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Human Rights

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that point, which I was about to come to. What would be the practical implications of applying such a dual regime? A lot has been made of the Chahal v. United Kingdom judgment, which, we must keep reminding ourselves, was made in 1996, when the Conservatives were on the Government Front Bench and the Human Rights Act had not even been conceived of as possible. The Chahal case is the extant jurisprudence on the subject, and the Conservatives are somehow suggesting that they will extricate themselves from the implications of that case without extricating themselves from the European convention on human rights. I cannot see how that can be done. Perhaps there will be a change in the European ruling; perhaps the Ramzy v. Netherlands case will come to a helpful conclusion, which is what the Government want. However, unless it does, so far as I can see, the law will remain unchanged and no amount of tinkering here will affect that binding jurisprudence elsewhere. The Conservatives also say that they will be in a position to enter reservations on the European convention on human rights, but they must know that under article 57, it allows reservations to be made only on entry—on signing and ratifying the convention—and then only in respect of legislation that is in force at that time. So I am afraid that they have missed the boat regarding that opportunity by 57 years. The margin of appreciation, to which the hon. Member for Hendon referred, does not apply only to the Germans because they have their basic law; it applies to us and to every signatory to the European convention on human rights. It is already applicable, so there is no gain whatsoever to be made in that regard. Far from being a gain, having two competing sets of human rights requirements would be the worst of all positions. There would be one set established by the European convention on human rights, and justiciable in Strasbourg; and another set established by the Conservatives’ British Bill of Rights—a local law for local people, providing local rights that would somehow be interpreted in a different way. Of course, they would not be interpreted differently, because people would go from one court to the other, there would be competing decisions and the result would be a legal nightmare. That is not a sensible provision. If, instead of that, the Conservatives are talking about a constitutional Bill of Rights, which we have argued for for years—a provision that sets out the rights of the British people in democratic terms and avoids the abuse of power by the Executive—we are with them, and we have something on which we can do business, because that has been part of our policy for a long time. However, if they are talking about a Union Jack-stamped equivalent of the European convention on human rights, I am afraid that it is a non-starter. Many others wish to speak, so I will conclude by saying simply this. It is very difficult to strike a balance between the rule of law and the difficulties that society faces, particularly, as we are often reminded, in the face of terrorism. It is not easily done, which is why we need the bedrock of the rights of the citizen. It is the easiest thing in the world to combat terrorism by just locking everybody up and throwing away the key. There would be no terrorism then, but it is not the British way—happily, it is not the European way since the European convention on human rights—and we should not espouse it. I am all for the rule of law, but I am all against the rule by tabloid editors, and that is why the Human Rights Act is so important.