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Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Teams

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady D'Souza on initiating this very important debate, which raises more questions than I fear it will answer. Civilians are the biggest casualties of conflict and, of course, Afghanistan is no exception. To date, the Afghanistan compact and its international partners agreed to work on the following key areas; security, governance, rule, law, humanity and economic and social development. The task is a great one and the main concern when responding to a country that is in need of reconstruction should always lie with the people who are affected by the aftermath of such destructive conflicts. Why is the amount of money promised per head for Afghanistan lower than for other recent post-war countries? Too little is being done to increase the capacity of the Afghan Government to be able to run things efficiently themselves. Findings from groups such as the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and Care International highlight immediate problems that are blocking the way for the necessary and important progress which needs to be made in order for Afghanistan to be able to begin the reconstruction process at a sustainable level. The distinction between military aid and aid provided by NGOs is blurred and is resulting in a loss of lives of aid workers. Since 2003, it is reported that 89 of these workers have been killed and since 2001 the ordinary levels of violence have risen, due to the mistrust civilians hold for the military and for any aid work carried out by bodies such as NATO. The propaganda that has been filtered to the civilian population about the UK and USA has made them adverse to intervention and the reason some NGOs have been successful to date is that they have built good and trusting relationships within the communities that they serve. The NGOs understand the need to build capacity within the Afghan Government, where UK aid policy is too state centred and is not effective in fulfilling the hearts and minds strategy, as local people have little understanding and trust for this type of commitment to be met at this level. Hearts and minds attempts at restoring and reconstructing a nation can be met only when the local people of Afghanistan have a level of self-empowerment and involvement in the actions taken to achieve such goals. The lines between the military and civilian actors must cease to be blurred, and the suggestion of promoting effective dialogue between military and civilian actors should be put into effect where it is clear that reconstruction will be led by local civilian agencies and military intervention will always be a last resort. In hostile environments, it is imperative that agencies are clear about who is doing what and that the local people are clear about this information if there is to be any chance of building up trust. Without trust at ground level, Afghanistan will remain in a state of chaos and confusion, and the lives of aid workers will continue to be placed at high levels of risk. The Government, alongside the Afghan Government, should aim to achieve stability by increasing civilian leadership to provide a clear context of understanding and increased engagement with local power holders and the communities. It is vital that the British Government respond to the needs of the Afghan people and not use funds as they see fit without this type of consultation. The suggestion of an independent evaluation is welcome as this would ensure that local concerns are addressed. As an example of the Government's response to a perceived need in Afghanistan, I highlight the opium trade. The women of Afghanistan are still in danger whether they are in high-level politics or young girls risking their lives to become equal citizens by educating themselves and raising human rights issues with their peers. It has been reported that several high-powered women politicians have come under the threat of suicide bombers. It is admirable that women should be recognised under the country’s constitution, but at the same time we are told that the state cannot protect them. Instead of bringing international officials in on short-term contracts, we need to channel money through the Afghan Government.