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Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 54:"Page 2, line 14, at end insert—" ““(4)   All reasonable attempts will be made to inform persons falling into subsection (2) or (3) that they have been placed on the barred list.”” The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 54, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 80, 81 and 86 to 89. Amendment No. 54 seeks to insert in the Bill an assurance that:"““All reasonable attempts will be made to inform persons””," that they have been placed on the barred list. Clause 7(3) states:"““It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that he did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know, that he was barred from that activity””." As this defence is being clearly spelt out in the legislation, we also need a clear guarantee that every reasonable attempt will be made to notify the individual that they have been barred. Currently, nothing in the legislation would ensure that this is done. Perhaps the Minister can either reassure me or accept the amendment. Amendments Nos. 80 and 81 would restrict the offence of a barred person engaging in a regulated activity to situations where there is an actual intention to mislead and remove the existing defence of not knowing or reasonably knowing that they were engaged in a barred activity. Clause 7 creates an offence punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment of seeking to engage in a regulated activity if barred. Given the broad scope of regulated activity, a wide range of employment will be covered by barring. It is extremely likely that people who are barred might apply for work without realising that it is prohibited for them to do so. For the sake of children and vulnerable adults, I hope that an effective vetting procedure would ensure that a person who was barred would not be able to engage in any ““regulated activity””. However, as the purpose of barring is not to punish those who are barred, but to protect children and vulnerable people—in other words, prevention—it would be more appropriate to limit criminalisation to situations where a barred person has attempted to engage in regulated activity by misleading the IBB or a regulated activity provider. For example, it is appropriate that a barred person who tries to get work under a different name should be criminalised; that is perfectly reasonable. If this requirement to mislead is incorporated, it would negate the need for the defence in subsection (3), as it is not feasible that someone would mislead if they did not know or could not be expected to know that they were barred: hence the need for my Amendment No. 81. Amendment No. 86 would introduce a defence to the offence of a person engaging in regulated activity without being subject to monitoring. I support the Government’s desire to ensure that every step is taken to create a situation where only those who have been properly vetted are able to work with children or the vulnerable. I presume that this punitive framework is intended to ensure that those engaged in the vetting processes are extremely rigorous in the way in which they carry out their duties. However, the wide range of regulated activities contained in Schedule 3 means that many thousands of people not directly involved in teaching or caring will be subject to vetting. Of course, every attempt must be made to ensure that people do not engage in regulated activity without vetting. The best way to achieve that is to ensure that IBB procedures and processes are clear and definite, but not by criminalising those who make mistakes. Clause 8 makes it an offence to engage in any regulated activity without being subject to monitoring. The only defences to that are if the individual got permission to engage in the activity prior to the Act coming into force or is involved in a regulated activity on an occasional basis. What does ““occasional”” mean? It is of particular concern that a strict liability offence can be committed as a consequence of involvement in an activity that is defined by such a non-specific term as ““frequent”” or ““occasional””. The defence introduced by the amendment is quite limited. The onus is on the person charged to prove that they did not know, or could not have known, that they should have been subject to monitoring. My amendment will not let people ““get away with it””. It will be quite difficult to prove what I have just outlined, because it involves proving a negative. It is similar to the defence introduced in Clause 7. However, it differs from that defence: it offers an alternative in that the person can prove that they did not know or could not have been expected to know. The reason is that when proving a negative it is extremely difficult to establish that you could not reasonably be expected to know. But at least it is some sort of defence, which it is reasonable to have. Amendments Nos. 87, 88 and 89 are all similar. They would change the scope of offences committed in Clause 9. It would be necessary to establish that a regulated activity provider had actual knowledge or suspicion that someone was barred rather than simply requiring ““reason to believe”” it, which is how it is put in the Bill. Clause 9 is not in itself particularly problematic, as it criminalises those who permit people they know or have reason to believe are barred to engage in regulated activity. This is the sort of act of commission that is more properly criminalised than the offences of omission in Clauses 10, 11 and 12, to which we will come later in our debates. However, I am concerned by the offence of those who have reason to believe that a person is barred. As such, a reason to believe could arise from an oversight—for example, not spotting a name on a list. It is more appropriate that the offence should be committed by those who ““know”” or ““suspect””, which are the words that I have included. A successful prosecution will require that, at the very least, the person had some knowledge that a person might be barred, but failed to act on it: it would not be for just a slip, an oversight or a small act of omission that anyone who was trying to carry out their duties conscientiously might commit. I beg to move.