Proceeding contribution from Lord Rooker (Labour) in the House of Lords on Monday, 24 October 2005. It occurred during Debates on delegated legislation on Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2005.
Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2005
rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2005 [4th Report from the Joint Committee and 9th Report from the Merits Committee]. The noble Lord said: The order was laid before the House on 14 September. The order was made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State on 13 September under the urgency procedure provided by Section 19(3) of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. It came into effect at midnight at the beginning of 14 September. The order specified the Ulster Volunteer Force, generally referred to as the UVF, and the Red Hand Commando. The latter organisation is associated with the UVF and has been used as a ““flag of convenience”” for UVF activity. The Secretary of State specified those organisations using the powers conferred on him by the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. The Act makes provision for the specification of an organisation that is concerned in terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland or in promoting or encouraging it, and has not established or is not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire. In applying his judgment to that test, the Secretary of State is obliged, in particular, to take into account whether an organisation is committed to the use now and in the future of only democratic and peaceful means to achieve its objectives; has ceased to be involved in any acts of violence or preparation for violence; is directing or promoting acts of violence by other organisations; and is co-operating fully with the decommissioning commission. In addition to the UVF and the Red Hand Commando, the following organisations continue to be specified, which is why they are listed on the draft statutory instrument as a consolidation exercise. They are the Continuity Irish Republican Army, the Loyalist Volunteer Force, the Orange Volunteers, the Real Irish Republican Army and the Red Hand Defenders. A statutory duty is placed on the Secretary of State to review this list from time to time in case changes of circumstances require it to be amended. To that end, the Secretary of State keeps the status of all specified organisations and those purporting to be on a ceasefire under continuous review and takes advice from the Chief Constable and his other security advisers as to the robustness of all ceasefires. Under the general requirements of the Act, an order to specify an organisation shall be made by statutory instrument which has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House, unless the Secretary of State thinks it necessary, for reasons of urgency, to proceed without a draft having been so approved. For reasons which I hope will become self-evident, it was necessary for the Secretary of State to proceed with specification of the UVF and the RHC with immediate effect on 13 September. In June, the UVF recommenced its long-standing feud with the Loyalist Volunteer Force, a terrorist organisation which is already specified. Over the succeeding weeks, the UVF carried out four murders, numerous attempted murders and various violent attacks which were all directed towards the Loyalist Volunteer Force, their families and associates. While some attacks were also perpetrated by the LVF, the overwhelming violence emanated from the UVF. The detail of the feud and its genesis is provided in the IMC report laid before the House on 22 September. Despite various assurances through third party interlocutors that the UVF would desist, feuding continued up to and including 9 September. On 10 September a major Orange Order parade, known as the Whiterock parade, took place. It was contentious, and the Parades Commission made a determination that placed a route restriction on the parade. As a consequence, those taking part initiated a protest at the contentious parts of the parade route. Subsequently, there was an outbreak of violence initially between some of the marchers, their supporters, and the police. Violence quickly escalated and spread to other parts of Belfast and beyond. However, the most serious and sustained violence occurred in the general vicinity of the West Circular Road part of the parade route. Almost all the violence was directed towards the police and their military colleagues who were there in support. It was violence of the most vicious kind, intended to maim and kill. Petrol bombs, blast bombs, pipe bombs and other missiles were unleashed, much of it from rooftops raining down on the security forces below. Such was the ferocity of the attack, it was simply not possible accurately to record the volume of missiles thrown. One of the most discouraging and disconcerting of all things among that mayhem was the use of live fire. Some 115 rounds were discharged at both the police and the Army by the so-called loyalists; those loyal to the police and the Crown. A detailed assessment of the violence has been made by the Chief Constable and the security service. Advice to the Secretary of State confirmed the involvement of the UVF in the instigation of the violence. It was not a spontaneous event perpetrated in the heat of the moment. It clearly required preparation, co-ordination and stockpiling of missiles, the deployment of guns and, crucially, the authorisation to ferment and actively participate in the violence. The violence on 10 September continued for fully 12 hours, from 3 pm to 3 am the following morning, and it was repeated on 11 September and 12 September, though to a lesser effect. The fact that no police officer or soldier was killed was indeed fortunate and was in no small measure due to their training, the tactical deployment and the quality of their public order equipment. The Chief Constable rightly made the point that no police force in western Europe or indeed the United States has had to face such a sustained and brutal assault. The involvement of the UVF in the violence and its previous actions against the LVF are incompatible with any claims to be on ceasefire and cannot be tolerated by any civilised society. Therefore my right honourable friend took the action that he took, for which he is now seeking parliamentary approval. I beg to move. Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2005 [4th Report from the Joint Committee and 9th Report from the Merits Committee].—(Lord Rooker.)
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 674 c233-5GC
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords Grand Committee
- Subjects
- Crimes of violence Demonstrations Northern Ireland Police Proscribed organisations Terrorism Real IRA Loyalist Volunteer Force Continuity IRA Orange Volunteers Red Hand Defenders Ulster Volunteer Force Red Hand Commando
- Legislation
- Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (Specified Organisations) Order 2005
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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