Skip to main content

Proceeding contribution from Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Labour) in the House of Lords on Friday, 16 March 2007. It occurred during Debate on bill on Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill [HL].


Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill [HL]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Maginnis, raises a very interesting point. I assure him that we will give it some attention, and I will write to him in due course about it. We were up to the third point—that proposals take no account of the huge changes now under way in communications technology. It makes no sense to change how our agencies operate until we understand fully what these changes mean for interception. The extent of the change is considerable. Voice over internet protocol creates some very sensitive capabilities and techniques; those have to be created to intercept these very sophisticated new forms. It is far more time-consuming, difficult and costly to do. The key feature of voice over internet protocol is the multiplicity of different ways of communicating through that medium. It is very good for the customer and the consumer, but bad for interception. We must not drive criminals into using ways of communicating which are less susceptible to interception and which therefore deprive us of an invaluable source of intelligence and jeopardise our fight against terrorism and very serious crime. No solution is proposed for the increased resource burden that would fall on the agencies in intercepting to an evidential standard, another point that was raised by my noble friend Lady Ramsay. This would limit the amount of interception that they could do and seriously impair their effectiveness. I might add that the Bill is also technically deficient: it incorrectly defines the ““communications data”” that they seek to use evidentially as a type already used as evidence. As such, we believe that the proposals are deficient: they are not thought through properly and they represent potentially very dangerous and very real threats to our ability to maintain our fight against serious crime and terrorism. I absolutely accept that, in drafting the Bill, the noble and learned Lord did not intend that this would be the final word. I do not suggest that it is simply a stalking horse; it is a way for us to debate these issues properly. We do not see that there is a basis on which we can change our current stance. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord was right to include my name among all the other names of those who believe that, if this could properly and safely be done, the Government’s position is that we would do it. I commend my noble friend Lord Desai for joining this august company. We do not feel that the current provisions are in any way deficient, but we welcome him. I dare say that we will have his support in due course. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, and, indeed, Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition will, on further reflection, consider that the words of Sir Swinton Thomas merit more than a little consideration and that the views expressed on this side of the House—and, indeed, on his side of the House by the noble Baroness, Lady Parks, with her usual wisdom—should prevail. I hope that he, with his party, will be able to see that this is not nonsense but profound good sense, which is keeping our country safe.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
690 c993-4 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Disclosure of information Admissibility of evidence Criminal proceedings Crime Electronic surveillance Evidence National security Public interest Terrorism Surveillance Telephone tapping Interception of Communications Commissioner Thomas, Swinton
Legislation
Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill (HL) 2006-07
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk