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Identity Cards Bill

My Lords, my name is on this amendment, and I strongly support it. We have reached one of the most important amendments we will deal with during our long debates on Report. For technical reasons it simply was not possible for this amendment to be tabled until Thursday, when it was all worked out. I put on the record my thanks to Liberty for being able to turn around so quickly a response to this specific amendment. They try to do great service to noble Lords and Members of another place. Amendment No. 33 provides that, in situations where the person has consented, the particulars should not be recorded unless they wish that this be done. However, in any situation where consent has not been given, that should be recorded. The rationale behind the amendment—I am putting this in a simple way, as I had to in order to explain it to myself—is that if a record is kept every time a person voluntarily uses their card, a detailed record of their habits and movements can soon build up. I expressed my concerns about the audit trail on Amendment No. 6 earlier today. As the purpose of the NIR is to provide a means of identification, it would not be appropriate also to allow it to build up so much detailed information on those entered on the register. We argue, therefore, that this information should not be recorded. Conversely, when access takes place without consent, it is certain to be by one of the state agencies authorised by Clauses 19 to 23, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, explained. As we have commented throughout the passage of this Bill, the grounds for access are exceedingly broad. In particular, the security agencies, authorised under Clause 19(2), need no justification for access to the register so long as it falls within the statutory duties of that agency. Because of this, it is extremely important that some degree of accountability is imposed by ensuring that any such access be recorded. It would be difficult for the National Identity Scheme Commissioner effectively to carry out his functions under Clause 24. While the Commissioner will not keep under review specific access by the security services, he does have a duty, under 24(2)(c), to review the arrangements made by persons to whom information is provided. We think that it is clearly desirable in our democratic society that some record of any state access to information should be made even if, as in this case, there is no public access to that record. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is right. At this stage, the amendment is probing in nature. There are some complex and technical issues as well as security issues and matters of principle underlying the amendment. Even if it were not late at night, it would be right to give the Government a full opportunity to address the arguments in the amendment and for us to talk about it behind the scenes before Third Reading. In one way we seek to ensure better drafting of the Bill but there is a deep difference between us on a matter of principle. We may not be able to resolve that but the Government may be able to give a better explanation, which may assuage some if not all of us.