---

Armed Forces Personnel

I am always diffident about taking part in defence debates, as I have not served in the armed services, although I have relatively recent connections with the forces. My husband was a national service officer, and our elder son was a regular officer in the same regiment—the 14th/20th King’s Hussars. As we speak, his second son is at a combined cadet force camp on Dartmoor, so perhaps there will be a third generation in the armed services in due course. At the outset of my brief contribution, may I pay tribute to all our armed service personnel, who are the very best services in the world and serve with great distinction and valour? May I extend my deepest sympathies to families who have been bereaved, some very recently indeed? It is an obvious thing to say but also true that without people who are prepared to join the Army, Navy and Air Force to serve our country, we would have no armed forces. One of the key problems being faced is the important issue of recruitment and retention, which has been mentioned in the debate. We are frequently told by Ministers that because the United Kingdom has enjoyed a successful economy for some time, difficulties in recruiting have been exacerbated. The only answer that the MOD has come up with to date to seek to solve the problem is to pour massive amounts of money into recruitment in the hope of attracting sufficient personnel for the future. However, we all are aware that money is getting tight and the Chancellor will probably not be too keen on providing more, in spite of the United Kingdom’s many and ongoing military commitments in various theatres. I believe that the problem is far more deeply rooted than just competition in the employment market place. The unemployment figures are beginning to creep up nationally, so in a relatively short time that reason will, perhaps, no longer be valid. We should cast our minds back to December 1998 during the negotiations on the St. Malo agreement. It was at that time that the Prime Minister decided that the UK would not join the euro. In all matters relating to the European Union, there can never be a straight decision. There is always a trade off—that is, a price to be paid. In this instance, the UK conceded and agreed that our forces would be integrated into a European Union defence force. From that time onwards, the Ministry of Defence did not quite know in what direction it would have to commit our armed forces in the future. Would the first priority be to serve the interests of the UK, or to co-operate with the European Union or with the United States of America, or a combination of all three? If the MOD did not know in which direction it was meant to be going, how could members of the armed services second-guess the future? Subsequently, the problems have been exacerbated because the UK is engaged in conflicts in which our troops are committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been well understood that, moving on from the former cold war scenario, changes would have to be introduced and the concept of the future Army structure came to light with its objective of strengthening the medium sector. It is crystal clear that we are without a whole category of vehicles suitable for insurgency work, and this lack has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The focus and direction of policy has been to prioritise the future rapid effect system, which is an integral part of the European Union rapid reaction force, but which realistically will not be in operation until possibly as late as 2020. Moreover, the whole project falls into a world of fantasy in which the total package requires airlift, electronics, future technology and state of the art communication at a projected overall cost of £6 billion initially, which ballooned almost overnight to £14 billion. Those sum are all beyond our financial means and are almost just a wish list, but these plans have resulted in us taking our eye off the ball. Rather than concentrating on what is needed now and for the immediate future to enable our armed forces to meet the challenges of fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan—insurgents who are highly mobile and armed with cheap but deadly weaponry—we are left in a virtual vacuum. We are expecting our forces to operate Snatch 1 armoured Land Rovers from Northern Ireland, which are clapped out and always overheating and breaking down. The No. 2s are just about acceptable, with a little life left in them yet, while the No. 3s are very few on the ground. The problem is that we are forced to use these old vehicles because there is no alternative, and because of ongoing long- term commitments the MOD is now virtually broke. We heard a little earlier in the debate that there are to be further cuts of at least £1 billion. The Chancellor has judged that there are more important things on which to spend taxpayers’ money, so is it any wonder that the strength of our armed forces is under pressure—by ““strength””, I mean the number of personnel who are currently serving in the armed services? The answer that the Government have arrived at is to keep moving the establishment—the number of service personnel who are actually needed to fulfil our present commitments—downwards. By that neat mechanism of fiddling the figures, the MOD can claim that we are ““nearly up to strength””. I have still not been able to acquire the reserve forces figures, which were due to be published on 1 April this year, in spite of my tabling more than one written parliamentary question. The present figures are 15 months old, which makes one wonder what is going on in the MOD. If I may make a suggestion, it is much better to publish and be damned rather than to make people think that it is sheer administrative incompetence or that the Government are trying to keep the truth from hon. Members and from the public who have an interest in these matters. If the figures are not provided before the recess, one can only assume that they are being deliberately withheld. Recruitment of both the Territorial Army and the regulars is now being merged, which will, in my view, be disastrous if it is not handled professionally and with a great deal of thought and planning. The recruiting teams will have to be made to understand that they are dealing with two completely different animals. The regulars operate in what might be described as a military bubble, but the TA personnel are, first and foremost, civilians and come from a totally different background and experience, although they have a considerable amount to offer the armed services. While our armed forces are placing their lives on the line each and every day on behalf of us all, which they are now doing in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq, it is essential that the Government, through the MOD and Parliament, concentrate on providing what is necessary for the present and for the immediate future. The Prime Minister has spent too much time placing European Union integrationist policy first, rather than ensuring that present day servicemen and women have appropriate and adequate resources and equipment. If we do not provide our forces with the best that money can buy, rather than some of the present outdated equipment, which is hardly fit for purpose, will it be any surprise if we cannot recruit or retain sufficient high calibre personnel? By spending too much time and energy on the future creation of forces which will eventually be totally integrated within the European Union rapid defence force, the Prime Minister and his Chancellor have sold the pass and limited the choices for the future. Many commentators believe that the Army of today is being starved of resources in order to feed a fantasy army of the future. I hope that they will be proved wrong, and I trust that the MOD will provide the appropriate equipment for our armed services to allow them to perform their valuable and vital duties.