Proceeding contribution from Bernard Jenkin (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 23 May 2007. It occurred during Adjournment debate on Iran (External Involvement).
Iran (External Involvement)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) on securing this timely debate. It is extraordinary that the issue of Iran, its role in Iraq and the causes of that role have been so underreported. For the record, after I first visited Iraq as shadow Secretary of State for Defence, shortly after the invasion in 2003, one of the key issues that I raised with the then Secretary of State for Defence, both on and off the record, was the role that Iran was already evidently playing in Iraqi politics and in the violence in that country. The Government and the coalition as a whole have been asleep at the switch on the issue. They have completely failed to confront the problem, which has resulted in the loss of perhaps many more lives than we should have lost. The external involvement of Iran cannot be separated from its internal politics. I beg for a much deeper, more three-dimensional understanding of that amazing country, Iran. It was an extremely powerful and influential country, with its own empire. It has many diverse and proud traditions, and there is no reason why its strand of Islam should not be peacefully expressed, but Iran has suffered historic decline over the past 200 years. I am afraid that the western powers have played a shameful role in the decline and humiliation of Iran over the past century, not least through some duplicitous treaty-making by our country and the overthrow of the flowering of democracy in Iran in the early years of the cold war. It was the western powers that installed the corrupt regime of the Shah of Iran, which led directly to the Iranian revolution, which has led directly to the situation that we face today. Not only that, but when the Shah was overthrown, we tacitly supported Saddam, in the containment of what we regarded then as a hostile power. I am afraid that our record is deeply inconsistent and nothing to be proud of. We may find excuses for it, but we must recognise our failings in our engagement with Iran. It is hardly surprising that an irresponsible leadership in Iran can capitalise on the deep suspicions that many Iranian people feel about the role of the United States and the United Kingdom in their decline and misfortunes. Finally on that point, what interest does Iran have in stabilising Iraq, when it is in Iran’s national interest, as the Iranians perceive it, to keep the United Kingdom and the United States in particular bogged down, instead of targeting this other member of the axis of evil? I believe that the Iranian regime is indeed part of an axis of evil, but that is the regime, not the people. That relates to my second point, which is that we must understand the nature of Iran. As my hon. Friend pointed out, we are not dealing with the equivalent of Nazi Germany or with the monocultural police state that we overthrew in Iraq. We are dealing with a very much more diverse and relatively liberal society, where many strands of opinion are capable of being expressed and where there is even a semblance or pretence of democracy and elections. There are dissident movements operating in Iran with which we should be actively engaged, although I shall not revisit the PMOI/MEK issue, which is a subject for a whole debate. Our inconsistency in dealing with those questions underlines the immaturity of our policy and discussion. Ahmadinejad is not just a deranged madman in charge of a whole country; he is part of a machinery. The religious leaders in Iran may not even have intended him to win his election, but it is important to see him as part of a machinery, rather than a rogue leader operating on his own. To underline that point, look at the sophistication with which the Iranian regime plays the international media and the way in which the British hostages were paraded in front of the cameras and encouraged to thank their captor for his munificence. Look at the timing of that operation, which skilfully removed from the public agenda the issue of UN sanctions, which should have preoccupied us over that period. That operation paralysed the international campaign of sanctions, stole a victory in the United Nations from the west and gave an unparalleled propaganda victory to Ahmadinejad and his regime at such a crucial moment. As my hon. Friend pointed out, Prince Harry’s deployment has unfortunately turned into another such debacle. I fail to understand why Ministers did not realise that the deployment a member of the royal family was fundamentally a political issue. How they could ever have understood it to be merely a military decision beats me. The episode demonstrates that the Government have no understanding of the complexity and breadth of the campaign that they have to fight against Ahmadinejad’s regime. That campaign has to be fought on every front. We are not just fighting a diplomatic battle, a counter-insurgency battle or a military battle in Iraq and Afghanistan; we are fighting a propaganda war. We are fighting for the hearts and minds of the Arab street, but at every turn we deliver Ahmadinejad and his regime the propaganda victory that he needs to be seen as the champion of the Islamic world against the perfidy of the western powers. To underline that point, we need to acknowledge the failure of current diplomatic efforts. There was a period when the EU3 was given its head by the Americans to take the soft power approach towards Iran, as opposed to having the United States holding the big stick. However, neither the soft power approach nor the big stick can possibly work separately. The idea that the European powers could be Mr. Nice Guy or do a good cop, bad cop routine against a country as sophisticated as Iran was always moonshine. We must have a seamless policy with the US and the EU, involving all the other senior powers in the United Nations. We have been moving towards that, but my goodness it has been slow, because we are not treating the issue as the top international issue that it should be seen as. Even the outcome in Iraq is now of secondary importance to the outcomes that we face in Iran. To conclude, Iran is the test case. If weapons proliferation succeeds in Iran, there will be a domino effect throughout the entire middle east. Every Gulf state will say, ““Well, I will need one, too.”” Already we know that Israel has nuclear weapons. The Gulf states are prepared to tolerate that, but they will not be prepared to tolerate a rogue regime in Iran possessing nuclear weapons, while they remain defenceless. Furthermore, if we cannot confront this terrorism-exporting regime as forcefully as we did Iraq, we are inviting Hezbollah to become active in Europe and the west, in the same way that al-Qaeda is already. My hon. Friend referred to the possible identity of interests between al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. We have already seen how incredibly effective and sophisticated Hezbollah has been in Lebanon. It is not widely known, but Hezbollah used unmanned aerial vehicles in its war against Israeli forces in Lebanon. We are dealing not with unsophisticated, ill-educated people but with serious forces. To succeed in our diplomacy in Iran, not least in order to deal with the externalities, we must change the emphasis of our rhetoric. First, we must elevate the issue in our domestic politics and in European and American politics, so that people begin to understand its urgency. Secondly, we must emphasise our good intentions toward the people of Iran. We must talk about the shameful human rights record of the Iranian regime—I do not have time to elaborate on it now, but it is a subject that will connect with the vast majority of Iranians. As Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher raised the issue of the Soviet Union’s human rights record in the 1980s to undermine support for that regime, we must do the same with regard to Iran. It will legitimise our campaign to contain Iran’s terrorist activities and encourage Iran to expose its weapons development programmes. There is no doubt that Iran seeks to obtain a weapons programme, but I emphasise again that a change of rhetoric might be helpful. We should acknowledge that if Iran wants an enrichment programme, albeit at utterly ludicrous expense to itself—if it really wants a domestic power generation programme with uranium enrichment on its own soil—we do not object in principle so long as it complies with the non-proliferation treaty to which it remains a signatory and accepts the comprehensive verification and surveillance necessary. It is demonstrably necessary, as the regime has clearly lied and lied and concealed and concealed what it is doing. I commend to the Government the statement made earlier this week by my right hon. Friends the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Foreign Secretary. They laid out a seriously thought out, comprehensive approach that the Government should be willing to adopt. I find it distressing that the Minister has sat through this debate without taking a single note; I fear that he will read out a text prepared for him by his officials. I hope that he will engage with the points raised, and that he will press his colleagues in Government to hold a full day’s debate on Iran. We have held full-day debates on Iraq, and it is time that we had one on Iran. Otherwise, we cannot demonstrate that our Government are treating the matter seriously enough.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 460 c438-41WH
- Session
- 2006-07
- Chamber / Committee
- Westminster Hall
- Subjects
- Armed forces Armed conflict Arms trade Iraq Foreign relations Terrorism Weapons Afghanistan Iran
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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