Proceeding contribution from Lord Goldsmith (Labour) in the House of Lords on Monday, 27 February 2006. It occurred during Debate on bill and Committee proceeding on Company Law Reform Bill [HL].
Company Law Reform Bill [HL]
There are three parts to this amendment that I need to deal with. The first is the drafting. The noble Lord would change ““the company has”” in Clause 243(3)(e) to ““the directors have”” because there may be some confusion in other places where ““the company”” refers to the members. For the purposes of this clause, ““the company”” means whoever has the right to decide matters for the company. It may well be that that decision will be a matter for the directors. In that case, if the directors have so decided, the company has so decided. However, it would be quite wrong to exclude consideration of those cases where the members have reached a decision. I do not see why the scope of the provision should be narrowed in the way that the amendment suggests. I hope that that deals with what the amendment proposes. The noble Lord made two further points. The first was whether it could be right that the statutory action should be available only where the company had refused to seek appropriate redress. He suggested that it is not in the interests of a company for members to be able to bypass the board’s usual decision-making process by taking action themselves. I do not agree that the statutory action should be available only where the company has refused to seek appropriate redress. Indeed, we discussed earlier that it would be open to directors to take a dilatory approach and to keep putting off the decision about whether to bring proceedings in order to buy time for reasons that may not be good. The court can take into account what has happened, but I do not agree that it should be a requirement of the action that the company has refused to seek appropriate redress. The second point raised by the noble Lord was whether I can confirm that the effect of Clauses 242(2)(e) and 242(3)(e) is to make it necessary for the court to review any decision by the board not to pursue a claim. He suggested that that would be burdensome. I am not sure that I understand why that should be so. Under Clause 242(2)(a), the court would look at the question of whether a person acting in accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue the claim. If the court is satisfied that such a person would not seek to continue the claim, that would be an end to the derivative claim. When it comes to the discretionary element under Clause 242(3)(e), the court would look to see whether the company had decided not to pursue the claim. If it had, that would be a powerful factor, but it would not be conclusive. Looking at all the circumstances, the court might see that there were ulterior reasons for doing so, or even that it was an obviously bad decision. I do not see that that imposes a significant burden on the court or the company, which is the way in which the noble Lord referred to the matter.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 679 c29-30GC
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords Grand Committee
- Subjects
- Audit Accountancy Company law Companies Directors Applications Civil proceedings Liability Meetings Registration Small businesses Shares Shareholders
- Legislation
- Company Law Reform Bill (HL) 2005-06
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
Librarians' tools
- Timestamp
- 2024-04-22 02:13:50 +0100
- URI
- http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_302708
- In Indexing
- http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_302708
- In Solr
- https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_302708