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Armed Forces: Chain of Command

My Lords, I wish to focus on the vital linkage between the chain of command and the summary discipline system. Command and discipline in the Armed Forces go absolutely hand in hand. A commanding officer, who has total responsibility for the command of his ship or unit, must, in turn, be responsible for—and carry out—its discipline. It is impossible to achieve and maintain the necessary level of discipline unless those under his or her command are in absolutely no doubt that their commanding officer has authority over them. It is discipline that ultimately underpins the way individuals respond to command. This necessary responsiveness and willingness, inculcated in everyone because they know exactly where they stand, has long been recognised in the British Armed Forces as essential to the maintenance of operational capability and the ability to win—even when against the odds. Our history is littered with relevant examples. That is why it is not just right, but essential, that the commanding officer himself should exercise disciplinary powers over those in his command. He is best placed to understand the circumstances of service life and of his particular unit—and the causes and significance of misconduct by those under his command. Parliament has legislated upon this very basis by providing a system of summary jurisdiction based around the commanding officer. This summary system of justice applies both within the United Kingdom and abroad—with the vital principle that it is consistent in application and that the individual soldier, sailor or airman is subject at all times to the same rights, powers, procedures and penalties under that system. While there may be purist legal arguments for ensuring that those who decide guilt and punish offenders are independent of the person accused, we interfere with the unique linkage between the commanding officer and his men at our peril. It is the commanding officer who will know best the importance of enforcing discipline by punishing misconduct expeditiously, with the whole unit being aware that justice has been done, and been seen to be done. The need for prompt action is true of any disciplinary system—but on operations it can be even more vital to deal swiftly with misconduct. The importance of having effective means for the commanding officer to deal with misconduct in deployed ships and submarines—as I know well from my experience—or indeed in any deployed unit, from whatever service, is vital to maintaining morale. The commanding officer’s summary powers enable straightforward dealing with offences—face to face between the member of the unit and the commanding officer—and are based on trust, authority and impartiality. I am absolutely certain that they play a vital part in underpinning our Armed Forces remaining world class, capable of operations across the full spectrum from diplomacy to direct action. Incidentally, I would contend that they are also why our Armed Forces have high morale and relatively low levels of criminality. Of course there must be safeguards; but we see far too many examples of Ministers being tempted to deal with concerns in an organisation by bolting on some sort of independent oversight or adjudication. If we continue travelling down this road, there will come a point where the close relationship between a commanding officer and his or her people will be lost—and if that is destroyed, the consequences will be serious. I am afraid that the summary system itself is under such sort of attack, and even if the Baines case currently before the courts goes in the Armed Forces’ favour, I have no doubt that there will be similar raids on it in the future, and then that the MoD will follow habit and cave in to ginger group pressure. Will the Minister confirm unequivocally that the Government still believe there is a vital need for commanding officers to be able to exercise disciplinary power over those under his or her command? And can he confirm that he is committed to the integrity of the chain of command free of outside interference? I turn to the issue of the individual liability of commanding officers for their actions, where it is very easy to underestimate the effect of threats of legal challenge on commanding officers. Naturally, we expect them to behave lawfully, but there are those without relevant responsibility who seem all too ready to challenge the actions of particular commanding officers. It is expecting a great deal of the individual that he or she puts out of their mind such considerations on the eve of battle. It is a fact that commanding officers do perceive that they are becoming increasingly vulnerable to legal challenge for their actions. I believe that we are going to see that generating real risk-averseness, clouding good military judgment. In this context I would mention the threat of being taken before the International Criminal Court. While I   accept that it will be an extreme that sees the ICC gaining jurisdiction, the theoretical possibility does exist. The   Williams case—which I know is not an ICC issue—does not fill me with any confidence at all about the Government supporting their fighting men and women. I am also sure that we will see creeping jurisprudence of the sort that has afflicted the European Court of Human Rights—created post-war, quite rightly, to cater for the excesses of Nazism but now dealing with such weighty matters as school uniforms. Can the Minister confirm that the Government believe that their legislation must not make service men and women risk-averse through fears of personal liability? If he does so confirm, I have to tell him that the message is not getting to the front line. Your Lordships will not mind me, in this bicentennial year of the Battle of Trafalgar, recalling one of Nelson’s famous command directives:"““No captain can do wrong if he lays his ship alongside that of the enemy””." The Armed Forces are under legal siege and are being pushed in a direction that will see such an order being deemed as improper or legally unsound. They are being pushed by people schooled not in operations but only in political correctness. They are being pushed to a time when they will fail in an operation because the commanding officer’s authority and his command chain has been compromised with tortuous rules not relevant to fighting and where his instinct to be daring and innovative is being buried under the threat of liabilities and hounded out by those who have no concept of what is required to fight and win.