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Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I shall start with the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. First, I thank him for his overall support in these matters. This is of course a question of national security and it is important that the parties work together as much as possible. On the question of containing proliferation, we strongly believe that the best way of achieving our goal of a safer world free from nuclear weapons is through consensus. We therefore continue to engage in efforts in this direction both in terms of constraining nuclear proliferation and in terms of disarmament. That is why this Government’s record on disarmament is so important. We shall, of course, keep the strategic planning process under review. As to whether the House will have an opportunity to debate the issue, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, knows that that is a matter for the usual channels, but I cannot imagine that in this instance the usual channels will say no. The White Paper sets out very clearly the technical issues. It runs through four possible scenarios and points very clearly to the importance of maintaining and upgrading the current system. I can confirm that the whole Cabinet endorses this decision. It is a matter that we have discussed on more than one occasion. The deciding factor on the number of submarines is basically a technical one. We want the ability to maintain continuous patrolling—that is important to us—and we need to know the design of the new submarine before we can make a decision on numbers. As to the warheads and whether reducing them to 160 will be sufficient, I can confirm that we are moving to that number on the basis of professional advice. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, raised a number of issues and questions. I agree that the White Paper is very clear. I think that anyone who is not an expert in these matters could read the White Paper and come to a clear understanding of the issues that are being debated and discussed. I note the noble Lord’s comment that now is not the time to abandon our protection. I thought that I went into the question of why we need to make the decision now when I was reading the Statement, but perhaps I should repeat it. The first of our Royal Navy Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines which carry the Trident D5 missile was launched in 1992 and had an original design life of25 years. So it will come to the end of its life in 2017. Even if the life of the boats was extended by around five years—the maximum we judge to be prudent—the first two boats would leave service around 2022 and 2024. All the advice and experience that we have shows that we will need 17 years for the concept, design and building of the new submarines, which is why the decision has to be taken by 2007. I know that some will say that the last time around it took only14 years from the decision to purchase Trident to the first system being deployed, but in the preceding decade a good deal of initial concept and design work had already taken place without commitment. That is why the estimate is 17 rather than 14 years. We have chosen this option because we think that it will give us the greatest security and the best value for money. It is about getting the balance right. It is not about lobbying by any particular companies; it is about the UK’s security. Yes, it is a judgment, but we have made it on the basis of the information available to us. No other nuclear power is looking at giving up its nuclear deterrent at the moment. The noble Lord asked about spending the money on countering the threat from terrorism, but he will know that we have an intensive strategy for managing risks from terrorism and we are investing heavily in a range of capabilities to deal with them. But we still need to insure against the range of potential threats that only nuclear weapons can deter, even though new threats such as terrorism have emerged. We know that the deterrent helps to deter some of the worst risks from terrorism, but we would not pretend that it deters all of them. The Statement made the position clear with regard to costs. The overall design and manufacture costs of some £15 billion to £20 billion are spread over three decades; on average, that is 3 per cent of the defence budget, no more than any other major defence projects would cost. The costs are at their highest in the early 2020s, but if this were spread evenly over these years it would be about £1 billion a year. That is 1 per cent of our total health spending. We spend some £6 billion on our international development budget. It is important to put this project in perspective. Some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, in respect of the rationale for this, the issue of lobbying and the question whether this is about the Prime Minister’s legacy were wholly inaccurate. This is a judgment that the whole Cabinet has come to. We recognise the need to make a decision now, and the Conservatives have made it clear that they do, too. The Liberal Democrats seem to be saying yes, they want to retain a deterrent, but they do not know what we should be doing.