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Proceeding contribution from Lord Hammond of Runnymede (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Monday, 13 June 2005. It occurred during Debate on bill and Committee of the Whole House (HC) on Finance Bill.


Finance Bill

I beg to move amendment No. 18, in page 125, line 45, leave out from beginning to end of line 23 on page 126. Schedule 28 AA of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 provides that where an interest payment is disallowed or reduced under the transfer pricing rules, thus increasing the tax payable by one party to the transaction, a corresponding adjustment is available to the other party. That is a sensible measure, which avoids double taxation occurring where part of a transaction has been disallowed under the transfer pricing rules. Sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 1 inserts a new sub-paragraph (4A) in paragraph 6—not to be confused with the paragraph 4A that we were debating earlier; for some reason everything in schedule 8 relates to a paragraph 4A. The new sub-paragraph (4A) excludes the entitlement to a corresponding adjustment where two conditions are met: first, that the provision subject to the transfer pricing rules is subject to them only as a result of the paragraph 4A introduced by sub-paragraph (3) in paragraph 1; and, secondly, that a guarantee is provided in relation to the security issued by the debtor by a person who has a participatory relationship with the debtor. That participatory relationship is defined so as to include the subsidiaries of the debtor. If A is one of the private equity investor group defined by sub-paragraph (4A) of schedule 28AA as participating in the management, control or capital of B—the acquisition vehicle—and B is both the acquisition vehicle and the debt issuer, it would be perfectly normal in those circumstances for B’s obligations as a debt issuer to be guaranteed by its operating subsidiary. To put that in practical terms, the companies generating the cash flow will, typically, guarantee the debt obligations being taken on by the holding company in the form of a raft of cross-guarantees between companies in the group. The transaction is subject to transfer pricing rules because of the sub-paragraph (4A) to be inserted in schedule 28AA. So, B’s interest charge may be reduced or disallowed for corporation tax purposes but, because of sub-paragraph (5), the lender is not entitled to reciprocal treatment, thus reducing its interest receivable for corporation tax purposes. Why is that? The question does not arise because we are being a little slow on the uptake. No one, including the body of expert opinion in the City, which considers these matters very closely, is sure of the answer. What is the relevance of the guarantee? Why does the existence of the guarantee relationship between a subsidiary and its holding company invalidate the right to claim a corresponding adjustment in the corporation tax return of the lender where a corporation tax deduction has been disallowed or reduced in the hands of the borrower? What is the abuse that the Government imagine they are addressing by the inclusion of sub-paragraph (5)? In many cases in which straightforward bank debt is involved, there will be no disallowable interest because the transaction will clearly be at arm’s length. However, to rehearse the argument that we had on the last group of amendments, what about banks with an equity participation in the target company? What about banks that have a private equity division or those that have provided an integrated financing package for the company, including equity and debt as an alternative to a conventional private equity investment? On the face of it, those banks will not be able to secure a corresponding adjustment. For example, when the lending that takes place is not senior debt lending but mezzanine lending—high coupon lending that takes a subordinate security to the senior debt—the correct pricing of that arrangement may not be so clear-cut for it to qualify as an arm’s length transaction. I am not talking about a situation in which an equity kicker is attached to the mezzanine funding, but one in which there is relatively high coupon debt with a subordinate security interest. It is not clear to us what the mischief is and what the relevance of the guarantee is, but it is clear that the provision must be wrong in principle. The existing provision that allows for an offsetting adjustment on the other side of the transaction when any adjustment is made is a neat and simple double-entry type solution to what could otherwise be a serious injustice. It is clear that, in the absence of an entitlement to an offsetting adjustment, these arrangements could give rise to a double tax charge where a partial or total disallowance of interest is made and both parties are within the charge to UK corporation tax.The provision potentially puts UK taxpayers at a disadvantage compared with non-UK taxpayers who will often be able to achieve a corresponding adjustment through a double tax treaty adjustment. The amendment probes the Government on their attitude to the problem by seeking to delete sub-paragraph (5) in its entirety. I have to say to the Financial Secretary that I have seldom been in receipt of such unanimously perplexed sets of briefing notes from different qualified external advisers. I am sure that he will have seen some of the briefings and noted the genuine perplexity of specialist practitioners in this sector about what the Government are seeking to address, what the perceived mischief is and what the relevance of granting of an intra-group cross-guarantee is. I hope that the Financial Secretary will be able to explain all these things, and we will listen carefully to what he says. I assure him that the expert bodies that have expressed mystification will also look closely at what he says to see just how the provisions are intended to work. Are they really intended to apply to group cross-guarantees? Why are they intended to apply to them; what do they seek to address; and how will they work in practice? We will listen carefully to his reply before deciding how we should proceed.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
435 c89-94 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Complaints Disclosure of information Admissions Charities Companies Corporation tax Charitable donations Finance EU law Investment Exemptions Interest payments Gift aid Ownership Museums and galleries Property Loans Open ended investment companies Small businesses Tax avoidance Taxation Transfer pricing Financial Ombudsman Service National Savings and Investments Collective investment schemes
Legislation
Finance Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk