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Iraq

I have always said that lasting progress in Iraq cannot be achieved by military means alone, but will depend on a combination of security, politics and economics. Our security strategy is clear and has not changed. It is not driven by the American political calendar, nor will it be thrown off course by those who use violence and terrorism to provoke sectarian reaction and to stop progress in Iraq. Our strategy has three main elements. First, we are helping the Iraqis to build up their own security forces—still with a long way to develop, but already with more than 300,000 recruited, trained and equipped. Secondly, as these forces develop we are handing them control, province by province, city by city, moving to the point where they have complete responsibility. Thirdly, we are underwriting that handover process by leaving in place quick-response forces not to do front-line security work, but ready to support the Iraqis if the situation gets out of control. We remain convinced that that remains the right strategy—indeed, the only one that could possibly work. I welcome the constructive approach of the Iraq Study Group. As I made clear yesterday, its assessment of the security situation is largely in tune with our own. We do recognise the gravity of that situation, but I also note the group’s own conclusion that there is no magic formula to solve the problems. People should not confuse a difficult situation with a problem of strategy. Our strategy has long included many of the elements that the group has highlighted. What is changing is the pace at which this strategy unfolds. Prime Minister Maliki and his Government want it to go faster. That is a natural response and, indeed, a welcome sign of increasing confidence, but it also crystallises the great challenge that Maliki faces. On the one hand, to keep up momentum—to reinforce a sense of progress and nationhood—he must show that Iraq is regaining control of its own destiny. At the same time, he must not ask too much too quickly of its developing security forces. The Prime Minister made it clear during his visit to Washington last week that we have always been open to engagement with Iran and Syria, but it is absolutely vital that the basis for their engagement must be support for the democratically elected Government of Iraq, not support for sectarian or terrorist agendas. Those countries know what they have to do, and they must decide which path they want to follow. There are some parts of Iraq, especially Baghdad, where the reality on the ground clearly is a long way from the point where the coalition can hand over. This morning’s suicide bombs were another reminder. Part of their motive, of course, is precisely to provoke an escalating sectarian reaction, but Baghdad is not Iraq, and I make no apology for reminding people that 14 of the 18 provinces are relatively peaceful. The security situation, and therefore progress along the security strategy, is different in each of these provinces. In the area under British lead in the south, two provinces have been handed over to the Iraqis, and a third is soon to follow. The fourth, Basra, remains the most difficult challenge, but again, the security situation is a symptom: the underlying cause is rival Shi’a power blocs vying for power. Right now, this is too much for the Iraqi security forces to deal with on their own, and there are real weaknesses in the local police, so unlike in the other three provinces, British forces are still doing front-line work in the main city. Operation Sinbad is working through Basra city area by area, re-establishing security, building confidence, rooting out corrupt and failing police, and putting Iraqi soldiers on street corners as a sign that the Government are determined to govern. Friday’s Operation Pisa—an impressive operation involving a number of bold ““strikes”” across the north of Basra city—shows that when we need to act, we do so and we do so decisively. But of course, the key is that these improvements in security are followed, quickly, by progress in governance and by economic regeneration, building momentum and winning over local people to a positive view of the future. This is our strategy. We will continue to support the Iraqis in overcoming the violence and intimidation that disfigure their country. We will work with them to build a long-term relationship, including training and mentoring to help the security of both the country and the region, and to deal with the ongoing challenge of international terrorism. Both in security and in the parallel strands of politics and economic development we have to accept that how quickly things move will depend on many factors, not all of them directly under our control. In fact, it is a measure of success if the path of progress becomes increasingly an Iraqi one. As I said in a speech last month, we must get used to thinking in terms not just of our strategy but of our role in their strategy. We continue to insist that we will not cut and run. This is not about political gestures or a trial of wills, but about recognising the challenges we face and also the commitment we have made. We will hand over when it is right so to do, driven not by arbitrary deadlines but by the reality on the ground. I have made clear several times why we will not be drawn into laying out a prescriptive timetable for draw-down, and I note that the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) supported that position yesterday. Our strategy will and must remain conditions-based. We will work to ensure that our plans remain clear and realistic, but we will also work to resist cynicism and defeatism as long as we still believe that we are making a difference—as long as we still believe that the presence of our forces is increasing the chance of a positive legacy for their work and their sacrifice in Iraq in the past three years.