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UK Worldwide Interests

My Lords, we all owe a great debt to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe. I hope that we shall hear a lot more of the robust ““Patten-speak”” which we heard. Once upon a time we had a Foreign Office which embraced foreign relations, culture and overseas aid. Diplomats in a long and varied career made friends in the countries in which they served and in other missions. Years later that investment paid off. In the 1950s, our ambassador in Moscow, William Hayter, and the US ambassador, Chip Bohlen, were close friends—a friendship which survived even the impact of Suez. They had been Third Secretaries together in the Soviet Union before the war at the time of the great treason trials. Such friendships have often been made in difficult countries with exotic languages and have given us access to otherwise impenetrable regimes. The British Council and the World Service have also played a most valuable role as part of the political relationship. So, too, did aid. When this Government came to power everything changed. When asked his view of British foreign policy, the head of the foreign policy centre set up by the Prime Minister and the new Foreign Secretary said that he was shocked to discover that it was based on the promotion of the national interest. We should not, he said, be talking to political leaders, moreover, but to the grass roots. DfID was created and its Secretary of State thereafter made decisions, notably in Ethiopia, Uganda, the Congo and Zimbabwe with little or no perception of the political consequences. Giving aid was good; and that was enough. The Commission for Africa is full of DfID-speak and the Prime Minister’s vaunted friends on that body are the Prime Minister of Ethiopia—who has recently been shooting down unarmed civilians who are not voting the right way and gearing up for another war with Eritrea—and President Museveni of Uganda whose desire for a third term has led him to seize and imprison his chief political rival and threaten him with death for treason. According to the DfID profile on Ethiopia, our development assistance of at least £60 million a year over three years is mainly in the form of budget support—that is, a direct grant—"““in response to the government’s clearly stated preference for this form of financial assistance””." Fortunately the Secretary of State has intervened to suspend further payments in the light of recent events. In the DRC the Government have given over £22 million to help with the supervision of elections and £40 million to help rebuild the country—let alone the money given to MONUC—all money down the drain. We should leave it to South Africa, which has major commercial interests there, to help the Congo. We are not only helping a number of African countries directly; we also contribute through the EU, the World Bank and, above all, the United Nations with £70 million in the DRC alone this year. In 2004–05, DfID contributed over £330 million and the FCO budget over £217 million to UN agencies. The UN is not noted for its efficient, or sometimes even honest, management of money. Why do we not give more of that money to our own posts to disburse? DfID spends a lot of money. Why not? Britain is rich compared to the countries of Africa, for instance. My quarrel is with the disastrous effects of the new order on our knowledge of, and therefore influence in, the world. The FCO has major responsibilities that are now threatened. It is responsible for the safety and well-being of British subjects abroad. That is becoming a more onerous task. DfID cannot get British subjects out of gaol, ensure the safety of a threatened British community in a coup, or rescue a British subject from a forced marriage. The FCO is responsible for the promotion of British economic and defence interests, which requires excellent local contacts and knowledge of the economic and political hazards. Not least, the FCO has a duty to report on the international terrorist threat, whether from Russia’s still-undestroyed chemical weapons, which are vulnerable to terrorists, or from Al-Qaeda in Africa. Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya. Somalia and even Malawi have all contributed to the terrorist threat in some way. We cannot cover that by an e-mail from No. 10, yet we have only minute diplomatic posts in those vulnerable countries, while DfID is expanding all over Africa. The FCO, which is responsible for reporting on international terrorism, the promotion of Britain’s economic and defence interests and the security of British citizens abroad, is being weakened daily by the cutting of posts and resources. Yet, all around Africa—and not only Africa—you will find minute diplomatic posts and large, lavishly staffed, separate DfID offices. In the UN, every country’s vote counts, as the Chinese, who are opening up everywhere, well understand. We, however, are wilfully reducing our influence in the name of a short-sighted economic drive. The Treasury has required the FCO to close nine embassies and 21 consulates and to retire 70 experienced diplomats, all to save £6 million per annum in an overall target of £86 million. Last year, the DfID budget for Africa alone was £357 million, and that department had 348 UK-based staff in post. The work of the commission for Africa, if it ever comes to anything, will not be done by closing posts in Africa, or by relying on DfID to assess the political risks or to estimate the political future of a leader such as Museveni. It concerns me that the chief responsibility for advising the Prime Minister on Africa in his strategic unit has gone to a relatively junior DfID representative, to whom all communications on policy from our African posts must go, whose political experience of Africa is probably minimal. In a further dilution of the influence on policy of the FCO, I understand that DfID is now to be represented on the JIC. In the recent White Paper, it was truly said that having a post on the ground is the most effective form of diplomatic representation in a country. It is the proper representation of our country, not its philanthropic activity, and I believe it to be vital and at risk. DfID is a valuable entity, but it should be only one of the manifestations of our international policy. So long as the countries we support as donors through DfID perceive DfID missions, which are often quite large, as a separate policy-making entity, completely independent of the usually very small diplomatic mission, the diplomats will not be regarded as the voice of the UK, and they will not have appropriate political access and influence. The DfID mission, which is full of young technical specialists who often neither speak the language nor understand the culture and politics, will be seen as the seat of power and influence. That will rarely be appropriate. Her Majesty’s Government should not forget that donors are rarely loved or respected, and are often perceived or represented as colonialist in their approach, whereas diplomatic relations confer dignity and imply equality. In Africa, this is not an issue to be ignored. A culture in this Government that fails to value trained professionals as a resource and allows the Treasury to play number games is having disastrous consequences. It is not unknown for a Prime Minister to want to be his own Foreign Minister. In the past, they had the sense to read papers and use a superb professional machine, the Office. God help us if we ever have a Prime Minister who, in addition, regards the Office as just one more expendable, old-fashioned cottage hospital. Skills are not easily replaced.