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Iraq

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their questions and I shall try to deal with each in turn. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, the Government have begun their response, but the study group’s report is to the United States rather than to us. Making sure that we understand the implications for us, which in some respects are distinct from those for the United States, requires a bit more work, but there is every intention of holding all the discussions that the House requires. This is the third such discussion in 22 days. I do not regret that clear necessity and we will not stand back from any discussion, but I cannot make a commitment on behalf of the House authorities that there will be one before the Recess. I certainly have no difficulty with addressing questions. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, asked whether we have a view about the conditions for withdrawal and whether they continue to be that we withdraw when the job is done. Perhaps I may respond to that and to one of the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about what we will do in the areas from which we are withdrawing and what we will do about when the United States forces begin to withdraw from the other three provinces. I do not think that it is a matter simply of withdrawing as a complete step. The first step will be to withdraw from front-line duties. As the Statement says, there will be a necessity to remain, although not on front-line duties, until it is certain that the Iraqi security forces can stand up and do the job that is required. This will have to be a phased and carefully calibrated set of events, because otherwise we might very well find ourselves inadvertently cutting and running and there is no intention of doing that. The United States withdrawal arrangements are principally a matter for the United States, in discussion with us, but if we still have forces there in that second phase, the probability is that withdrawal through the south should be facilitated. The Prime Minister has expressed his intentions regarding his visit to the region. He wishes to re-stimulate what he, I and, I believe, this House regard as the central plank of what is required—that there should be a re-engagement in the Middle East peace process as the vital key to resolving a number of issues across the region. That is what is needed and that is at the front of his agenda. Sir Nigel Sheinwald was the envoy to Syria. He engaged in a deep discussion with the Syrians. I do not wish to make extravagant claims, but I believe that the decision of the Syrians to dispatch an ambassador to Iraq to begin a process of normalisation of relationships was one of the achievements of that visit and I am very pleased that it was successful in that respect. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, asked about links to Iran. Discussions are going on all the time on a whole variety of matters to try to keep within the bounds of normality in dealing with another state—even in such areas as immigration, in which I am involved. In response to the question about Iraqi support for the ISG, we understand that it has been measured, that the Iraqis are considering it, that there is not immediate unanimity of view because they are debating and analysing it, as we are. It would be more surprising if suddenly everyone in that troubled country and all of the factions were absolutely of one mind within two days of reading a report produced in Washington. Truly, that would have surprised me completely. But there is a debate going on, and I believe that there is a measured understanding of the report’s importance and of what some of the links with the neighbours mean. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that the Iraqis will be involved throughout. I echo in this House the last words of the Statement: we need to start thinking not just about the United Kingdom and the United States—although we are responsible for the United Kingdom’s interests—but about the Iraqi Government, who have been democratically elected, and about how we can assist the progress of democracy under that Government. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, is right: we will need to draw in others, but I do not accept that there should be no threats. A robust discussion with the neighbours should not burn off their desire to take part, but there has to be an honest discussion about the sponsorship of terrorism and the potential development of nuclear weapons. Those issues will not just vanish. The international community has a long-term concern, and I hope that a moderate and modulated discussion of that kind can be held. However, if necessary, I do not think that it would be inappropriate if, for example, the world were to say to one of the neighbours—Iran—through the Security Council, that the development outside international treaties of a potential nuclear weapon was not acceptable. In general, questions from whichever party in your Lordships’ House about that problem have emphasised that that would be an undesirable development in any terms. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, suggests that the missing piece of understanding is the extent of asymmetry in the character of warfare. I am not sure that it is really a missing piece in terms of understanding because the conflict in Lebanon taught the lesson very thoroughly. We are seeing terrorist organisations being equipped to fight wars very much more consistently than was ever the case in the past, and that must now be part of the strategic assessment made by Her Majesty’s Government and all the allies, who are trying to achieve peace in the Middle East. I agree with the noble Lord that it would be a serious mistake if we were to overlook the significance of that change and the way that it alters or reshapes big-power politics and the capacity of big powers to exert force without a response from people much more locally. That has to be part of the analysis. The noble Lord asked about Asia and Russia. Of course, China and Russia are both members of the P5, and there are many other links aside from the work of the United Nations Security Council. All effort, whether in respect of the Iran nuclear dossier or the dossier about Iraq, has attempted, and does attempt, to engage those powers and other emerging economic powers in Asia because, as the noble Lord said, they should not be neglected in this calculation. The international community cannot just be defined in terms of those who have traditionally been, or have become, members of NATO. I agree that it can no longer be defined without proper regard to the emergence of these powerful blocs, and work is being done very seriously on that basis. I hope that I have responded to the question about whether there will be further reports and further debates. I believe that new developments inevitably stimulate questions and debates, and I do not resist the concept of those discussions as they arise. I turn to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. If I may say so, I thought that he was unusually inconsistent this afternoon. He believes that there is every implication in the report that we are driven exclusively by Washington but, on the other hand, he says that Washington does not agree with us and that we are in a totally different position. They cannot both be true—at least, not at one and the same moment. They may be true sequentially or at other times but they are not true at the same moment. I thought that the visit to Washington resulted in a major discussion between the President and the Prime Minister, and that is part of a constant assessment which must take place. In the context of that assessment, I have no difficulty at all in saying to the House that we have been very much more forward-leaning in talking to Syria and Iran and in trying to engage them in this process in a constructive way than, in my judgment, the United States has been, and I believe that we should continue to be so. If there is a difference about the extent to which we should do it, or the rapidity with which we should do it, I believe our position is right. The region cannot do without the major players, who can be so disruptive, taking part in processes that may be more constructive; hence the force of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, about not antagonising them too much in the process, if I can paraphrase him in that way. I conclude my comments on the important points and questions raised by both noble Lords by saying that these are acutely difficult times. There should be no attempt to pretend otherwise. I do not suggest for a moment that, for example, four provinces with a significant part of the population are not still among the most difficult of all the problems that are faced, because I agree with that analysis. We see a willingness on the part of the Government of Iraq to stand up, to do the job that is required and to take over with assistance and our assurance that we will not abandon them before we know they can actually do the job. That is not a bad principle to guide what we do. How fast it may succeed, and whether it will succeed, are matters on which we will be tested—I accept that. However, if we believe that the democratic process in Iraq should be given every chance of succeeding in the interests of the people who have been oppressed by a brutal dictatorship for a very considerable period in recent history, then let us give it that chance. Let us have the honesty to say to the people of Iraq that we stand for democracy and we intend to fight for democracy.