I refer the Honourable Member to the answer of 8 July to question 15259.

Trials of automated vehicles must be undertaken in line with the requirements set out in the Automated Vehicle Trialling Code of Practice. Trialling organisations must have a safety driver monitoring both the road traffic environment and vehicle systems so that they may resume proper control if necessary.

The Code should be used by trialling organisations in conjunction with detailed knowledge of the legal, regulatory and technological landscape, ensuring they are compliant with all relevant UK law.

To trial vehicles without a safety driver, companies must obtain an exemption from existing regulations through a Vehicle Special Order. And in order to operate a passenger carrying service, companies are also expected to obtain an Automated Passenger Services permit.

Should a company submit an application to operate a without a safety driver, the Department would conduct an extensive safety and security assessment which would include scrutiny of operational resilience and data management.

Trials of automated vehicles must be undertaken in line with the requirements set out in the Automated Vehicle Trialling Code of Practice. Trialling organisations must have a safety driver monitoring both the road traffic environment and vehicle systems so that they may resume proper control if necessary.

The Code should be used by trialling organisations in conjunction with detailed knowledge of the legal, regulatory and technological landscape, ensuring they are compliant with all relevant UK law.

To trial vehicles without a safety driver, companies must obtain an exemption from existing regulations through a Vehicle Special Order. And in order to operate a passenger carrying service, companies are also expected to obtain an Automated Passenger Services permit.

Should a company submit an application to operate a without a safety driver, the Department would conduct an extensive safety and security assessment which would include scrutiny of operational resilience and data management.

Trials of automated vehicles must be undertaken in line with the requirements set out in the Automated Vehicle Trialling Code of Practice. Trialling organisations must have a safety driver monitoring both the road traffic environment and vehicle systems so that they may resume proper control if necessary.

The Code should be used by trialling organisations in conjunction with detailed knowledge of the legal, regulatory and technological landscape, ensuring they are compliant with all relevant UK law.

To trial vehicles without a safety driver, companies must obtain an exemption from existing regulations through a Vehicle Special Order. And in order to operate a passenger carrying service, companies are also expected to obtain an Automated Passenger Services permit.

Should a company submit an application to operate a without a safety driver, the Department would conduct an extensive safety and security assessment which would include scrutiny of operational resilience and data management.

The Government recognises the critical role of subsea telecoms cables for international connectivity.

The Government works closely with international partners, including Taiwan, to ensure the security and resilience of subsea telecoms cables. This includes engaging bilaterally with priority partners and multilaterally through NATO, the EU and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

This engagement focuses on preventing damage to cables, incident preparedness and response and ensuring cables are laid in the right places to serve UK interests.

Attempts by foreign governments to coerce, intimidate or harm their critics overseas, including the Uyghur diaspora, are unacceptable. The freedom of speech and other fundamental rights of all people in the UK are protected under UK law, regardless of nationality.

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.

We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.

Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK

The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.

The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.

The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.

In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.

Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.

A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.

Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.

Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.

At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.

Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.

A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.

The Department has worked around the clock to ensure that digital services were restored as swiftly and safely as possible. There has been no delay to implementation of the new secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS), which went live on 11 August following a period of testing with providers

Since then, we have worked closely with providers to test functionality before bringing providers back onto our systems in a careful, phased approach. We are now in a position where all providers have online access to our civil legal aid services via SiLAS, alongside our criminal legal aid services, which were restored in September.

I refer the honourable Member to the answer I gave on 10 November to Question 87407.

We do not plan to introduce varying salary requirements based on location. Our aim is to have a single immigration system which works for the whole of the UK.

Every occupation is expected to be paid at least the “going rate”, which is set at the median for all UK residents who perform that role, or the median rate for all qualifying occupations whichever is higher, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.

The salary threshold, currently £41,700 for new applicants, is in place to ensure that resident workers’ wages should not be undercut and also to protect overseas workers from being used as low-cost labour.

Having a national salary limit keeps the Skilled Worker immigration route simple to operate and allows for movement between locations for larger companies.

The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) published a review of Skilled Worker salary requirements on 17 December, and repeated a recommendation they have made many times previously, that salary thresholds should be set at a UK-wide level:

"We continue to believe that ‘regional salary thresholds also bring more complexity and may be harder to enforce within the migration system, particularly as the UK is geographically small, making it is easy to live in one region and work in another’. We also do not want to institutionalise some parts of the UK as ‘lower wage’. Furthermore, as the MAC has shown previously, wages vary far more within regions than across them so even if thresholds were set at a regional level there would still be many areas of the UK that would struggle to meet them."

I refer the Hon Member to the answer provided on 9 April to Question 43452.

As penholder on Myanmar at the UN Security Council, we convened six Council meetings in 2024, including the first open meeting in five years focused on the Rohingya, and we have convened three Council meetings so far in 2025. We also co-sponsored a UN Human Rights Council resolution in April this year, and a UN Third Committee Resolution in November, on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, condemning ongoing violations particularly against ethnic minorities, including Rohingya. We continue to call for the protection of civilians and humanitarian access to Rakhine State, most recently at the UN Third Committee on 19 November.

I visited Hong Kong in November for a two-day programme of engagements. I met with stakeholders across the Hong Kong Government, the business community and public to discuss areas of co-operation and challenge on areas of contention.

This is likely to be the last time that the shadow Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Jeremy Hunt), is up against me at the Dispatch Box. We have had the privilege of these exchanges for just over two years now, and I have a huge amount of respect for him. He steered our country through a very difficult time after the mini-Budget, and I wish him well in whatever he chooses to do next.

If UK living standards, as measured by real household disposable income per capita, had grown by the same amount between 2010 and 2023 as they did between 1997 and 2010, the amount would have been over £4,000 higher in 2023. We are committed to boosting economic growth to turn that around. Although it will have been welcome news for millions of families that inflation is now below 2%, there is still more to do. Earlier this month, we delivered our first international investment summit, announcing over £60 billion of investment and unlocking nearly 38,000 jobs in the UK, all focused on creating and spreading opportunities to lift living standard.