Skip to main content

Proceeding contribution from Lord Goodhart (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 25 January 2007. It occurred during Debate on United Kingdom: Treaty of Union.


United Kingdom: Treaty of Union

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth—but unlike my noble friend Lord Mar and Kellie—I am a convinced supporter of the union. The end of the union would be a tragedy for England, and even more so for Scotland. I am also a strong supporter of Scottish devolution and the existence of the Scottish Parliament, without which the pressure for Scottish independence would be far greater than it is. However, I am not trying to convert those who want Scottish independence, few of whom are present in your Lordships’ House today. I want to try and explain to those who support the union why the exclusion of Scottish MPs from voting on issues solely concerned with England and Wales would lead to the break-up of the union. I talk of England and Wales—and, so far, only the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has mentioned Wales—because so long as the Welsh do not have the power of primary legislation then England and Wales must remain a single unit for these purposes. Ironically, the exclusion of Scottish MPs is supported by a great many Conservatives, including all who have so far spoken in this debate—four of whom are, in fact, former Cabinet Ministers. Such exclusion would lead to chaos in circumstances, which happen sometimes, where one party has an overall majority of the seats in England and Wales but is not part of the United Kingdom Government. Let us take education as an example. That matter is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, so the United Kingdom Parliament would necessarily be responsible for education in England but not in Scotland. If Scottish MPs are excluded, imagine then the position of a Secretary of State for Education and Skills in the UK Government, who would presumably be a member of the governing party. That Secretary of State would have no power to get either primary or secondary legislation on the subject of education through Parliament, because he or she would have no majority. The Opposition, meanwhile, would control the power of voting but would play no part in administering the Department for Education and Skills, and would have no say or control in financing that department. Think of that situation: it is totally and completely unworkable. We could, of course, have a separate English Parliament. It might be workable, but how would it work in fact? First, the English Parliament would insist on taking control of welfare and pensions—the largest element in public spending, and a subject that would be of enormous importance to England. The English Parliament would next insist on setting its own taxes. It would not be prepared to leave control of the raising of funds, which the English Parliament would then need to spend, to a United Kingdom Government controlled by another party. The result would be that the powers of the United Kingdom Government were limited to foreign affairs, defence and, probably, immigration, with perhaps some DTI matters such as competition. Do those powers contain enough glue to keep the union together? Clearly, they do not. The English Government would be far more powerful in everyday life than the United Kingdom Government, and if that happens then Scottish secession from the union seems almost certain. Is there another answer? None is wholly satisfactory but I will suggest that, as I have indicated, we need to recognise that the circumstances giving rise to the English question—or the West Lothian question—are relatively rare. They happen only when one party has an overall majority in England and Wales, but at that time is not part of the United Kingdom Government. That condition can and indeed has occurred, but only rarely—and when it has, the situation is usually unstable and has not lasted long. When that condition occurs, we need a pragmatic acceptance by the United Kingdom Government that they should not impose legislation on England that is not acceptable to a majority of English MPs—although they would, of course, retain ultimate control. I hope that this would become a constitutional convention, to be parted from only in exceptional circumstances. That is the best hope of retaining the union, while removing the right of Scottish MPs to vote on questions affecting England and Wales would have exactly the opposite effect.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
688 c1232-3 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Devolution Anniversaries England Members Parliament Scotland Voting rights United Kingdom Nationalism Independence movements West Lothian question English votes for English laws
Legislation
Act of Union 1707
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk