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Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I thank the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement. As we are putting our consistency on the line, I can say that, although I have been in a succession of parties, my consistency in supporting the argument for a British nuclear deterrent can be tested. Indeed, I supported it when Mr Blair was wearing his CND badge. As for the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, who seems to have taken a close interest in the development of Liberal Democrat policies, which again I welcome, I remind him that there is a history of the Conservative Party swallowing a Blair-made case hook, line and sinker, only to repent at its leisure. We will be very happy to stand where we are. This is probably the most important decision that any Prime Minister, and any Government, must take. One is worried about some of the rationale. When the Prime Minister says that our independent nuclear deterrent is the ultimate insurance, one must ask whether that is not an invitation to nuclear proliferation, because almost any country can then seek that ultimate insurance. It is extremely dangerous logic. The Prime Minister has advanced a case today for some reduction in the capacity of our deterrent, but has made a commitment to a very expensive solution to the dilemma. We agree that now is not the time to abandon the protection that nuclear weapons provide. I should say in passing that, although I have had only a short time to look at it, the information as presented looks interestingly clear for the layman to go through. There are important points in it. It says, "““we know of no state that has both a nuclear capability and the ability and intent to use it against our vital interests””." It also states, "““accurately predicting events over the period 2020 to 2050 is extremely hard””." We are therefore presented with a case in 2006 that is based chiefly, from what I can see, on the argument that it takes 17 years to develop a replacement. I will be interested to see whether all experts think that that is realistic. We are left with the questions: why now and why this option? I am afraid that there is a suspicion that this is about the Prime Minister’s legacy. One must wonder whether this is a decision to be taken in the dying days of an Administration. We will hear from the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, later. We are told in the newspapers that the Prime Minister-in-waiting will revolutionise Labour policy, clear the decks and change attitudes. So why do we need this decision in what, as I say, are the dying days of the Blair Administration? We have been given the costs, but are they really anything but notional? How much lobbying has gone on by British Aerospace and other defence suppliers? We agree that there is a deterrent to be had, that there is a war to be fought on terrorism and on crime, and that they are not mutually exclusive. But it is legitimate to ask, as former Home Secretary Charles Clarke has asked, whether the balance is right between the kind of expenditure commitment involved in this decision and the commitment made to the war on terrorism. Further, there is a wide range of legitimate views. We shall hear the view of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, later, but Sir Michael Quinlan said: "““I am in favour, but not at any price””." The noble Lord, Lord Hattersley, has said that replacing Trident would be an ““expensive nonsense””. How we wish that the noble Lord, Lord Hattersley, would occasionally grace us with his presence, but unfortunately I do not think that we pay as much as the Guardian. The position taken on these Benches is clear. It would be unwise at this time for Britain to abandon its nuclear weapons altogether, but we would extend the life of the present system with a reduction in the number of submarines and warheads. That is certainly not unilateral disarmament, still less is it fence-sitting. The decision to commission a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines may well be the wrong one and certainly it is being taken by the wrong Prime Minister at the wrong time. We need to use this time for a broader look at our foreign policy and security needs, our role in Europe, the reform of the United Nations, and the need to reinvigorate the non-proliferation treaty and to give impetus to nuclear disarmament—and here I echo the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, about the Government’s initiatives, if any, in this area. As I have said before, this has often been a matter of grave division, certainly on these Benches and on the Benches opposite. The Conservatives have always maintained a bland unity, which makes the present position even more worrying. I do not go as far as Matthew Parris, who called this a, "““pointless piece of Blairite posturing””," while going on to express his support very much along the lines that we are arguing. But there is a need for a rational and informed decision to be taken, and I urge the Government to both broaden and deepen the debate so that all options are discussed and consideration of our foreign policy interests is conducted without reliance on concepts such as ““buying a ticket to the top table””. This is really a Statement saying, ““Don’t send me naked into the conference chamber””, but the response to that from these Benches is that we must have all the available information and a fully informed debate. We must not be bounced or rushed into a decision about matters that are decades away; we should not have to rely on an assurance from the Prime Minister that the decision has to be taken now, even though many reasonable and expert opinions say that there is time and it is necessary to conduct a longer and better-informed debate.