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Proceeding contribution from Bishop of St Albans (Bishops (affiliation)) in the House of Lords on Monday, 10 October 2005. It occurred during Debate on select committee report on Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill: Select Committee Report.


Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill: Select Committee Report

My Lords, I had the privilege of being a member of the Select Committee and, with other members, I put on record my gratitude, particularly to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who chaired us with remarkable and judicious fairness and wise good humour. As a committee, we were all agreed about one thing—that no one should suffer unbearably. We all recognised that, in circumstances where someone is suffering unbearably towards the end of their life, we would want medicine to intervene. But it was at that point that some of us parted company. I cannot go so far as the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, and the Bill would wish. Why not? Because I believe that the philosophical basis for the legislation is profoundly flawed. It is based on the notion that the exercise of personal autonomy is the highest moral good. However, a moment’s thought will reveal that the exercise of personal choice is not what gives life value. What gives life the highest value is being in a relationship of love with another person, and one’s family, children, grandchildren, friends and neighbours. All those songs about love through the centuries, from the Song of Songs to the winsome songs of Kylie Minogue, exist because they are a celebration of what life is all about. Apart from Frank Sinatra’s ““My Way””, and nothing could be more kitsch or self-centred, when did you last hear a song or read a poem about the joys and importance of personal autonomy? What is the personal autonomy demanded in the debate? It runs in a very curious syllogistic form: ““One—medicine exists to cure illness and relieve suffering. Two—I am ill and suffering, and have personal rights. Three—therefore, I demand the right to demand that purveyors of medicine kill me””. But that argument has very serious holes in it. First, you can give the patient that right only by then infringing the rights of doctors. As we have already heard, it is no answer to say that any law would contain a conscience clause whereby physicians would opt out; just mention the Abortion Act 1967. Yes, a minority of doctors would be prepared to carry out euthanasia, but the great majority—especially those actively involved in care of the dying—do not want it foisted on them. Imagine, if the Bill went through, that you were terminally ill and in hospital. The first caller comes round with a little sheet and says, ““Do you want cornflakes or porridge?””. The next caller is your physician, who would be required, if logic has anything to do with it, to offer you a series of options—palliative care, euthanasia or assisted suicide. Just thinking about it is chilling. To call that a therapeutic option, as some proponents have done, is to see language and values twisted out of all recognition. Secondly, there are the rights of other terminally ill people to be considered. It is simply na&-uml;ve to suggest that, because any law would allow assisted suicide or euthanasia for volunteers only, that is what would happen in practice. In those circumstances, who is a volunteer? The figures from Holland really should give us considerable pause. We need to think, therefore, of the autonomous rights of those who do not wish to go down that route. Perhaps I may, en passant, deal with this public opinion argument. I have not noticed that Parliament is rushing to fulfil public opinion’s desire that capital punishment should be back on the statute book. If not that, why this? It seems to be special pleading. Thirdly, whose autonomy would be exercised here? If you imagine someone, as we leave this Chamber, about to jump off Westminster Bridge, would we not all automatically seek to prevent them doing so? Then we would all be intervening, and rightly so. But what about the patient who wants to commit suicide and we agree to that? Surely, we are making a value judgment between two people who are suicidal. We are saying to the person who wants to jump off the bridge, ““Your life is of enormous value””, but to the one that does not, ““Actually, we agree with you””. The minute you say that, you are then influencing their autonomous decision. A story in the scriptures has shaped the civilisation of our country ever since it was first heard. It is the story of Cain and Abel. As your Lordships will know, after Cain killed Abel, the Lord asked Cain, ““Where is your brother Abel?””. Cain replied, ““I do not know. Am I my brother’s keeper?””. I do not want that question to be swept aside as describing only those who take ““a minority religious view””, because that is not just. The answer to that question has shaped our society and it challenges every generation. Because we have recognised the authentic moral force of that question, we have answered it with a resounding, ““Yes, I am my brother’s keeper””. If we allow this Bill to proceed, we shall overturn one of the most cherished and profound values by which we as individuals and a society have lived and ought to live in the future.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
674 c30-2 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Consent to medical treatment Depressive illnesses Chronic illnesses Diagnosis Doctors Ethics Euthanasia Medical treatments Older people Mental capacity Public opinion Palliative care Prescriptions Pain Suicide
Legislation
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (HL) 2004/05
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk