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Defence Policy

The Secretary of State is better placed to answer that than I am, but the experience so far is that we have had a successful handover to civilian authorities in Iraq, and the advice of our commanders has obviously been that they believe that, militarily, it was the appropriate time to do so. The fact that the level of violence has been containable and comparable with, if not lower than, that before the handover is testament to the correctness of that decision. It is very difficult to conceive of either the military or public opinion tolerating any increased deployment to Iraq, not least because of the overstretch in our forces, but it is fair for us to know under what circumstances we might redeploy the force that is there on overwatch and in what circumstances. That is reasonable, but the Minister might want to deal with that during his winding-up speech; I am sure that the House would like greater clarity on the issue. The incremental approach must be right, as long as we are getting progress in Iraq and can guarantee sufficient numbers for force protection. It is perfectly reasonable for the House to demand that of the Government. We briefly mentioned Iran earlier. The whole House will be extremely concerned that it is now becoming clear that factory-grade and other weapons are increasingly going from Iran into both Iraq and Afghanistan. Those weapons include roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades capable of piercing armoured vehicles and killing our troops. Elements of the Iranian regime are therefore involved, and must understand that they are involved, in the attacking and killing of international forces that are upholding UN mandates. We need assurances from the Government that the Iraqi border in Iraq is sufficiently patrolled by coalition and Iraqi forces to minimise the risk of such weapons being used against our forces. On the Iranian regime’s interference in Afghanistan, it has been reported that officers of the Iranian revolutionary guard are supplying weaponry to Taliban insurgents, reportedly including sophisticated SA-7 Strella anti-aircraft missiles—a serious threat to our helicopters. I would like the Minister of State to deal with that specific issue in his winding-up speech. The real strategic question is whether Iran should be allowed to become a nuclear weapon state. I suggest to the House that there are three reasons why Iran should not be allowed to do so. The first is the nature of the regime itself. It has already been shown to be involved in destabilising Iraq and it is almost certainly involved in providing weapons to Afghanistan. We have heard the rhetoric from the leadership of the regime and we know what that could mean for the wider region. Secondly, if Iran is allowed to become a nuclear weapon state, other countries will want to follow. We would be likely to see nuclear proliferation, which might affect Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other countries in the region, creating a destabilising, expensive and pointless nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most dangerous regions. Thirdly, we know, as the Secretary of State mentioned, that Iran has been more than capable of carrying out terrorism by proxy. What that could mean in terms of terrorist blackmail from a nuclear armed state is something that none of us would want to imagine.