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Proceeding contribution from Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 17 November 2005. It occurred during Question for short debate on Avian Flu.


Avian Flu

My Lords, I warmly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, for introducing the debate, which has been wide-ranging. I intend to touch on only those issues for which Defra is responsible, because I do not feel that I can really touch on the health issues. I want to cover three areas. The debate is particularly timely because, two days ago, Defra published its epidemiology report on the avian influenza outbreak in quarantine, which raises a number of issues about our biosecurity. A wider issue was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stratford—why we are importing wild birds at all. I concur with him that we should not be. Indeed, I have tabled an amendment to the NERC Bill to that effect. I shall go back to the detail of the epidemiology report. I realise that the Minister will not be able to answer all the questions in the time available, but I need to put at least some of them on record. The report raises a large number of questions, about both the principles of importing wild birds and the state of our quarantine system. The mortality in the black-header caique population was notably high—100 per cent—but that was not attributed to any reason. What proportion of legally imported wild birds normally die in quarantine? Are welfare standards really adequate when so many birds can die for no apparent reason? That is a rhetorical question; it clearly is not, because the report goes on to state: ““The Mesias””, a different species,"““from Taiwan, also exhibited a notable mortality. This was attributed to nutritional/dietary problems””." The birds were apparently not being fed correctly. I turn to some issues around biosecurity. For example, there were four sentinel chickens, which is a normal way of testing for disease. They were all free of the disease when 53 other birds may have died from it. Does that suggest that the sentinel system is not a reliable safeguard? Another noble Lord raised the habit of tissue pooling in virological testing so that it is impossible to tell from which bird the disease came. That is a serious matter, made more serious by the fact that some birds appear to have been put in the deep freeze afterwards while some were incinerated. On what basis are decisions made on which dead birds will be incinerated and which frozen for testing? If birds simply appear to have died—that is what the epidemiology report says—but only a few have been frozen and the rest incinerated, it will be impossible to go back and have a second look at any of the issues. Considering the uncertainty with which the report gives dates for deaths and incinerations, is there any possibility that some of the birds were not burnt at all, but sold before the end of the quarantine period? I take on board other noble Lords’ comments about not raising the temperature on this issue, but this report raises some questions, particularly given that much of the evidence has been burned. I turn now to issues relating to our poultry farmers. In this country we raise poultry under much higher welfare conditions than in the rest of the world. Our poultry keepers look to the Government to support the type of conditions that they are trying to encourage. Therefore, it is fair that at times such as these the Government should offer poultry keepers very clear guidance—the noble Lord, Lord Chan, asked if there was any guidance available to them. I have received several queries from farmers that are basic and surprising, because, for example, I understand that they have not received any guidance regarding compensation levels during an outbreak. There is a lesson here from the foot and mouth outbreak: farmers will be paid compensation for healthy birds that are slaughtered, but the foot and mouth outbreak demonstrated that indirect losses were great. There is no intention to pay for consequential losses, but losses may arise simply from being in a surveillance area or a restricted zone. There is also the question of organic status regarding birds that are shut indoors for a considerable time. The Government have stated that they will not finance secondary cleansing. However, if a farmer suffers an outbreak on his farm, his flock will be restricted, with the litter on which it lies, to the farm building. It will stay there for 21 days. The compost that results will then be required to be escorted by a vet to incineration. Is that regulation a sensible use of veterinary time? Of course, biosecurity needs to be ensured, but, surely, we do not need a vet to accompany dead animals and their litter—he should concern himself with the living animals and ensuring that the disease has not spread. The poultry industry is valued at some £1,674 million. We should take seriously our responsibility to support it in every possible way. Finally, the Minister and the Government have made many statements about the poultry industry in which they always refer to chickens. But elsewhere in their literature they state that waterfowl are particularly vulnerable. Can the Minister say anything about regulations that may specifically refer to ducks and geese?


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
675 c1293-5 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Birds Health services Inspections Disease control Essex Import controls Imports Poultry Quarantine Registration Standards Vaccination Smuggling Avian influenza
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk