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To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what estimate she has made of the cost of establishing and operating a dedicated, multilingual hotline for reporting transnational repression, staffed by personnel trained in state threats; and how that cost compares to the annual cost of the Defending Democracy...
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what estimate she has made of the cost of establishing and operating a dedicated, multilingual hotline for reporting transnational repression, staffed by personnel trained in state threats; and how that cost compares to the annual cost of the Defending Democracy...
The Government is committed to ensuring that individuals who may be victims of transnational repression (TNR) can report concerns with confidence, and that those reports are handled effectively across policing. While it would not be appropriate to comment on individual security arrangements, support is always threat‑led and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.
Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) is embedding a national reporting model to ensure that cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. This is supported by training and guidance available to all forces, including call handlers, to recognise indicators of TNR.
Our understanding of TNR is informed by multiple sources, including engagement with victims and civil society (which continues at ministerial and official level), to ensure policy remains evidence led and proportionate.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are well established, operate 24/7, and allow for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent discussions she has had with her Nigerian counterpart on the persecution of Christians in that country.
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent discussions she has had with her Nigerian counterpart on the persecution of Christians in that country.
I refer the Hon Member to the answer provided on 26 June in response to Question 11395.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, if she will establish a secure online reporting portal for transnational repression to provide victims and potential victims with a safe means of reporting incidents directly to the UK authorities.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, if she will establish a secure online reporting portal for transnational repression to provide victims and potential victims with a safe means of reporting incidents directly to the UK authorities.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, how many police officers have received training on identifying and responding to transnational repression; and if she will provide a breakdown of the number of officers trained by each police force.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, how many police officers have received training on identifying and responding to transnational repression; and if she will provide a breakdown of the number of officers trained by each police force.
That this House expresses deep concern over the intensification of Chinese state repression against Tibetans; recognises that on 2 July 2026, Tibetan activist Lobsang Palden, widely known as Lobga Rangzen, set himself on fire outside of the United Nations Headquarters in New York, a day after China’s new so-called Ethnic Unity and Progress Law entered into force; notes that this was in protest of China’s continued occupation and repression of Tibetan identity, religion and political expression; condemns the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law in which Article 63 provides a basis for the Chinese authorities to target individuals and organisations overseas alleged to have undermined ethnic unity; further notes that this pattern of intimidation is spreading to UK soil as uniformed Chinese security personnel stood behind glass doors of the Chinese embassy shouting and pointing live stun batons toward Tibetan protesters; acknowledges this weapon is illegal in the UK and that Chinese embassy personnel acted as if they were in China, not the United Kingdom; and urges the UK Government to take every appropriate measure to prevent these instances of transnational repression that pose a direct threat to the safety, rights and freedoms of Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Konger, and all other diaspora communities living in the United Kingdom.
That this House expresses deep concern over the intensification of Chinese state repression against Tibetans; recognises that on 2 July 2026, Tibetan activist Lobsang Palden, widely known as Lobga Rangzen, set himself on fire outside of the United Nations Headquarters in New York, a day after China’s new so-called Ethnic...
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of Article 63 of the new Ethnic Unity and Progress Law introduced by the government of China, which directs Chinese authorities to act against organisations and individuals outside China for any acts that "undermine ethnic unity and progress or create...
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of Article 63 of the new Ethnic Unity and Progress Law introduced by the government of China, which directs Chinese authorities to act against organisations and individuals outside China for any acts that "undermine ethnic unity and progress or create...
I refer the Noble Lord to the answer provided in the House of Commons on 8 July in response to Question 15259, which - for ease of reference - has been reproduced below:
"This is a concerning development in China. We note the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' concern that this law may entrench restrictions on the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities in a country where the environment for freedom of religion or belief is already restrictive.
"The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has discussed this law with Chinese officials, stressing the importance that the law does not harm the rights of members of minority groups and that it is not applied extraterritorially. We will never tolerate attempts by foreign governments to coerce, intimidate, harass, or harm their critics overseas, and anyone caught assisting a foreign state to undermine our security will be brought to justice."
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps her Department is taking to implement the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights report on Transnational Repression in the UK, and whether Sikh and Punjabi communities are explicitly reflected in transnational repression guidance and risk assessments.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps her Department is taking to implement the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights report on Transnational Repression in the UK, and whether Sikh and Punjabi communities are explicitly reflected in transnational repression guidance and risk assessments.
The Government carefully considered the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on transnational repression (TNR) and responded formally on 30 October 2025.
The Government’s approach to TNR is designed to capture the full range of behaviours and victims, ensuring flexibility in responding to the threat and avoiding the risk of stigmatising communities. The Government agrees that the approach to TNR must remain responsive to the evolving nature of the threat and that it keeps this under regular review, informed by operational insights and ongoing engagement with civil society organisations and trusted networks.
GOV.UK guidance has recently been updated, alongside guidance issued by the National Security Protective Authority, providing practical advice for individuals who believe they may be at risk, including steps to help keep them safe both physically and online.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what comparative assessment she has made of dedicated transnational repression reporting mechanisms operated in other jurisdictions, including the FBI's dedicated reporting line in the United States; and what lessons have been drawn for the UK.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what comparative assessment she has made of dedicated transnational repression reporting mechanisms operated in other jurisdictions, including the FBI's dedicated reporting line in the United States; and what lessons have been drawn for the UK.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are the most widely known and easily accessible means of contacting the police, allowing for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases. CTP has rolled out training and guidance across all forces, including for call handlers, to support the identification and escalation of potential TNR cases. CTP is also embedding a national reporting model to ensure cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. Given the targeted and specific nature of TNR in the UK, expected demand for a dedicated hotline was assessed to be low, and a separate reporting route could risk duplication and confusion. The Government recognises that some individuals may be reluctant to report incidents and is therefore focused on strengthening confidence through improved guidance, training, and engagement with victims and civil society. The UK continues to engage closely with international partners, including the United States, to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation on TNR and wider state threats, sharing best practice on detection, reporting, and response mechanisms. |
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what the evidential basis was for the Government's assessment that expected call volumes to a dedicated transnational repression hotline would be low; and whether that assessment accounted for evidence of significant under-reporting through existing channels including 101.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what the evidential basis was for the Government's assessment that expected call volumes to a dedicated transnational repression hotline would be low; and whether that assessment accounted for evidence of significant under-reporting through existing channels including 101.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are the most widely known and easily accessible means of contacting the police, allowing for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases. CTP has rolled out training and guidance across all forces, including for call handlers, to support the identification and escalation of potential TNR cases. CTP is also embedding a national reporting model to ensure cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. Given the targeted and specific nature of TNR in the UK, expected demand for a dedicated hotline was assessed to be low, and a separate reporting route could risk duplication and confusion. The Government recognises that some individuals may be reluctant to report incidents and is therefore focused on strengthening confidence through improved guidance, training, and engagement with victims and civil society. The UK continues to engage closely with international partners, including the United States, to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation on TNR and wider state threats, sharing best practice on detection, reporting, and response mechanisms. |
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, if she will reconsider the Government's rejection of the Joint Committee on Human Rights' recommendation for a dedicated national reporting mechanism for victims of transnational repression.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, if she will reconsider the Government's rejection of the Joint Committee on Human Rights' recommendation for a dedicated national reporting mechanism for victims of transnational repression.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are the most widely known and easily accessible means of contacting the police, allowing for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases. CTP has rolled out training and guidance across all forces, including for call handlers, to support the identification and escalation of potential TNR cases. CTP is also embedding a national reporting model to ensure cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. Given the targeted and specific nature of TNR in the UK, expected demand for a dedicated hotline was assessed to be low, and a separate reporting route could risk duplication and confusion. The Government recognises that some individuals may be reluctant to report incidents and is therefore focused on strengthening confidence through improved guidance, training, and engagement with victims and civil society. The UK continues to engage closely with international partners, including the United States, to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation on TNR and wider state threats, sharing best practice on detection, reporting, and response mechanisms. |
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, how many reports of transnational repression made via the 101 service by members of the Hong Kong diaspora have been recorded in each of the last three years; and how many of those reports resulted in (a) a recorded crime,...
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, how many reports of transnational repression made via the 101 service by members of the Hong Kong diaspora have been recorded in each of the last three years; and how many of those reports resulted in (a) a recorded crime,...
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are the most widely known and easily accessible means of contacting the police, allowing for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases. CTP has rolled out training and guidance across all forces, including for call handlers, to support the identification and escalation of potential TNR cases. CTP is also embedding a national reporting model to ensure cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. Given the targeted and specific nature of TNR in the UK, expected demand for a dedicated hotline was assessed to be low, and a separate reporting route could risk duplication and confusion. The Government recognises that some individuals may be reluctant to report incidents and is therefore focused on strengthening confidence through improved guidance, training, and engagement with victims and civil society. The UK continues to engage closely with international partners, including the United States, to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation on TNR and wider state threats, sharing best practice on detection, reporting, and response mechanisms. |
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what training 101 call handlers receive in (a) identifying and (b) recording reports of transnational repression.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what training 101 call handlers receive in (a) identifying and (b) recording reports of transnational repression.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are the most widely known and easily accessible means of contacting the police, allowing for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases. CTP has rolled out training and guidance across all forces, including for call handlers, to support the identification and escalation of potential TNR cases. CTP is also embedding a national reporting model to ensure cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. Given the targeted and specific nature of TNR in the UK, expected demand for a dedicated hotline was assessed to be low, and a separate reporting route could risk duplication and confusion. The Government recognises that some individuals may be reluctant to report incidents and is therefore focused on strengthening confidence through improved guidance, training, and engagement with victims and civil society. The UK continues to engage closely with international partners, including the United States, to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation on TNR and wider state threats, sharing best practice on detection, reporting, and response mechanisms. |
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the adequacy of the 101 non-emergency police line as the primary route for Hong Kongers in the UK to report incidents of transnational repression.
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the adequacy of the 101 non-emergency police line as the primary route for Hong Kongers in the UK to report incidents of transnational repression.
The Government, in consultation with CTP, has assessed that existing reporting channels, including 101 and 999, are the most widely known and easily accessible means of contacting the police, allowing for effective triage by trained professionals with onward referral to specialist teams. Language support, including translation services, is embedded within these mechanisms, and work is ongoing to ensure interpreters can support the accurate identification of TNR cases. CTP has rolled out training and guidance across all forces, including for call handlers, to support the identification and escalation of potential TNR cases. CTP is also embedding a national reporting model to ensure cases indicating potential foreign state involvement are identified and escalated to specialist teams. Given the targeted and specific nature of TNR in the UK, expected demand for a dedicated hotline was assessed to be low, and a separate reporting route could risk duplication and confusion. The Government recognises that some individuals may be reluctant to report incidents and is therefore focused on strengthening confidence through improved guidance, training, and engagement with victims and civil society. The UK continues to engage closely with international partners, including the United States, to exchange insights and strengthen cooperation on TNR and wider state threats, sharing best practice on detection, reporting, and response mechanisms. |
Lords committee stage. Clause 1 agreed to. Amendment 20 to clause 2 disagreed to on division (150 to 216). Clauses 2 to 8 agreed to. Schedule agreed to. Bill reported with amendments (HL Bill 37).
Lords committee stage. Clause 1 agreed to. Amendment 20 to clause 2 disagreed to on division (150 to 216). Clauses 2 to 8 agreed to. Schedule agreed to. Bill reported with amendments (HL Bill 37).
Moved by
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
1: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, after “activity” insert “including espionage”
Member's explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to clarify whether all aspects of espionage are covered by the reference to “foreign power threat activity”, in the light of the recent conviction of two Chinese spies,...
Moved by
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
1: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, after “activity” insert “including espionage”
Member's explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to clarify whether all aspects of espionage are covered by the reference to “foreign power threat activity”, in the light of the recent conviction of two Chinese spies,...
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has other relevant amendments in this group. Amendment 1 is a probing amendment that enables the Minister to clarify the exact breadth of the...
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has other relevant amendments in this group. Amendment 1 is a probing amendment that enables the Minister to clarify the exact breadth of the...
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This builds on the Private Notice Question which she placed before your Lordships’ House and indeed on our Second Reading debate last week where the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which, as the noble Baroness...
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This builds on the Private Notice Question which she placed before your Lordships’ House and indeed on our Second Reading debate last week where the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which, as the noble Baroness...
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for what they said. They both spoke in very measured terms and I wish to support broadly everything that they have said, for two reasons: first, because I agree with them, and, secondly, because I...
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for what they said. They both spoke in very measured terms and I wish to support broadly everything that they have said, for two reasons: first, because I agree with them, and, secondly, because I...
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. This amendment seeks to ensure that our national security framework is not only addressing the threats of today but is prepared...
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. This amendment seeks to ensure that our national security framework is not only addressing the threats of today but is prepared...
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the amendments in their names. It is timely to have a debate and to keep raising—as I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, does regularly—the threat we face from China. The ISC in its China report...
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the amendments in their names. It is timely to have a debate and to keep raising—as I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, does regularly—the threat we face from China. The ISC in its China report...