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Policing (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 2007

A huge number of things about this order cause an immense amount of disquiet. One of the difficulties we face is that this order is coming forward in the wake of the Police Ombudsman’s report on Operation Ballast. Impartial and experienced people see that report as widely flawed. It is perhaps one of the most flawed documents we have seen in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland over the past 40 years. It struck me as peculiar when I heard the Lord President say that a matter in respect of the Police Ombudsman had been overlooked in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Many of us believe that that was a fairly convenient oversight. When something is introduced by Order in Council, it is much easier to get a flawed amendment passed than if it is proposed when a Bill is being considered and amendments can be tabled. The reality is—I am almost concluding before I bring forward the argument—if we move the Police Ombudsman and the whole process of examination, re-examination and examination after acquittal,and we see it implemented the way in which it is implemented by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, we will find the methodology. It will not merely be facts that are misinterpreted. I will talk about the way in which so-called facts were handled in the past. It will lead to a revelation of methodology. We all know that—none better than those of us who have served and lived in Northern Ireland—the methodology in dealing with committed terrorists is not something that you would want your best friend to be involved in. The reality is that it is a dangerous and difficult business. I come from soldiering in 1970, when there wasno such thing as ““good intelligence”” in terms of Northern Ireland. In 1972, we had 470 victims of terrorism. Building up an intelligence network is not a pleasant business. The people who have intelligence are not the noble Baroness the Lord President, or Ken Maginnis, or the gentlemen sitting behind the Lord President. They are terrorists, whose information can be tapped. They are dangerous people to work with, and they bring huge danger to their handlers. If we give someone like the Police Ombudsman the power to probe that methodology and, if we take the latter-day threat, the national intelligence agencies—which are becoming more responsible—they will not impart their intelligence to our ordinary police constabularies if they believe that they are bound to reveal it to the ombudsman, who can then reveal it to the public. No one has leaked information more consistently than the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Journalists knew more about Operation Ballast than the Chief Constable or the Secretary of State, long before Operation Ballast was produced. It is not just an internal matter if we damage the integrity of the intelligence sources in our nation. We are not an island in that respect: the intelligence agencies of other nations share information withus. Do we honestly believe that they will share information that ultimately will be revealed to the ombudsman? I hope that I have made the point sufficiently that there is a huge danger. I know that the noble Baroness has colleagues who well and fully understand the implications. I hope that there will be more consultation and discussion within government. It is important that I briefly underpin what I am saying. With other professionals, I have looked at the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland’s report on Operation Ballast. I noticed that it contains seven serious factual inaccuracies, which I will provide for the Lord President if required. There are six serious potential security risks to individuals or to intelligence methodology. There are five seriously flawed judgments, which are frequently repeated assertions without any supporting argument. For example, where the ombudsman has found that some documents are shredded, she does not suggest that it has to do with data protection legislation, but that it is a deliberate attempt, with malice aforethought, to destroy something incriminating. She makes that assertion, and it is totally wrong. There are three obvious self-contradictions in the report and four non-sequiturs. There are six insidious innuendoes which endanger the lives of decent people who have put themselves between the terrorists and the community, some for over 30 years, and who have now retired, believing that they can enjoy their remaining years with their families without having to be behind six-foot fences and bullet-proof glass; without having to look under their vehicles; without having to run the gauntlet that they have had to run for many years. Now they have been thrust back into the forefront. Terrorists are released; we can trust them back out in the community, but the verypeople who brought the 470 deaths in 1972 down to 13 deaths in 2001 are being examined. I could say other things about Operation Ballast. There are 15 demonstrations of lack of professionalism and a profound failure to understand the issue. There are 20 blatant examples of a lack of impartiality in assessments and conclusions, to which I have already alluded; drawing the wrong conclusions and looking in the wrong place. For example, somebody is brought in for questioning for 48 hours. The police have some forensic information but have not defined quite what it is, and they go to the Secretary of State to ask for a 48-hour extension. That produces a piece of paper. Once the matter is dealt with, that piece of paper is probably shredded; it is of no importance. But I will tell you who should have a copy of it: the Secretary of State. Of course, the Police Ombudsman would not have thought of looking there. Or perhaps the Secretary of State and his staff did not know where it was. All in all, this is a dreadful report, full of sloppy drafting. To put it in the context of six years’ work by the Police Ombudsman, that is six years of clawing increasing powers unto herself with a budget rising on a year-by-year basis—£5 million in the first year and £9 million now. That is a fair rise in six years, given the increasingly peaceful situation we have in Northern Ireland. But a total of £42 million! And it is being suggested that it is money well spent. Let me put that £42 million in the context of 13,000 or 14,000 police a few years ago and almost 10,000 police now. What has the ombudsman delivered? She has delivered an average of one criminal conviction per year. That is 0.001 per cent. Going at that rate, there would be one conviction per 100 policeman every 100 years. That puts it in context. That is what the Police Ombudsman has achieved. It cost £7 million per conviction, and we want to give her the opportunity to rake over history in a way that is of no benefit to the erstwhile victims or to a society striving to overcome its distrust. That is the very antithesis of good law. I am sorry for taking so long, but I want to be frank, and I do not want anyone to leave the Committee without understanding the implications of what has happened over the past six years. I do not want them to exacerbate the problem that we are likely to face if we increase the powers of an ombudsman who does not measure up to the criteria intended by Maurice Hayes, and has never done so. Maurice Hayes was one of the most senior civil servants in Northern Ireland. He took a huge interest in security and cross-community matters, and he was widely respected by us. When he suggested a police ombudsman, he asked for somebody with real judicial experience. We did not get anyone with judicial experience or investigative knowledge about the background of terrorism that has troubled us for many years. There are other aspects of this order that I would like to talk about at equal length, but I shall not inflict myself on the Lord President. I hope that she will take seriously the possibility that by moving this order in this form, she may not only damage the emerging peace and political process in Northern Ireland, but undermine the whole basis for trust between and among intelligence agencies, both internal and external to the United Kingdom. We are facing, possibly for the next 40 years, a terrorist threat of international dimensions. However much we want to pander to certain prejudices to persuade people along, that is not the basis for making law or the basis on which we should risk the integrity of the United Kingdom.