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Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill [HL]

My Lords, I am happy to write to the noble and learned Lord in relation to those figures. We probably have the report in the Box, so by the time I sit down that figure may come, but I shall certainly write to the noble and learned Lord. In 2005, Canadian statistics that amended the previously released 2004 figures indicated that the updated figure for 2004 was that of 187 cases in which intercept evidence was adduced in criminal proceedings—not just terrorist proceedings—only three resulted in convictions. In 2005, there were 296 cases in which intercept evidence was adduced, but none resulted in conviction. Those figures are from the Annual Report on the use of Electronic Surveillance. In the United States of America in 2005, there were 1,710 law enforcement interceptions, which is almost exactly the same number as in the UK, despite America being many times bigger. They resulted in 776 convictions, which is a success rate of under 44 per cent. That is well below the success rate of more than 80 per cent estimated for the United Kingdom in an admittedly relatively small 2004 sampling exercise. Those US figures come from the annual wiretap reports made to Congress, so I assume they are accurate. However, the use of intercept in prosecution is happily not the only thing that matters. Intercept as an intelligence tool in the United Kingdom has delivered excellent results against terrorism and serious crime, including—crucially—prevention. Protecting life and safeguarding the security of this country must be any Government’s top priority. We have other strings to our bow. For instance, recently there has been additional investment in the police and the Security Service to increase the use of a wide range of investigative tools and in longer-term approaches to work with communities to counter radicalism and to isolate and challenge those espousing violence. Let me now spell out again why the proposals of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, provide none of the safeguards on which to base an evidential interception system. First, the cherry-picking effect of giving the prosecution alone the right to choose when to deploy evidential intercept is unlikely to be ECHR-compatible. The resulting legal challenge could undermine agencies’ ability to use intercept at all, whether for intelligence or evidential purposes. Secondly, the fact that there are no safeguards over the standard PII procedure for protecting sensitive material would jeopardise the close co-operation that currently exists between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and underpins the excellent results the current regime delivers. My noble friend Lady Ramsay alluded to that. Thirdly—