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Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Teams

asked Her Majesty’s Government what progress has been made by provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I am delighted that this debate is taking place and even more delighted that it will be the occasion for the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Malloch-Brown. Provincial reconstruction teams were set up in the aftermath of the US-led liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban in 2001.The idea was to bring stability and reconstruction to Afghanistan and the PRTs seemed an ideal model in the context of post civil-war Afghanistan. The first PRTs were operational by early 2003, each one consisting of about 60 to 100 soldiers plus, over time, Afghan advisers and representatives from various development agencies. The mix was a good one as was the intention of dealing with counterterrorism, security assistance, peace operations as well as training civil administrators and promoting the rule of law and economic development. PRTs were a good thing in principle but sadly part of an overall flawed strategy for Afghanistan at that time. It was mistakenly believed that having liberated Afghanistan, peace building and reconstruction would be a relatively simple matter. And there was too a degree of naivety about the incentives for local warlords to abandon their power bases and adopt government rule. Afghanistan, as many noble Lords will know, is not a unified country, which is something of an understatement. Its topography and political history have combined to make it a decentralised nation with factions between ethnic and language groups, divisions between rural and more urbanised areas, and physical separations due to mountain ranges and the paucity of transport communications. In the post-Taliban world, the international community's aim has been to democratise, unify and develop the nation. In some sense the PRTs were a mechanism to achieve security cheaply, but there were too few of them and too little oversight and co-ordination. It was perhaps significant that the PRTs were dreamt up at the same time as frantic preparations were taking place for the war in Iraq. It has to be acknowledged from long experience that the rule of law and good governance are always but always the key factors in bringing about stability. As one colleague has pointed out, personal violence affects an individual far more than does a broken bridge. The PRTs were simply not geared to undertake this fundamental task and the lawlessness that prevailed needed and still needs a strong and widespread military presence. Despite these structural flaws several PRTs from many nations began work and three basic objectives began to emerge: enhancing security, strengthening the reach of the Government in Kabul and facilitating reconstruction. In following these objectives confusion inevitably arose between the military and civilian components of the PRTs and their work and they were frequently criticised by NGOs; the latter believing that the PRTs had introduced unsustainable projects that lacked community input and the crucial ingredient of capacity building. The savage toll that fighting is taking in the south of the country should not obscure the real advances that have occurred in other parts, particularly in the north, due in part to some of the PRT inputs. However, there are questions which should be asked about any continuous military presence outside the battle arena including: what is the mandate or changing mandate of the PRTs; how do they implement their mandate; how well do they do it; and above all are they meeting local needs and making a difference? Measuring impact, as we all know, is not an easy task but progress requires knowing what works and why. Current conditions for most people in Afghanistan are of the greatest concern—poverty is deep and widespread, insecurity is growing, the level of violence in the country is at its highest since 2001 and progress on reconstruction is slow and fragile. Above all, most commentators now remark on the lack of public confidence in the central government and the belief that it can guarantee people’s safety. Lawlessness prevails in far too many provinces, and corruption and intimidation are rampant. People witness the large foreign military presence, the billions of dollars of aid pouring in—it was recently estimated that between 2005 and 2007, the US provided almost $10 billion of aid—and at the same time people experience insecurity, continuing poverty, especially in rural areas, and the lack of progress in building both physical infrastructure and the institutions of democracy. Lack of capacity is still seen as one of the biggest constraints and it is one of the peculiarities of aid that those regions that have achieved a degree of stability and have few narcotics receive less development assistance. Despite all that, Afghanistan is increasingly seen by the outside world as a security rather than a development challenge. Priority needs in the next few years have been drawn up and largely agreed by a consortium of some 25 development agencies which have been working in Afghanistan for some decades. They can be summarised as follows: the provision of basic services in areas beyond the reach of the central government; building the capacity of local and central government to provide such services in the long term; holding the Afghan Government and donor agencies to account on the reconstruction process; and promoting human rights and democratic governance. Traditionally these activities are carried out by NGOs working with local civil society organisations. The NGO community believes very firmly that there should be a clear separation between military and civilian activities and that to continue with present arrangements will compromise the space for effective civilian-led reconstruction. More specific criticisms concern the potential security risks to the local populations of any confusion between military and civilian operations, such as the military taking it upon themselves to dress in civilian clothes and use NGO resources including vehicles, office equipment and premises without permission. Equally, the NGOs wish to be clearly distinguished from the PRTs, which may bomb a village one day then ask to build a school in the same village the next day. The PRTs, on the other hand, should have as their primary focus the promotion of peace and the provision of human security for the Afghan population, through, for example, training a democratically accountable national army and police force. The NGO consortium believes strongly that official development assistance should not be used to fund PRTs or military objectives such as force protection, intelligence gathering or hearts and minds operations. Furthermore, the NGO community working in Afghanistan is critical of the PRT strategies of building relationships with local power-holders due to the potentially deleterious consequences: in the absence of adequate regulation, such relationships can reinforce inter-group conflict, the war economy and corruption. I do not necessarily subscribe to the civilian/military division, particularly since each PRT tends to work in different ways and contexts, but a reassessment of roles would, to say the least, be helpful. Closer collaboration between the military and civilian sectors, not just in the field but in the recruitment and training of PRTs, might be a better model for the future. What impact have the PRTs had and how it is to be measured? One suggestion, serious at the time, was that success could be measured by the number of smiling Afghan children in a given village. However, given their agreed objectives, the degree of stability in a region must feature as a main indicator of success, as must the spread of the rule of law and good governance. The security failures, the fragility of local and regional peace keeping forces, the growth of corruption and the too-slow by far extension of government authority to rural provinces, are inescapable facts and suggest that PRTs should be greatly increased and/or their functions redefined to meet current conditions. For example, why not have a co-ordinated focus on communications infrastructure? Another commentator has pointed out that it should not be beyond the co-ordinating authorities in Kabul to be able to analyse cause and effect; has reconstruction such as clinic building resulted in a reduction in rocket attacks, for example, or, what activities have had the greatest local impact, measured, for instance, by better co-operation with local power structures? At the same time, the agreement that all or the majority of donor assistance must be channelled via the central government, while crucial for bolstering government authority has to be modified in the light of the serious gaps in government capacity at all levels and the growth of corruption. The NGO community has an absolutely vital role to play in outreach and fostering ownership and should be fully supported in carrying out that role. Almost six years after the defeat of the Taliban Government and some four years after the institution of PRTs, their multinational and multifunctional roles as well as the insecure environments in which they work should prompt a reassessment of where and how they can be most successful in significantly extending stability and the climate for reconstruction.