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Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2007

My Lords, the Opposition support the need to extend the controls and to update the list of toxins and animal pathogens. The risk of a terrorist attack remains as great as ever. According to Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the current terror threat will ““last a generation””. The number of individuals identified as being actively engaged in plotting terrorist acts runs well into four figures. Dame Eliza claimed that MI5 knew of no less than 30 groups plotting actual attacks. She warned that in the future terrorist attacks were likely to come from, "““the use of chemicals, bacteriological agents, radioactive materials and even nuclear technology””." Nor has the use of such techniques been merely a theoretical threat. Ever since the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, the public have been concerned by the danger of terrorist groups obtaining chemical weapons. Such fears were only exacerbated when several people were killed in the United States five and a half years ago. In their way, these sorts of attacks are unquestionably among the most chilling. Therefore no one could possibly dispute the need for effective legislation in this field. The orders have, I accept, the demanding task of including all the pathogens, viruses and other substances that actually or potentially give rise to concern without, at same time, imposing unnecessary burdens on those whose commercial activities involve using such substances in an entirely legitimate way.It is in the context of achieving the right balancethat the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industries has some preoccupations about the manner in which the categories of organisms and toxins have been extended under Schedule 5. It is especially concerned about the effects of notes (c) and (d) of the draft instrument which relate to the transfer of elements of genetic material from specified pathogens to new hosts. In a letter written to the Secretary of State on 20 February the association stated: "““As currently worded, the content could be construed as suggesting that storage and use of the modified host organisms should be subject to high security measures even where the pathogenicity of the modified host is unaffected””." As a result it argues that, "““genetically modified organisms that have low or minimal pathogenicity and which would normally safely be handled in low containment facilities with no special security measures will now have to be subject to the high security standards required for high risk organisms which require containment in level 3 or, in some cases level 4 facilities””." The association believes that the consequential obligation to invest in higher levels of security by the enterprises concerned will prove extremely expensive. It concludes that this could deter legitimate and beneficial research into genetic modification in the United Kingdom. I know that it is the Government’s policy to deal with this very delicate but important balance in the form of guidance. I do not know what stage the drafting of this guidance has reached. I would be most grateful if the Minister could enlighten your Lordships as to what the proposed timeframe will be. I would also like the Minister to give your Lordships’ House some idea of who will be consulted in the drawing-up of this guidance. I know that he will appreciate the importance of making sure that commercial concerns are properly involved before any final decisions are reached.