the proposed merger, the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority (as supervisors of the London Stock Exchange Group’s UK-authorised subsidiaries) must assess the proposal from a regulatory standpoint.
In addition the proposed merger must be approved by competition authorities and is subject to a range of other assessments including those of overseas regulators and shareholders.
European Regulation No 648/2012 (EMIR) sets out detailed standards on the quality of collateral that a central counterparty (CCP) can accept, and includes a general requirement that the CCP can demonstrate to its supervisor that the form of collateral in question does not present unmanageable risk to the CCP. Furthermore, CCPs are permitted under EMIR to invest their collateral “only in cash or in highly liquid financial instruments with minimal market and credit risk.”
Any proposals for inter-CCP links would need to be assessed against relevant parts of EMIR by the Bank of England, as supervisor of LCH. EMIR requires that models used to set CCP margin requirements (and any changes to them) are validated by the CCP’s supervisor. EMIR also requires that a CCP wishing to extend its business to additional products or services must obtain the authorisation of its supervisor.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have agreed to cross-margining of variable payments through LCH Clearnet and Eurex; and if so, who will be responsible for regulating these separate entities; and whether they have required any increase in capital or margin.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have agreed to cross-margining of variable payments through LCH Clearnet and Eurex; and if so, who will be responsible for regulating these separate entities; and whether they have required any increase in capital or margin.
European Regulation No 648/2012 (EMIR) establishes a strict supervisory framework for CCPs, which in the UK are regulated by the Bank of England.
EMIR’s requirements – which continue to apply in the event of a merger or change of control of a CCP – include that a CCP must be sufficiently well-resourced to withstand extreme market events, including the simultaneous default of its two largest clearing members.
In the event of a qualifying change of control the Bank of England must under EMIR also assess the suitability of the proposed acquirer and financial soundness of the proposed acquisition.
Copies of the Bank of England’s 2016 report on supervision of financial market infrastructures were laid before Parliament on 4 March and are available in the House library.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they intend to review the arrangements under which the margin triggers on Italian and French sovereign bonds traded in London and cleared through LCH.Clearnet are established by entities under the supervision of French regulators.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they intend to review the arrangements under which the margin triggers on Italian and French sovereign bonds traded in London and cleared through LCH.Clearnet are established by entities under the supervision of French regulators.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will review the ability of LCH Clearnet unilaterally to set margin requirements and specify ““value hair cuts”” and the risks so posed to financial stability.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will review the ability of LCH Clearnet unilaterally to set margin requirements and specify ““value hair cuts”” and the risks so posed to financial stability.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the consequences for financial system stability of any change of control or ownership of LCH Clearnet.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the consequences for financial system stability of any change of control or ownership of LCH Clearnet.
SI 2011/669. With an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 1 April 2011.
SI 2011/669. With an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 1 April 2011.
SI 2009/2976. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 4 December 2009.
SI 2009/2976. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 4 December 2009.
SI 2009/2975. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 2 December 2009.
SI 2009/2975. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 2 December 2009.
SI 2009/1827. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 4 August 2009.
SI 2009/1827. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 4 August 2009.
SI 2009/1828. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 30 July 2009.
SI 2009/1828. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 30 July 2009.
SI 2009/1601. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 3 August 2009.
SI 2009/1601. Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 3 August 2009.
SI 2008/3235. (Negative instrument). Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 7 January 2009.
SI 2008/3235. (Negative instrument). Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 7 January 2009.
SI 2008/52. (Negative instrument). Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 4 February 2008.
SI 2008/52. (Negative instrument). Together with an explanatory memorandum from the Treasury. Coming into force 4 February 2008.