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Defence Policy

I am sure that the whole House will join me in expressing condolences to the family and friends of Lance-Corporal Sarah Holmes of 29th Regiment Royal Logistics Corps, who died in support of operations in Iraq. I welcome this debate on defence policy. I particularly welcome the opportunity to focus on the strategic direction for our armed forces, which is all too often overlooked in the understandable focus on day-to-day issues. The UK’s defence policy was laid out in the strategic defence review of 1998 and re-confirmed in our White Paper in 2003. The vision is"““to defend the UK and its interests, including against terrorism, strengthen international peace and stability, and act as a force for good in the world””." That vision defines the role of our armed forces in the world. It requires us to have forces capable of acting across the full spectrum of military activity, from conflict prevention to war fighting. It requires us to work effectively across Whitehall with other Departments—notably the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development—and with our allies and partners around the world. We could not deliver that vision without the men and women of our armed forces. Last Friday, I was reminded of all those who have lost their lives in the service of this country since world war two. The dedication of those involved with the armed forces memorial in Staffordshire is an appropriate and timely reminder of the debt that this nation and others owe to the men and women of our forces. As we debate our defence policy, it is important to remind ourselves of the challenges that we are likely to face in the future: international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, fragile states and intransigent regimes. Of course, other pressures will complicate our response to such challenges: climate change, energy security, pressure on natural resources and social, technological and geopolitical change. The UK has a significant part to play in improving the international community’s preparedness for such challenges, not least through our armed forces. Our foreign and defence policies decide where, how and with whom we are likely to deploy our armed forces. The judgment made in the SDR in 1998 was that we were likely to deploy alongside allies and partners, and that has been validated by recent operations. That will continue to be the policy for the foreseeable future for any medium or large-scale military operation. The House has questioned Defence Ministers regularly and appropriately in recent months about tour intervals and harmony guidelines, so it is worth my taking some time to explain that important part of our defence policy. We have planned on the basis that we should have armed forces capable of conducting one enduring medium-scale operation and one enduring small-scale operation at the same time, while retaining the capacity to conduct a third small-scale operation for a limited period—all while keeping within harmony guidelines, which, for the Army, are to have 24 months between six-month operational deployments. Having such a force structure also enables us to conduct a large-scale operation, such as that in Iraq in 2003, or a second medium-scale operation, such as that in Afghanistan, for limited periods, albeit with the consequence that those ideal tour intervals will not be achieved. That is the position that we have been in for the past few years. I am pleased to say, however, that conditions in Northern Ireland mean that the Army no longer has to maintain forces dedicated to assisting the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Conditions on the ground in Bosnia have also allowed us to reduce our presence there and, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced to the House last week, we plan to reduce our forces in Iraq by the spring of 2008. Those reduced commitments go some way towards allowing our servicemen and women the time at home that they need to recuperate and to see their families. The overriding lesson has been that our defence planning assumptions and our force structure have succeeded in generating the sort of capabilities that we need to deploy. But that is not the whole story, as many right hon. and hon. Members know. Emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and the need to respond to a rapidly evolving threat, present commanders with new opportunities and new constraints. We need to match that with the necessary force structure—involving additional UAV units and battlefield helicopters, for example—but perhaps balanced by fewer anti-submarine warfare assets. We keep our force structure under regular review, with an eye to what we need to protect our interests both nationally and in the multilateral context in which we are most likely to deploy. The outcome of the comprehensive spending review allows us to do just that. It provides 1.5 per cent. annual real-terms growth in the defence budget to 2010-11, thus cementing a decade of real growth. By 2011, the defence budget will be more than 10 per cent. higher in real terms than in 1997-98.