---

Legislative Process

I thought that I had already said that I can see two reasons for the sub judice rule. First, it avoids us appearing to prejudice a court’s decision, and, secondly, it prevents us from getting on to the courts’ turf at all. The comity point—the obligation to not comment on things that are rightfully the business of a court while proceedings are under way—should be more narrowly defined, and it should centre on the substance of the case. To take the example of our Select Committee report, if the people who brought the case had given evidence to us, and then sued the Saudi Arabian Government, it would have been wrong of us to publish the evidence and to say, ““What happened to you is absolutely outrageous.”” However, I do not see why we should be prevented from publishing evidence given to us by people other than those involved about another series of events. Equally, I do not see why I should not ask the Government how much it cost to brief the counsel who is looking after the interests of those involved in the case. All that I am saying is that the dividing line is drawn much too far away from the court’s procedures, and much too far into our territory. When a case goes on for two years, as did the case to which I referred, it is very difficult for Members of Parliament to carry out their jobs. Two Procedure Committee reports have been produced on the subject. My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield considered the matter when he was Chairman of the Committee a couple of years ago, and the Committee concluded that,"““with appropriate use of the Speaker’s discretion, it does not recommend changes to the sub judice rule””." The latest Modernisation Committee implies the same thing. It says that the perceived imbalance between how the sub judice rule applies in Parliament and outside could be addressed"““by the appropriate use of the Speaker’s discretion.””" It goes on to say that the phrase ““national importance””, which is involved in the matter of the Speaker’s discretion in the sub judice resolution, should be interpreted ““reasonably””, and not solely with reference to its 1970s origins. It will be interesting to learn whether the proposals work, but I suspect that they will not, and that the Speaker will find that his discretion does not go wide enough. It certainly will not go wide enough to enable the Clerks in the Table Office or on Select Committees to advise Members that they are entitled to make the inquiries that they want to make; they might err on the side of caution. That will result in Members having to take their cases directly to the Speaker, because it is the Speaker’s discretion, and no one else’s, that matters. The sub judice resolution of 15 November 2001 said, on the subject of discretion, that matters sub judice"““shall not be referred to””," but then it says—and this is the crucial point on discretion—that"““where a ministerial decision is in question, or in the opinion of the Chair a case concerns issues of national importance such as the economy, public order or the essential services, reference to the issues of the case may be made in motions””" and so on, with the Speaker’s discretion. Any lawyer would agree that the phrase,"““issues of national importance such as the economy, public order or the essential services””," restricts the definition of ““issues of national importance”” to those categories. I hope that the Procedure Committee, the Leader of the House or perhaps the Speaker himself, will look into the matter again so that we can try to redefine the Speaker’s discretion in the sub judice rule, or redefine the remit of that rule by allowing different standards for civil and criminal proceedings. We should restrict it to the crux of the case that is before the courts, and not bring in peripheral matters. We should reconsider the wording of the provision on the Speaker’s discretion, because I think that we will find that it does not go wide enough. I am seriously worried because, in the past two years, I have found myself restricted once as a Select Committee member, and once as a private Member of Parliament, from pursuing matters that could not conceivably have affected the result of a case, or have been a breach of the comity between Parliament and the courts. I have been restricted from doing so by the very narrow wording of the sub judice rule. I am disappointed that, as I said in an intervention on my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire (Mr. Knight), the Procedure Committee did not think it necessary to change the wording of the resolution. I think that we will have to return to the matter.