---

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

I thank the noble Baroness for the way in which she spoke to her amendment. This goes back to some of the comments that I made on earlier amendments. We are trying to give the courts a degree of flexibility so that they can tailor an order to best fit the circumstances of the case under consideration. We have been conscious that technology moves quickly and we want the legislation to stand the test of time, so we think that judicial flexibility, which would be limited by virtue of the reasonableness of the provisions and compliance with the Human Rights Act, would be an important advantage. Clause 1(3) and the corresponding provision in Clause 19 allow the courts to impose positive as well as negative obligations on the subject of the order. Under an order, a person can be required to take action as well as not to take action, but always subject to the requirement that the terms must be preventive rather than punitive. We do not wish to see these provisions restricted in the way proposed because we do not want the courts to refuse to make an order simply because a particular term cannot be described as a prohibition, a restriction or a requirement. Rather, the courts should be able to impose those terms that they consider will prevent harm. They will have to justify and explain them, and make sure that they are human rights compatible, that they are not oppressive and that they are proportionate, but we believe that they should be entrusted with the opportunity. Having heard my response, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content that these provisions do not cause the worry about which she might be concerned.