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Armed Forces

My Lords, it is difficult to do justice to the very serious operational, funding and equipment issues affecting the effectiveness of our Armed Forces, but I must join other noble Lords in praising them for what they have done, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is all too easy to forget Trident, the strategic nuclear deterrent continuously on patrol and the many other operational tasks undertaken by our Armed Forces which are not in the glare of publicity; but there can be no doubt that, in certain key areas, the Armed Forces are not getting the support they deserve. In Iraq and Afghanistan we have seen some inspirational examples of leadership and great courage; our Armed Forces are a huge credit to our country and more importantly to the military leadership—and I stress military—within those forces. What I have to say next is not so positive. I remain very concerned that, although our Armed Forces have the support of the nation, they are seen by many as a peripheral activity. Too few people have an understanding of the demands placed on our service men and women and their families. The Government and MoD officials, not just the Chiefs of Staff, have a great responsibility to educate the nation. As many other noble Lords have said, we need to remember that recent emergencies have all been unforeseen: the Falklands, the first Gulf war, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq. The threat now posed by international terrorism has the potential to be more demanding and is likely to last longer. In some ways people felt more secure in the Cold War than they do now, but that concern has not been translated by the Government into recognising the need for a sustained—and I stress sustained—increase in defence spending so that the Armed Forces can meet their wide range of operational challenges, which have major implications for training, which is crucial and expensive, and on the size of the forces. The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, has made a strong plea for the Royal Marines; I make a strong plea for other parts of the Armed Forces as well. Frankly, they are too small for the tasks being laid upon them. There are problems in funding a modern equipment programme and providing the right operational and administrative support not only on the medical side, about which much has been done, but in looking after families properly. In addition, the Armed Forces must have a legal system which they trust. I found it extraordinary that the Adjutant-General was forbidden to come and talk to the House of Lords Defence Group. In recent months the Ministry of Defence has successfully persuaded the Treasury to fund a number of urgent operational requirements, but many of those were for equipment that should have already been in the defence programme. We know, for example, about the future rapid effects system vehicle, which is so important for the Army. It is unlikely to be available before 2012 and possibly not until 2017 or 2018. The RAF transport fleet, which does a great job in very demanding circumstances, is also suffering from neglect in funding. I am well aware that the noble Lord, Lord Drayson, has done much to improve the equipment process, and I join other noble Lords in congratulating him on his promotion, if he looks upon it as such. My final point before moving on to Afghanistan is about the direction of the military campaign. The noble Lord, Lord Hurd, in a very important debate on Iraq, turned the spotlight on the shortcomings in the campaign in Iraq. I sense that Afghanistan is drifting the same way. We need a clearer political military strategy that can be translated into clear direction for commanders on the ground. I recognise that, for the coalition in Afghanistan, this direction should come from NATO, but we also need a sharper focus here in London. I will say a little more about NATO in a minute. It is important that the strategy covers not only the military but the political, economic and hearts-and-minds campaign. We talk too much at the moment about the tactical successes, which have been considerable, particularly in Helmand province, but we do not think through how the campaign might develop. I think that there are going to be some bumps on the road. I shall concentrate on Afghanistan. All the indications are that the coalition is looking for an elegant way to extract itself from Iraq and concentrate on Afghanistan because, to quote a number of people, it is ““winnable””. I wonder whether that is the case—I say so not only because of the history of Afghanistan but also given the position of the warlords and tribal leaders. NATO, certainly at the moment, does not have enough troops in Afghanistan to allow us to really dominate the situation in order that a proper and, dare I say, very expensive reconstruction campaign can follow in its wake. What are we really going to do about the poppy crop? A lot of noise was made about this in the early stages but very little seems to be happening. There are also other limitations. The Afghan national army has a very high rate of absenteeism, and you cannot train senior non-commissioned officers and other officers in just a few months. The Afghan national police are even worse. The relationship with Pakistan is critical if we are to succeed in Afghanistan. Noble Lords will realise that this is a huge challenge. It would be awful if failure in Afghanistan and our demands on Pakistan created difficulties for the Pakistani/Indian relationship. Finally, we have to recognise that as far as Afghanistan is concerned we are in for the very long haul. I asked a number of people when I was there recently what they meant by the long haul. The optimistic ones said20 years. I wonder whether the Conservative Party or the present Government are ready for that. Afghanistan is, therefore, a real test for NATO. However, the contingents of too many NATO nations deployed in Afghanistan are too small and have very restricted rules of engagement; some are not allowed out at night. That makes it very difficult for the operational commander and will in time cause huge resentment. In addition, the chain of command back from General McNeill in Afghanistan to NATO is laborious and ponderous. Recently I have been asking myself what my hero Field Marshal Viscount Slim, father of Lord Slim, would say about this. As many of your Lordships will know, Field Marshal Slim transformed the very demoralised British Eastern Army into the most successful 14 Army in Burma. If any man understood morale, he did and that is fundamentally important to our Armed Forces. Let me just quote what he said about morale in his outstanding book Defeat into Victory because there has been much talk about the military covenant. He said that morale must have a spiritual dimension, not in the religious sense but: "““There must be a great and noble objective. Its achievement must be vital. The method of achievement must be active … The man””—" it was, of course, mainly men, then— "““must feel that what he is and what he does matters directly towards the attainment of the object. He must be convinced that the objective can be attained; that it is not out of reach””." Next, and very importantly, a man must feel, "““that the organisation to which he belongs and which is striving to attain the objective is an efficient one. He must have confidence in his leaders and that goes all the way up the chain of command and he must know that whatever dangers and hardships he is called upon to suffer, his life will not be lightly flung away. The man must feel that he will get a fair deal from his commanders and from the army generally. He must, as far as humanly possible, be given the best weapons and equipment for his task. His living and working conditions must be made as good as they can be””." That is not a bad check list for the Government.