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Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

Will the noble Lord consider a further point that has not been made? There seems to be a substantial case for the matter that he is pursuing because his amendment does not remove ““substantial”” from Clause 1(3). There, he is expressing a weight of evidence showing that the breach of the duty is a substantial element in causation. In regard to his amendments relating to page 2 of the Bill, it will not be tested in the same way. Presumably as a matter of law, the word should have the same meaning as it had in Clause 1(3). Where a word is mentioned in an Act, it is a basic tenet that it does not have different meanings in different places. It is quite right that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has left ““substantial”” in Clause 1(3) and has turned his attention to a better word in respect of page 2, referring generally to the amendments in that form.