---

Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill

My Lords, this debate shows how most of us are reflecting on our experience of regulation and deregulation. It is not surprising that in the temper of the times, the focus has been on the necessity to deregulate rather than to regulate. My executive experience, gained in ministerial posts almost 30 years ago, was rather of the necessity for regulation. I am as conscious of its necessity as I am of the mood of the times. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, was candid enough to reflect on his recent experience of that kind, but with the passage of the years it seems that there have been rather different approaches to regulation which have given rise to some of the difficulties that this Bill attempts to confront. Perhaps the most significant piece of regulation for the protection of consumer interests with which I was engaged was the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which was controversial in a sense, although the controversy was at the margin. The proposal that there was a need for such legislation flowed from a series of careful studies undertaken in a number of different forums. Reports came from distinguished non-party people, from the European Union and so forth. All of that preceded the enactment of the Bill with the result that there was broad agreement on what needed to be done. I think it is fair to say that it lasted well and very few people suggested that much deregulation was required as a result of the Act. One of the challenges we face today is that of governments reacting to particular problems too quickly, without sufficient deliberation, and not looking at the matter which requires regulation in the wider context; indeed, looking at it in an unsystematic way with the result that incoherence develops and burdens become unacceptable. If we are to tackle the problem of over-regulation, I believe that at least as much attention needs to be given to the case for regulation prior to bringing forward the legislation that will enact it. A second reason for this speedy reaction to a problem seems to be the instinctive desire of governments to demonstrate through some change in the law that they have the measure of it. I do not think that that is a partisan point. Too often these matters are treated in a partisan sense by the government of the day, without sitting down and addressing them in a round table atmosphere so as to gain consent for a proposed solution before the matter is even introduced to Parliament. That, for me, was the very powerful message of the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover, with respect to deregulation. But it is also a message with respect to regulation, and the application of tests, compliance costs and risk assessments would certainly go a long way towards reducing this contentious problem to size. Another general consideration which it is appropriate to raise at Second Reading—we shall in the later stages of the Bill have the opportunity to consider the impact of its detailed proposals—is how on earth this measure ever came before Parliament at all. It is the most astonishing piece of legislation, even in its revised form as brought before this House. In introducing it, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said that the Bill before us was not what noble Lords may have heard about. I think that is to suggest that noble Lords pay perhaps rather less attention than we do to legislation coming before Parliament. But the trouble is that we cannot simply draw a line under what was considered in another place as though it had no bearing on what we are considering now. This reflects very clearly the thrust of the Minister’s concerns and, since the original Bill was introduced, there has been a step by step withdrawal from the more extreme positions that have been espoused. We are far from having a measure which, by agreement across the Chamber, can be consented to. Frankly, there is no division of opinion around the House about the desirability of deregulation where procedures are burdensome and unnecessary or incoherent, but the ways and means of achieving it are immensely important if our democratic procedures are not to be dangerously undermined. It was bizarre that the Bill was not recognised to have any constitutional import when clearly it had the effect of cutting down the scrutiny that Parliament would give to legislation. In days of yore, such matters were considered on the Floor of another place and its Members took their time. Far from having that treatment, the Bill had eight days in Committee of guillotined debate as though it was just any sort of routine measure. That also strikes me as hard to justify. I put it to the Minister, humbly and with a certain degree of force, that when the powers of Parliament are being tackled in this way, even as an indirect consequence of the Government’s intentions—however well intentioned they may be and however well intentioned they may think the legislation is—they would do well to consult not only the business interests affected outside but the parliamentary interests inside this House and another place prior to bringing forward legislation. I have on many occasions in this House advocated a cross-party approach to constitutional legislation, for that is what will result in it lasting. The provisions of the Bill as it stands seem very far from perfect. In addressing their detail we will be greatly assisted by the reports that have been received from the two committees which have given the matter detailed consideration. I notice in particular that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its 20th report, has suggested that the veto arrangements should be looked at with particular care—indeed, it has suggested that, as they stand, they should be deleted—partly because if the veto is exercised by a committee, it is only a provisional veto and can be rejected by either House, as I read the Bill. That is not the only problem with the veto provision as it stands. If, far from exercising their veto, the committees were not to choose to exercise their veto, that would have the contrary effect of precluding other Members of the House from participating fully in a debate in which it is quite possible that there would be an important minority opinion to be expressed. That seems to me to be almost as serious as the power exercised to preclude the procedures which are advocated to accelerate debate. I hope that issue, too, will be looked at with care because Members of Parliament in another place, when they are elected, are not understood by their constituents to have absolutely no power over a matter because a committee of the House has been given delegated responsibility to decide it. The last point I wish to address at this stage relates to the work of the Law Commission. I sat at the feet of Lord Gardiner as a young man in Parliament and I am greatly impressed by the work of the Law Commission. I have drawn attention over the years to the difficulty that there has been in enacting its recommendations, but I think it is quite spurious to suggest that because it has deliberated long and carefully and its recommendations are normally highly sensible and defensible, they can be categorised as technical and uncontroversial. There have been examples—some of which were mentioned in debates in another place—where the Government have wished to intervene and modify, or even act entirely contrary to, the recommendations of the Law Commission. It seems to me that we, in this democratic institution of Parliament, should not delegate our democratic responsibilities to an appointed body such as the Law Commission. However wise such a body may be, the rights of minorities to raise points that may have occurred only to minorities is crucial to the effectiveness of our system. I hope therefore that the proposal in Clause 3 will be struck from the Bill.