---

Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2007

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their supportive interventions. Before I respond to the specific points that they raised, perhaps I may say a few other words in conclusion about the terrorism threat. As I think both noble Lords recognise, the terrorism threat is real, current and serious. As they both agreed, the events of the past few years have graphically demonstrated that. The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, referred to the sarin incident, which, as he said, was a truly chilling occurrence. It is essential that we do everything in our power to reduce the risk and maximise protection of our citizens. We do it in a variety of ways. Some are very visible, through changes in legislation. As we are discussing today, we are also increasing physical security in public and business places. Both noble Lords rightly drew attention to the need to get the balance right and to ensure that we do not unnecessarily overburden those who are involved in entirely legitimate business concerns. We have gone to considerable lengths to achieve that. The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, rightly raised questions about achieving that balance and some of the concerns about notes (c) and (d). We endeavour to ensure that organisms that require appropriate security are covered. The guidance will be produced to address the points that the noble Lord has made. We have been in extended discussions with the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, which was initially concerned, as the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, rightly said. Perhaps events have overtaken the concerns to which he referred, as I understand that it is now somewhat more content with the approach adopted. We have had some constructive discussions, and the issues of the potential impact on research relating to genetic modification have now been resolved to its satisfaction. I will endeavour to check that that continues to be the case. On how the list was arrived at, we consulted carefully with representatives from the Health and Safety Executive, the Health Protection Agency, the Ministry of Defence, Defra, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office and the Security Service. They met to consider which pathogens handled in UK facilities could have the potential to cause serious harm if used by a terrorist. That group is known as the Salisbury group, and we worked closely with it to ensure that we had the list right. We therefore consulted across the industry sector, and I can advise the House that while we have not yet produced guidance it is in an early stage of development. I make it clear today, and am putting it on the public record, that we undertake to work closely with the ABPI to produce guidance—we hope, by this autumn. I hope that answers the central point to the noble Lords’ satisfaction. This is an important duo of orders, which will enable us to get the balance about right on control and so on. If noble Lords wish to raise particular concerns with me about the two orders and their impact outside this short discussion, we will be more than happy to meet them again. In addition, I should say that we have consulted extensively in the scientific community. Meetings were constructed involving some 100 scientists, from all over the UK, with a view to getting comments on the contents of this and future lists. In drawing up this new list, information was also drawn from the US, Canada and other British sources—some directly from leading scientists working with particular agents. I understand that the scientific advisory committee on genetic modification was also consulted, so we did go some long way to cover all the bases. On Question, Motion agreed to.