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Nuclear Proliferation

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for introducing this important debate. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was drawn up in a world order where the great danger was of a war between two nuclear superpowers, but the end of the Cold War and the development of a new global system have changed this. While proliferating states are still a concern, a new threat has emerged in the form of terrorist groups. Unlike states, terrorists do not need access to uranium mines, complex nuclear facilities or reliable delivery systems, as a dirty bomb alone would be sufficient to meet their ends. Nor can terrorists be deterred by traditional means. Whereas states seek nuclear weapons to deter potential attack, terrorists seek to use them to inflict havoc and destruction. Nuclear weapons technology is now easier to acquire, and the industrial capacity of states to manipulate such technology has improved vastly. We have seen the development of an international black market for nuclear material. The dismantling of the AQ Khan network was a success, but we still do not know the full extent of the materials and expertise that it provided to countries such as Iran, or whether elements of the network are still intact. The efforts of countries such as Iran and North Korea to subvert the NPT have eroded confidence in the treaty’s ability to constrain proliferators. It is vital to British interests that Iran does not become a fully fledged nuclear power. There would be a real possibility of an arms race in the Middle East and serious implications for the future of the NPT regime if a country that had signed the treaty succeeded in using it as a cover to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians continue to claim that all work done in this area is for civilian use only. They claim that their activities are legal under the provisions of the treaty and describe Western objections as ““bullying””. It is true, as is frequently pointed out by those in Iran who would try to justify their nuclear work as research into nuclear energy rather than weaponry, that the non-proliferation treaty aims to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as to work towards nuclear disarmament. However, it was set up to operate in a climate of openness and mutual trust between countries. To this end, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established, with a clear warning that countries that hoped to divert nuclear technology and material into military uses would be identified and stopped. Iran’s 18 years of concealment of its nuclear activities from the IAEA and repeated violations of its safeguards agreement does not inspire confidence. There are strong grounds to doubt that it is pursuing solely peaceful research. The IAEA concluded in April that Iran must go well beyond the terms of its agreements with the IAEA to restore international trust in its intentions, but instead of responding positively to this demand, Iran has accelerated its enrichment research and reduced IAEA access by ceasing to implement the additional protocol. Furthermore, the Iranian Government have ruled out a proposal for the country to meet its civilian nuclear power needs through a joint-venture enrichment programme in Russia, an opportunity that Iran would surely grasp if its intentions were purely peaceful. The Iranian leadership has also made blunt threats to disrupt the flow of oil to international markets. I hope that consistent international pressure will lead Iran to clarify all outstanding issues with the IAEA, to demonstrate conclusively that its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes only and to make the commitments that could lead to an improvement in its relationship with the rest of the world. I add my voice to those who have spoken in support of the US Government’s offer of talks with Iran if it agrees to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. This is a very positive step towards a diplomatic resolution of the current crisis, and I hope that Iran will respond fully. The debate about Iran serves to highlight how much the world has changed since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. At least three countries now have nuclear weapons which are not governed by the treaty and two more are attempting to join them. We must not let the treaty become an irrelevance as more countries develop nuclear weaponry outside its framework. Will the Minister give any indication that serious steps are being taken to establish a worldwide protocol to cover these countries? Can she explain what plans the Government have to monitor and regulate future agreements between countries that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and those that have not? Finally, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that past unauthorised exchanges of nuclear technology such as that which passed between North Korea, Pakistan and Libya do not happen again?