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Defence Policy

When I was a junior doctor, I learned never to argue at all with nurses and I entirely accept my hon. Friend’s point. When it comes to reconstruction in Afghanistan, we cannot emphasise enough the importance of including local Afghans in our reconstruction efforts. The more they participate, the more they take ownership and pride in rebuilding their country, which is shattered after years of warfare. A local villager no doubt views an attack by the Taliban on a school that he helped to build very differently than he would if that school had been exclusively built by western forces. However, reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have to produce quick and tangible results for the people. Smaller projects that benefit a wider population in a shorter amount of time can have a more enduring effect than longer drawn-out projects that may indirectly benefit a large proportion of the population. In effect, the simple physiological needs of the Afghans have to be met by the international security assistance force or else the Taliban will fill the vacuum created by our inaction. That is especially true during the winter months when times get rough for many ordinary Afghans. Something as basic as food and water has to be provided before more ambitious projects can be launched. I echo what I believe the Secretary of State said earlier: we need broadly to learn the lesson from Iraq that the military can create and hold space only for so long. The politicians and the non-governmental organisations need to fill that space. We cannot wait for a zero-risk environment to begin wholesale reconstruction. We must also deal with the rising internal tensions in Afghanistan resulting from what is seen as the endemic corruption within the Afghan Government, running all the way to the highest levels. The whole country will welcome the fact that more of our troops are coming home from Iraq and no one will be more relieved than the families of the troops concerned. We in this party have never called for precipitate reductions or a timetable for withdrawal. We have to do what we believe to be right on the basis of the advice of our commanders on the ground. On that, we have always stood with the Government. In Iraq our overriding objectives should be to maximise the success of the mission that we set out to accomplish and to minimise the danger to our troops. There are still a number of questions that need to be asked and answered. There are the ongoing questions about the safety of the British forces remaining in Iraq, particularly at Basra air station, the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, the protection of the Iraqi-run border and the steps towards a political settlement, both internally and regionally. The Secretary of State dealt with some of those questions in his speech. There remains one crucial question, however, that we need to ask today: now that our military forces are in an overwatch posture, can the Secretary of State or his Minister of State say under what circumstances they believe British troops would redeploy and intervene while conducting that role? Who would determine those criteria and who would take the decision? Would it be taken by the British Government and military alone or would it be a joint decision between Britain and Iraq? That is a very important question to which the Government have never provided a very clear answer, even though it lies at the heart of the entire overwatch question. Some Members still seem to want a rapid and complete withdrawal from Iraq. In southern Iraq, a premature withdrawal—one without sustainable security architecture—could easily result in the escalation of the armed power struggle between the rival Shi’a militias. That would be likely to draw in the fledgling security structures. There would be the risk of further political destabilisation and a heightened threat to the Sunni population in south-east Iraq. A timetable that was set out would also provide perverse incentives. It is particularly important that the Liberal Democrats start to justify exactly why they would be willing to take the risks of a timetable that is set out with the clarity that they seem to want. Afghanistan would also feel the chill wind of prematurely departing British troops, as known Iraqi fighters would be immediately given the signal to move their caravan on to Afghanistan if they chose to do so, believing that they had accomplished their goal of defeating the coalition forces in Iraq. It would be a terrible signal to send to the Taliban that violence could succeed in hastening the departure of coalition armed forces, and the last thing that we want to do is to further them in that belief and aim.